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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of paper.
This paper is an attempt to compare the relative effectiveness of various
naval weapons used during World War II. This paper is not a definitive history
of naval actions during the Second World War; it analyzes the weapons and their
effect on the control of the sea. Since limitations and strengths of the weap-
ons employed are important, they have been studied in great detail. Also while
attempting to understand the most effective weapon, attention has been given to
the proper method of employing the different weapons. One of the problems of
this paper is that it has been structured narrowly on the types of weapons used.
This causes difficulties when a correlation of the dual effectiveness of weapons
is analyzed. For example, the striking of a mine in the English Channel caused
Gneisenau to remain in port for repairs, where she was destroyed by an aerial
bomb.
For a large part of this paper a statistical method of study has been under-
taken in order to derive some significant and meaningful relationships. While
in several cases this type of study presents serious difficulties, and does not
completely eliminate historical judgments, it provides a realistic and firm
foundation on which some interesting correlations have been built. It is hoped
this method will be further employed in attempts to eliminate certain myths about
naval, and perhaps, all other military weapons.
Throughout this paper only the Atlantic Theater has been studied. This
has been done because of limitations of space. Also, in order to better understand
how the \>reapons were viewed during the periods beforo and during the war, short
segments on naval theory have been included with each chapter. VJhile theso
studies are not complete the limitations -of space required in a Master ! s Thesis
have not allowed for greater detail.
2. Ideas and theories of naval warfare.
In order to provide a general framework for the study of naval theories a
short segment has been included in this introductory chapter. Whereas each of
the following chapters have sections on the naval theory dealing with that par-
ticular weapon, this study is more general and describes the views on naval war-
fare as a whole.
In the most general sense the arguments between naval writers divided on
one question. This question was first brought out before World War I. One of
the leading naval theoreticians of the time, Alfred Thayer Kahan, suggested su-
premacy of one nation over another was caused by sea power. Mahan insisted that
certain national characteristics shaped the superiority of one nation 1 s military
supremacy on the sea. One of the primary ingredients of sea power was the battle
fleet. Mahan's conclusions led to, or at least supported, the rapid construction
of large battle fleets by Germany and Britain. Mahan 1 s interpretations of sea
power influenced the construction of large warships which became increasingly
powerful during the period before World War I. A number of technological im-
provements made such increases in size and power possible. The very least that
can be said of Mahan was that his theories and doctrines supported the naval race
that had such disastrous consequences for both Germany and England.
Despite the acceptance of Mahan 1 s theories in England and the United States,
and to a lesser extent in Germany, a rival school of naval thought arose on the
continent. This school of guerre de course , commonly known by its French name
Jeune Ecolo
, found its leader in Admiral Theophile Aubo. The young school be-
lieved that the greatest possibilities of controlling the sea lay in commerce
destruction and protection of the coastline. With the development of high speed
torpedo boats in the 1880 's the doctrines of the young school received a great
deal of impetus. The whole argument of the Jeune Ecole became directed to the
abilities of small craft to attack the more powerful units of a superior fleet.
It was Theodore Ropp f s contention that the Jeune Ecole was right but fifty or
sixty years too early.
It was not difficult to understand how these two schools came into being.
Mahan was writing an answer to the young school in his emphasis that commerce
attacks were never successful in defeating a maritime power. Kahan felt that
throughout history it had been battle fleets which had decided the course of
naval operations. The Jeune Ecole , which was primarily a French theory, attempted
to find a method to counteract the superior naval force of Great Britain. Also,
the French recognized that if the next war with Germany was like the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870, naval power would have veiy little influence. Therefore
what the French needed was a cheap, but successful method of defending their
coastlines and destroying any blockading force England might attempt to use.
The emphasis on attacking commerce presented England with some serious problems,
and during the last war achieved some remarkable successes. The Jeune Ecole
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faded out because of the failure to recognize the possibilities of the submarine.
Nevertheless, the development of ideas of small naval weapons was primarily their
contribution to naval theoiy.
E. M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli
to Hitler
,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1S&3) » P. ^7.
2Ibid
.
,
p. 1*53.
Given the division of emphasis on the size of weapons it was possible to
study some of the controversies during the period between the wars. The First
World War seemed to prove to many writers the extreme vulnerability of battle-
ships. This was caused partially because of the failure to develop new theories
to meet the changed situation. Mahan was accepted in Germany and England up un-
til the 191^ War with little question. The major naval battle of World War I,
Jutland (May 31-1 June, 193.6), was practically the ideal type of battle which,
according to Mahan, could gain command of the sea. In this battle the German
fleet was unable either to reach the Atlantic or defeat a large enough portion
of the British fleet to gain superiority. The British at Jutland suffered heavier
losses and while able to keep the German fleet in the North Sea, were unable to
destroy it. Jutland seemed to show that armament had surpassed armor and naval
leaders began to wonder about the future possibilities of battleships. The
British fleet on the evening of May 31 » 1916, had witnessed the rapid destruction
of three of their newest battle-cruisers by major caliber shells. Various writers
on naval tactics noticed that no matter how powerful a battleship was built an
opponent could always build one more powerful. This belief while seemingly an
answer to battleships 1 vulnerability was nothing of the sort. Throughout recent
history one capital ship has been able to destroy another and this lias been their
prime usefulness. It was more important to discover if the battleship could be
destroyed easier by another type of weapon.
There were serious doubts during the period between the wars whether the
battleship could accept punishment from other means of attack. Certain advocates
of airpower felt that whenever the battleship came under the cover of an opponent's
air force, it would be easily destroyed. Probably the most famous of these au-
thors was the American general, Billy Mitchell. His belief in the destructibility
of battleships was based primarily on a number of tests conducted after V.'orld
War I. Battleships which had been anchored and were taking no defensive action
were attacked by bombing aircraft and sunk. These tests, which did not accurately
depict the method of destroying a battleship, were used as the basis for an argu-
ment against battleships. Several naval officers were led to agree with Mitchell's
view. Sir Percy Scott, who had been the father of modern naval gunnery, joined
forces with the advocates of air power and expressed his view that battleships
were useless. While aircraft were very powerful weapons, it seems that 1920 was
too early to fruitfully predict their usefulness in war. A number of operations
during the Second World War showed the power of aircraft but some actions showed
that the traditional battleship was still useful.
Added to the question of the vulnerability of the battleship because of air-
craft i*as the question of their value in the day of strategic air attack. Several
leading theoreticians, both naval and military, predicted that the navy in general,
and the battleship in particular, were no longer useful. Some writers were pre-
dicting that countries would be destroyed in the first few attacks by aircraft
before the navy could exert its influence. While admittedly such military leaders
as Lord Trenchard felt that it would be a long while before the airforce could
deliver a crushing attack others, such as Fuller, were predicting just such an
event.
In both of these predictions concerning air power it seemed to be a return
to the beliefs of the Jeune Ecole . A smaller and less expensive weapon would be
Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime, 1918-1939 t (Hamden, Connecticut:
Archon Books, 1962), p. 113-4-
.
2Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939
.
(New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. c^T See for the
threat of strategic bombardment ELenor Eddy "Britain and the Fear of Aerial
Bombardment, 1935-1939," Aerospace Historian , Vol. XIII, no. ^, Winter, 1966,
p. 177-184.
able to destroy or neutralize the power of a superior naval force. This emphasis
on aircraft limited the scope of the thinking to solely this means of attack.
The naval limitation treaties seemod to give a just basis for the judgment
on the distrust of battleships. The first of these conferences limited the con-
struction of ships to 10,000 tons and mounting guns to no larger than 8-inches.
Since the Washington Naval Treaty applied only to capital ships it was necessary
to call a later conference at London in 1930 to further restrict the naval building
programs of various nations. The success of these naval limitation treaties were
limited by each participant's desires. Also, they attempted to limit armaments
without first settling political questions.
Adding to the problems of the navy was a misconception by the naval powers
as to the nature of the next war. Britain seemed to have expected the support
of France during the next European war. It was hoped that with the support of
France any possible enemy in Europe could have been contained and perhaps defeated.
Since France suddenly collapsed nearly the whole of continental Europe fell into
Germany's hands. This sudden failure of France rearranged Germany's strategical
situation and made it extremely difficult for British forces to actually come in
contact with a significant portion of the German Army. Until the invasion of
Russia there was no continental opponent which could combat the German armies.
German leaders on the other hand expected the war to be short. After the
Fall of France, Hitler seemed, to have expected Britain either to surrender or
at least come to a settlement. While perhaps Germany had logic on its side they
misinterpreted England's determination to continue the struggle. Because Hitler
had predicted that the war would be short they had spent little effort on the
construction of a navy. When the war started in 1939 the German U-boat arm was
•^-Raymond O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: United States and the London Naval
Conference
.
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1962), p. 11.
equal in number to the British submarine force, but Germany 1 s surface fleet could
not seriously challenge the Royal Kavy. Had a large number of submarines been
available at the first of the war Germany might have been able to defeat England
before they had time to develop sufficient countermeasures.
The naval leaders in Britain scorned to be only concerned with the easier
problems of naval development during the period between the wars. Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond^ concern was not the German submarines but the surface craft.
He proposed the development of a large number of small cruisers to protect the
shipping lanes. Such a plan ignored two of the major weapons of the small German
naval arsenal. The first of these was the pocket-battleship. Richmond's cruisers
would have been easily destroyed by the superior armament of the radically new
German warships. Totally ignored were submarines and their ability to destroy
commerce. The ignoring of such weapons of naval warfare had serious consequences
later in the Second World War.
The errors of naval thinking during the period between the wars had a great
deal to do with the failures during the war. It was not until 1S&3 that the
Allies began to achieve a large measure of success against the German submarine
campaign. If the correct preparation had been available before the war such a
situation might have arrived at the very beginning. So far through this discussion
several weapons have been ignored. These weapons were in large part ignored by
naval, theoreticians during the period between the wars. Among these weapons were
mines. In the index to the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution there
were only six articles mentioning mines. Such a lack of study and misapplication
of theories of naval warfare had very important effects during the course of the
Second World War.
Robin Higham (ed.), A Consolidated Author and Subject Index to the Journal
of the Royal United Service Institute
,
(Ann Harbor Michigan: University Micro—
films, Inc., 19&0
, p. 301.
8Map 1-1 Atlantic Theater
The area bordered by the dark line indicates the rogions studied by this
paper.
North America
Arctic
North Atlantic
-.
South Atlantic
The Lincoln Library of • Essential Information, Buffalo, New York:
The Frontier Press Comp. , 1966, p. 656 C.
3. Definition of terns.
As already mentioned this paper only covers the Atlantic Theater. The
Atlantic Theater lias been defined as that area of the world's oceans that lies
between the eastern shores of North and South America and the western shores of
Europe and Africa. The included areas are: North and South Atlantic, Mediter-
ranean Sea, Baltic Sea, Earents Sea, White Sea, North Sea, Irish Sea, Gulf of
Mexico, Caribbean Sea, large rivers, and finally ports which were available for
ocean going vessels. For an easier description see map 1-1 which has been re-
produced on the preceding page.
Shallow vatQT was that part of the ocean that lay in areas where the water
was less than 100 fathoms or 600 feet deep. Also, the tern shallow water has
been expanded to mean that part of the ocean that was within forty miles of a
major land mass. Major land mass in this sense meant one large enough to support
either an air base or a harbor which could take oceangoing ships. The tern
"shallow water" is often interchangeable with "narrow seas." Narrow seas usually
referred to areas of operation where small boats, such as E-boats, worked and
was usually close to shore. In practically all cases the different terns referred
to the same area, but in those cases where they differ, special mention has been
made.
In this paper tonnage, which was not easy to determine, was limited to two
different typos; gross tonnage and displacement. Merchant ships used gross tonnage
which was one hundred cubic feet of permanently enclosed space per ton. Gross
tonnage has nothing whatsoever to do with weight. Warships used displacement ton-
nage which was the actual weight of the water displaced by the vessel. Small
E. C. Talbot-Booth , Merchant Ships
,
(London: The Journal of Commerce and
Shipping Telegraph, 1959), p. 14.
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vessels throughout this paper mean those ships under 1,600 tons. This only
applied to merchant vessels because many powerful warships, notably escorts and
submarines, displaced less than 1,600 tons.
Throughout the years the definition of warships has changed and it is best
to describe the characteristics of those that have changed the most noticeably.
Perhaps one of the most confusing terms was battle-cruiser. This was a vessel
of nearly the same size as a battleship but with lighter armor and higher speed.
In some accounts the German ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were described as
battle-cruisers and in others were called battleships. Part of the confusion
arose because of the increased speed of battleships during the war. During the
First World War battleships seldom exceeded twenty-five knots. During the Second
World War it was not uncommon to find thirty knot battleships. Warships in order
of decreasing size were: battleships, battle-cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, corvettes, sloops, and torpedo-boats.
Destroyers have undergone great changes in both purpose and size during the
eighty years of their existence. Originally torpedo-boat destroyers, their first
function was to protect the fleet from torpedo craft. This function has remained,
but the torpedo craft has changed. No longer was the primary threat a torpedo-
boat but a submarine. During the Second World War destroyers according to class
were about 1,500 to 2,200 tons. Frigates, sloops and corvettes were somewhat
smaller. Nowadays Mitschner class frigates displace ^,730 tons and the destroyer
as a type has practically disappeared.
Aircraft have been arbitrarily divided into five classes: (l) heavy bombers,
(2) medium bombers, (3) fighter-bombers, (k) fighters and (5) flying boats or
seaplanes. Heavy bombers were four-engined and carried heavy loads for long
distances. Medium bombers were usually two-engined and carried lighter loads
11
for shorter distances, but at higher speeds than heavy bonbers. Fighter-bombers
were usually single-cngined and served the dual role of air defense and bombing -
attacks. Included in fighter-bombers were dive-bombers which, while seldom use-
ful for air defense were extremely accurate in delivering bombs. Fighters were
fast single or double-engined aircraft which did not carry bombs but were used
for air defense. Finally, seaplanes because of their size and slowness were used
for reconnaissance.
b. Accidents.
Because the ships lost be accidents and marine causes cannot correctly be
attributed to enemy action a section discussing them has been included in the
introduction. Roskill in his official history of the war noted that the Allies
lost some 1,600 vessels and over three million tons of shipping because of causes
other than enemy action. While information has been difficult to obtain about
the losses of ships because of accidents it seems safe to assume they were caused
in large part by the conditions of war: convoy, extinguished navigation aids,
use of second rate ships and evasive routing through more hazardous areas, in-
experienced crews, fatigue, and others.
The Admiralty listing of ships destroyed by enemy actions included a short
section on the loss of ships by marine causes.
^•S. W. Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, (London: HtfSO, 196l), p. 305.
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Table 1-1. British merchant vessels over 100 gross tons lost by marine causes,
3 September, 1939—2 September, 1945.
' CAUSE NUMBER OF SHIPS TONNAGE
Foundered or lost ir i 238 324,000
open sea.
Fire or explosion. 202 464,000
Collision. 290 496,000
Wrecked or lost off shore. 659 1.395,000
Total 1,389 2,679,000
There were some differences between the figures which Roskill gave and those
which the Admiralty produced but the difference reflects American and other
Allied ships which were lost because of marine causes. From the chart it became
obvious that most ships had accidents near shore. A number of explanations were
available for this phenomenon; more condensed traffic, unmarked shoals and other
navigational hazards, and generally more traffic because of the large number of
small ships.
The loss of warships required a detailed study. During the Second World
War in the Atlantic the British lost one escort carrier, nine destroyers, twenty-
seven submarines, and forty MTB's or ML's because of accidents or unknown causes.
Only seven of the British submarines were listed as lost because of accidents.
2
The other twenty submarines were listed as being lost by causes unknown. Most
Great Britain: Admiralty, British and Foreign Merchant Vessels Lost or
Damaged by Enemy Action During the Second World War , (London: HKS0, 1947), p. 8.
Hereafter referred to as British Merchant Vessels . This table includes both
Atlantic and Pacific Theaters but it does give a significant indication of the
losses of commerce vessels by marine causes.
Great Britain: Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy: Statement of Loss During
Second World War , 2d September, 1939—2d September, 1945, (London: HMS0, 1947).
Hereafter referred to as Ships of the Royal Navy . This listing compared with H. T.
Lenton and J. J. Coledge, Warship Losses of World War II
,
(Shepperton-on-Thames.:
Ian Allen) , and the war loss sections from Jane ' s Fighting Ships
,
(New York:
Macmillan Comp. )
.
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of the unknowns in the submarine division were probably lost to mines, but there
were no survivors. German submarines had fewer losses because of unknown causes .
because they carried on extensive radio communications with their bases. Added
to the loss of British submarines were two American, which were lost in the At-
lantic. The 5-36 and the R-12 were lost because of accidents in the Atlantic.
The Germans lost 781 submarines during the war in the Atlantic by all causes.
Of these submarines J2j were lost because of accidents of one sort or another.
During the Second World War the British and Americans lost 75 submarines by all
causes. Thus, 12$ of the Allied submarines lost were sunk by accidents. The
Germans lost U-,1% of their submarines in the same manner. The different rates
of loss for Allied and German vessels were difficult to explain. Two suggestions
were made about the difference: (1) less experience in handling the complex craft,
and (2) the British spent more time operating in shallow waters.
The loss of a ship by any cause was a grevious loss, especially when every
vessel was desperately needed but the losses because of accidents were especially
important. Mot only were they unnecessary, but next to submarines they were the
largest cause of loss during the Second World War. No other method of enemy at-
tack except submarines caused nearly as much tonnage to be lost to the British
merchant fleet.
Naval History Division: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United
States Submarine Losses World War II
,
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Frint-
ing Office, 1963) , P. 16-7 and 50-1."
2Great Britain, Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-3oat Casualties
During the War: Particulars of Destruction
,
(London: HMSO, 19^6).
CHAPTER II
MINES
1. Mine warfare before World War II.
During the First World War mines played a very vital role in the contain-
ment of the High Seas Fleet and the destruction of German submarines. Robert
Grant in his detailed study of the German submarine losses during the 191^ War
noted on several occasions that the mine was the most effective anti-submarine
weapon developed during the war. Minelaying was so important during the war
against the Kaiser's Germany that minelayers were accompanied by heavy units of
the fleet. This practice led, in part, to one skirmish between the opposing
battle fleets, the Battle of Dogger Bank. Grant noted that the most valuable
of the mine fields were those across the Straits of Dover. The North Sea, he
said, was not sealed during the war to submarine traffic. He attributed the sue-
cess of the Dover Barrage to the limited area in which mines were planted. An
added factor to the success of the barrage may have been the watchfulness which
the Allies exercised over the area.
During the period between the wars mines were ignored as weapons of naval
warfare. This seemed rather incredible because of the prominent role they had
played in the 191^ V/ar. The United States Naval Institute Proceedings has only
3
one article dealing with mines and their counter-measures. This lack of study
Robert M. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed: The Effect of Anti-Submarine Warfare
.
191^-1918
.
(London: Putnam and Company, 1964), p. 17 and 44.
2Jbid. , 107-8.
^Robert M. Grant, "The Use of Mines Against Submarines," USNIP , Vol. 64,
no. 9, September, 1938, p. 1275-1279.
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severely limited the different applications of these weapons and it was not re-
alized until the war had started that they had a valuable role to play in commerce
destruction.
It has not been possible to document the following considerations but they
deserve some attention as explanations for the failure of study to be given to
mines. The United States and Great Britain have tended to follow Mahan's dicta
which led to the construction of battle fleets. While mines were useful for
blockading passages, little thought was given to their employment as offensive
weapons. Mine warfare fell more in line with the decrees of the followers of
the Jeune Ecole
. Most consideration of mines has been directed to their defensive
aspects. This was in part due to the failure to develop a sufficient delivery
system for offensive mines in the 191^- War. The Germans were correct in developing
minelaying submarines, but the successful use of offensive mines had to wait un-
til the construction of adequate aircraft. The use of mines as an offensive, as
well as defensive weapon, was one of the striking changes of the Second World
War.
2. The nature of mines.
Mines were generally grouped into two different classes; independent and
controlled. Controlled mines were used in nearly every case as defensive weapons.
They were either fired or rendered harmless by a shore station. Their major ad-
vantage was that they could differentiate between friendly and enemy ships. Little
or no use was made of this type of mine during the Second World War.
The independent mines were of three different types: moored, ground and
moving. The moored mine was held in position by a cable or wire which was attached
to a heavy weight which rested on the bottom of the ocean and maintained the
position of the mine. This type of mine was fired either by being; struck by
16
passing ships or by being influenced by ships which did not strike it but passed
near it. Magnetic minos were detonated by the change in the earth's magnetic
field caused by the passing of a steel ship. Acoustic mines wore detonated by
the noise of a ship's propellers. Pressure minos were detonated by the increase
of water pressure caused by a large vessel passing near them. Any of these types
of minos could be equipped with a counter which counted the number of ships that
passed it. This device was an anti-sweeping device which would not allow the
mine to detonate until several ships had passed. More will be said about this
device in the section on countermeasures.
Ground mines, always of the influence type, rested on the bottom of the
sea. Since they did not have the long cables they were necessarily laid in
shallower water than morred mines. Admiral Ruge, who commanded part of the
German mine sweeping force during the Second World War, placed the limit of twenty-
five fathoms on their effective depth. Much beyond this depth, depending on
their sensitivity, they would not explode; if they did explode the pressure wave
diminished to the point that not much damage was done to the ship passing over-
head.
Moving mines, which were seldom used during the war were of three types;
drifting, creeping, and oscillating. Drifting mines were allowed to float around
the oceans or more often down rivers. Creeping mines were attached to a weight
similar to a moored mine, but this weight was not sufficiently heavy to cause
them to remain stationary. Oscillating mines were allowed to drift throughout
the ocean but due to a clever mechanical invention changed depth constantly and
Frederich Ruge, Per Seekrieg , Trans. M. G. Saunders, (Annapolis, Maryland:
United States Naval Institute, 1957), p. 18.
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were always either rising or sinking. Generally moving mines were of the con-
2
tact type, although some were of the influence type.
3. The explosive nature of various mines.
The effect of mines on ships when they detonated differed greatly. Contact
mines since they actually touched the side of the ship were more likely to de-
stroy the underwater integrity of the vessel and cause it to sink. Ground mines,
on the other hand, since they sent out pressure waves tended not to sink the more
protected vessels but caused internal damage. This internal damage included
throwing motors off their mounts, twisting shafts, and cracking boilers. One
author has expressed his belief that mines laid on the ocean floor were more
dangerous. He felt this because since they needed no positive buoyancy they
could carry more explosives. This was of course the case, but the added explosive
power of a ground mine was countered by the nearness established by contact mines.
It was not added explosive force that made ground mines more dangerous, but in-
creased radius of detonation, increased difficulty of sweeping, and increased
efficiency of delivery systems.
The internal damage caused by ground mines was demonstrated by the detona-
tion of mines during the Channel dash of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau . On this
•^The effectiveness of this type of mine was restricted. Ships passing
through the water created a wako which washed them to one side.
^arge parts of this section were derived frori a study of the nature of
mines by J. S. Cowie, Mines, Ninelayers, and Minelaying
,
(London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 19^-9), hereafter cited as Covrie, Ilines . This entire section for
the most part has been a condensation of Cowie 's study on the nature of mines,
but for simplicity's sake this foot note is the only citation.
-'Ruge, Per Seekrieg
, p. 18.
^A. D. Van Nostrand, "Ilinesweeping," USMIP , Vol. 72, no. ^, April 19^6,
p. 507.
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occasion (12 February, 19^2) Gneiscmu detonated a magnetic mine off the port
side in the vicinity of the main after battery. The hull suffered snail dents
and individual tears along the seams. Scharnhorst detonated Wo mines; the first
caused little damage but the second was somewhat more serious. It exploded off
the starboard side and the ship took on more than 1,200 tons of water. Damage
was suffered by the fuel pumps, electric installations as well as machinery.
Also the main and secondary armaments were partially jammed but soon repaired.
In both cases the damage to Scharnhorst and Gncisenau was not great enough to
impare permanently their fighting capacity. The battle-cruisers were forced to
undergo repairs where Gneisenau was destroyed by an aerial bomb.
The greatest disadvantage of mines was once laid they had no respect for
the nationality of the vessel they sunk. With the exception of controlled mines
they would just as rapidly sink a ship of the country that laid them as an op-
ponent's vessel. Admiral Raeder noted that in order for the invasion of England
to be successful in 1S&0 it was necessary for the German forces to suspend mine-
2laying activities in the invasion area. These mines were laid to trap British
shipping, but would have been just as effective against German invasion shipping.
k, Countermeasures against mines.
Most of the countermeasures against moored mines had been developed during
the First World War. Generally speaking they involved the cutting of the cable
I. M. Korotkin, Battle Damage to Surface Ships During; World War II , Trans.
U. S. Joint Publications Research Service for the David Taylor Model Basin,
(Alexandria, Virginia: Defense Documentation Center for Scientific and Technical
Information, 196k), p. 120-125. Hereafter Korotkin, Battle Damage .
2Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with
the German Navy
, (Washington, D. C. : Office of Naval Intelligence, 19^-6-7), Vol.
I, 19^0, Discussion Points for the Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the
Fuehrer, 20 June, 19^0, p. 58. Hereafter Fuehrer Conferences.
19
which attached the nines to the weight. Once the mine had floated to the sur-
face it was supposed to be harmless, but if it was not it was destroyed by gun-
fire.
The new developments in influence mines during World War II made serious
problems for the minesweeping forces. One of the first new developments that
had to be countered was the German magnetic mine. While the British understood
the principle of magnetic mines they had to first discover the specific method
by which the Germans had produced these mines. In order to accomplish this a
mine was recovered and taken apart and analyzed. This simple action was in fact
very dangerous and difficult. Once the secrets of the German magnetic mines had
been discovered, countermeasures were immediately initiated. These measures were
generally of two types. One was the neutralizing of the magnetic force field of
the vessel. This generally meant the wrapping of a ship in electric cable which
could be turned on to counteract the magnetic force of the ship. This was known
as degaussing. The other method was the creation of an artificial magnetic field
to detonate the mines safely. This was first done by having shallow-draught ships
tow long lengths of cable which electrically detonated the mines. Later Welling-
tons were equipped with electro-magnets in order to detonate the magnetic mines.
This last method was really only effective in narrow waters where there was little
2
or no chance of missing a mine because of its being outside the magnetic field.
In order to make it more difficult for both magnetic mines and other types
of mines to be swept they were equipped with counters and delayed arming devices.
John Frayn Turner, Service Most Silent; The Navy's Fipht Against Enemy Mines,
(London: George C. Harrap and Co., Ltd., 3 955) f Chapter 3.
o
Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Birds and Fishes: The
Story of Coastal Command
,
(London: Hutchinson and Son, Ltd. , I960)
,
p. 130 and 183.
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The counters were made so that tho mine would not explode until several ship:;
had passed by. Also, they could not be detonated by artifical fields until a
certain number of passes had been made. This made the sweeping problems much
greater because it was necessary to sweep several times in order to detonate all
the mines. Delayed arming devices did not activate the mine until several days
had passed. This caused explosions when no minelaying activity had taken place
for several days. These devices were m±xed together in order to make it even
more difficult to sweep them.
The acoustic mines were detonated or swept by sound. The British first
equipped a number of ships with Kongo hammers which produced a sound wave of
nearly the same frequency that was needed to detonate these mines. The Ameri-
cans in the Pacific attempted, unsuccessfully, to detonate acoustic mines with
2depth charges and sirens. Noticably, these mines were swept by the same method
which made them dangerous, sound. Apparently no method during the war was dis-
covered which would stop the noise of a ship passing overhead.
Pressure mines during the war were apparently unsweepable.-* A number of
methods were used but none of these seemed safe. In general they included go-
ing either dead slow over the mines in order not to create a pressure wave or
sending a stoutly built ship over them with the sole object of trying to destroy
them.
Turner, Service Most Silent
, p. 120.
John D. Alden, Flush Decks and Four Pipes
,
(Annapolis, Maryland: United
States Naval Institute, 1965), P. 37.
^RoskiLl, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. f&. In this work Roskill said
that pressure mines were at first impossible to sweep but once again a mine was
recovered intact. This implies that a satisfactory method of countering them
was developed but he never explains this method. A. F. Pugsiey, Destroyer Man
,
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), p. 167, stated quite explicitly that
there was no satisfactory means of sweeping mines.
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As sweeping devices were invented by one side, counter measures against
swooping were developed by the other. Careful evaluation of photographs of
German U-boats entering their bases with minesweepers in the lead showed the
British technicians a method to counter the effect of the minesweepers. They
developed a mine which would only fire after it had been influenced by a strong
magnetic field. The Germans countered by escorting their submarines with two
minesweepers. Another was developed which would only fire after it had been
influenced by two strong fields. Had it not been for a limitation of space in-
side the mine the whole force of German minesweepers might have been necessary
to escort one submarine.
5. The offensive war with mines.
During the Second World War 76,000 mines were laid by the British armed
services; 55»000 by aircraft; 11, 000 by fast minelayers and destroyers; 6,500
by coastal forces; and 3t000 by submarines. In the process of laying mines one
fast minelayer, two destroyers, four submarines, and four coastal force vessles
and five hundred aircraft were lost. Axis casualties both sunk and damaged ac-
2
cording to the vessels laying the mines were:
Surface vessels 175?
Submarines — 7&
Aircraft 13^7
With some mathematical formulae a correlation which showed the relative
effectiveness of each typo of weapon can be derived. If the number of mines
1Covrie, Mines
, p. 159.
Cowie, Mines
t
p. l64~5. These figures have a number of flaws in them but
are the only ones available. It must be assumed that some of the British mines
were laid in the Pacific Theater but the larger percentage were laid in the At-
lantic Theater. The half a ship lost in the surface vessel olass was because
one was lost partially due to other weapons.
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laid by each method was divided into the number of ships sunk or damaged a figure
which showed, in theory, how much of a ship was sunk by each method was derived.
The formula looked like the following.
Ships damaged or sunk by mines laid by each type
of vessel or craft
= ships per mino.
Mines laid by each type of vessel or craft
With British mines and Axis casualties the ratio of ships per mine turned out
to be:
Surface craft .00985
Submarines .02233
Aircraft . 02540
Average . 02090
When the process was reversed, i.e., dividing the number of mines laid by each
type of craft by the number of enemy vessels sunk or damaged, a figure which
was probably more realistic was derived and showed how many mines it took by
each method to cause an enemy casualty.
Mines laid by each type of craft or vessel
= mines per ship.
Ships damaged or sunk by mines laid by each
type of vessel or craft
The ratio of British mines and Axis casualties turned out to be:
Surface craft 63.037
Submarines -44. 776
Aircraft 40 . 831
Average 41 .484
Either way the ratio was figured, aircraft were in the British case the most
effective method of laying mines. Every mine that aircraft laid sank a larger
portion of a ship and it took fewer air laid mines to cause an enemy casualty.
While further discussion will be made of the various attributes of aircraft they
were the most effective method of offensively laying mines.
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During the period from June, 1940, to Kay, 1945, the R.A.F. flew 19,104
sorties on minolaying missions, laid 46,895 mines and lost 519 aircraft. During '.
this period 737 Axis vessels, totaling 704,771 tons wore lost to mines. A further
205 ships or 467 ,676 tons were damaged by mines. This averaged out as follows:
Average tonnage of ships lost 958.9000 tons
Average tonnage of ships damaged 2325.2000 tons
Average tonnage sunk per sortie 36.8900 tons
Average tonnage damaged per sortie 24.4800 tons
Average tonnage sunk per mine laid 15.0290 tons
Average tonnage damaged per mine laid 9.9728 tons
Average tonnage sunk per plane lost 1357.9000 tons
Average tonnage damaged per plane lost 901.1300 tons
These figures point out some interesting aspects of mine warfare in the
Atlantic during the last war. They adequately showed that mines were much bet-
ter weapons to attack small vessels in hopes of sinking them than larger ones.
The larger vessels were more likely to be damaged than sunk as shown by the more
than double tonnage for vessels damaged over vessels sunk. But the rest of the
figures pointed out that for each mine laid, for each aircraft sortie, and for
each aircraft lost the tonnage sunk exceeded the tonnage damaged by a substantial
margin. This situation arose partially from the fact that more tonnage was sunk
than damaged by air laid mines. During this period the same number of mines were
laid, sorties flown and aircraft destroyed for both damaged and sunk vessels.
This was because it was impossible to differentiate which planes were lost, or
mines exploded and what their exact effect was on the ships causing the detonation.
The British air minelaying offensive when broken down into quarters showed
the effectiveness during the different periods of the war. (See tables II-l and
1i^^cill, War at Sea , Vol. I, p. 336 and 511, Vol. II, p. 395, Vol. Ill,
pt. 1, p; 96 and 289, Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 142 and 275.
2h
II-2.) An immediate) success occurred durjng the third quarter of 19^0. After
this there was a decline until the first quarter of 19^2 and this lasted until
the third quarter of 19^3. From the low point in tho last quarter of 19^3 there
was a gradual rise in enemy tonnage lost because of aerial mines. A sudden in-
crease (up to 137t7^l tons lost) marked tho last full quarter of tho war.
This sudden increase marked the period when the enemy minesweoping effort
had broken down completely. At the end of the war fewer mines were being laid
than at any other time since the first quarter of 19^2, yet more tonnage was
sunk by aerial mines than during any other period during the war. The amount
of effort necessary to combat a determined minelaying campaign occupied a large
portion of the German Navy's effort. Using oil as a common measurement during
tho three months of November and December, 19^1, and January, 19/'-2, the consump-
tion of oil for the U-boat arm was listed as 12,000 tons per month. During this
same period the minesweeping force needed 10,000 tons of oil per month. When
this was figured out, it became apparent that Germany expended 83.3$ as much
effort defending themselves from Allied mines as they did attacking Allied ships
with submarines. While this percentage figure may not have held true for the
entire war it did show that a large effort was spent in combating enemy mines.
Further consideration will be given to the effectiveness of aircraft as
minelayers when compared with aircraft on bombing raids and direct attacks at
sea. For the moment, aircraft must be considered more effective, in terms of
results achieved against losses, in mine warfare than in any other employment.
The airplane's success as a minelayer over other methods of laying mines
was due primarily to its mobility. The pilots could take their craft over areas
Fuehrer Conferences
, Vol. II, 19^1, Report of the Commander in Chief,
Navy to the Fuehrer, 1^- November 19^1 , Annex 6, Consumption of Fuel Oil, p. 72.
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which wore normally closed to surface vessels and submarines. One of theso areas
was the closed sea, the Baltic. While this was for all intents and purposes a
German lake, considerable montion was made in the Fuehrer Conferences and else-
where that the greatest threat to the security of seagoing vessels in the Baltic
1
was mines.
Aircraft suffered from several disadvantages which other vessels did not.
The first of these was noticed by looking at Table II-2. It was not until the
first quarter of 1942 that more than one mine was laid per sortie. Surface ships
laid perhaps a few hundred mines on each operation. Also, one of the most dis-
cussed disadvantages of aircraft as minelayers was their inaccuracy. The British
discovered the secret of the German magnetic mines because one fell intact be-
tween the high and low water marks on the English coast, also some British mines
fell on German soil where they were recovered intact.^ In January, 1943, a new-
technique of radar minelaying from 15,000 feet was developed, but some of the
4
mines fell on Sweden, thirty miles from their intended position. Mention was
made in the Fuehrer Conferences of using nei* types of mines in sudden massive
campaigns in order to gain the maximum potential before their secrets were dis-
covered. This seemed to confirm the view that the Germans had given up on
•^Fuehrer Conferences, 1943 1 I**- April 1941, Reasons for Increasing the Steel
Quota of the Navy, Signed by the Naval Chief of Staff (Miesal)
, p. 33 and Fuehrer
Conferences
, 19'+5» Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer,
20 March 1945, P. 99. Also Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic
Air Offensive Against Germany , Vol. Ill, (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 277.
2
Roskill, War at Sea
, Vol. I, p. 579. KMS Adventure (1927) of 6,470 tons
could carry 3^0 mines. The fast minelayers, building in 1939, could carry 156
mines.
3Ibid
.
, Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p, 140.
*
*Ibid
.
. Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p 288.
^Fuehrer Conferences
. 1941, Conferences of the Commander in Chief, Navy with
the Fuehrer, 22 May 1941, p. 64.
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having their new mine devices remain a secret. By building a large stockpile
of new mines they could get the most out of them before the British discovered
how to counter them.
Submarines, according to the figures on pages 20 and 21, were the next
most effective means of delivering mines. The submarine's main weapon durirrj
the Second World War was the torpedo but it did achieve some success with mines.
Among the submarined advantages was greater accuracy laying mines than air-
craft. Also, submarines went where ships went and it could logically be expected
that more ships would follow. This meant that aircraft sometimes laid their
mines in water through which ships could not pass. Submarines, on the other
hand, seldom, if ever, laid their mines in an area where other ships could not
go. The submarined ability to plant mines and leave the area unnoticed meant
that until an enemy vessel detonated one of the mines no counter measures, such
2
as sweeping, took place. The commanding admiral of the German submarine force
acknowledged that the submarine's main weapon was the torpedo, but due to chang-
ing circumstances mines could at times prove moi'e profitable. He was considering,
when ho made this statement, the traffic off the American coast. While the heavy
unprotected traffic continued it was best to equip submarines with torpedoes.
Later when the traffic was thinner and more heavily protected the submarines go-
ing to the American coast should have been equipped with mines. -* Admirals Doenitz
and Ruge disagreed about the employment of submarines on minelaying operations.
Arnold S. Lott, Most Dangerous Sea
,
(Annapolis, Maryland: United States
Naval Institute, 1959), p. 210.
2
Carle, Mines
, p. 93.
'i
-^Fuehrer Conferences
, 19^2, Report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines
at the Fuehrer Headquarters, 14 May 19^2, in the presence of the Commander in
Chief, Navy.
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Admiral Ruge stated twice in his book that submarine crews were never predisposed
to minelaying operations. Admiral Docnitz in his memoirs noted that while he
was commanding the U-boat ami ho argued for increased numbers of minelaying sub-
marines.
Offensive minelaying operations were generally less critical than defensive
mine fields. This does not mean to say that they had less value than defensive
fields. What it does moan was that in England's case the primary necessity was
the defense of merchant shipping. The attack on German merchant shipping while
contributing greatly to the total war effort was not absolutely necessary for
England to achieve a victory. Germany on the other hand was not as dependent
on merchant shipping but England could have been defeated without an offensive
mine attack.
6. The defensive war with mines.
Mines in offensive actions were a relatively new development of the Second
World War. During the 191^ War they had been used in this manner but never as
extensively as in World War II. During the war with Hitler mines played a dimin-
ished role as defensive weapons.
Part of this change in role was due to the rearrangement of geography. Ad-
miral Wegener, one of the few German naval theorists of the period before the
Second World War, had predicted the value of conquering Norway. The conquest
of the Scandinavian coast along the Atlantic and the Fall of France gave Germany
a position which was extremely difficult to blockade with mines.
Ruge, Per Seckrieg
, p. 6? and 255. Karl Doenitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days ,
Trans. R. H. Stevens, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., 1959), p. ^3~^.
^Lt. Cmdr. Peter K. Kemp, Key to Victory: The Trumph of British Sea Power ,
in World War II
.
(Boston: Little Brown and Comp. , 1957), P. 59. Cited from
Vice-Admiral W. Wegner, Die Seestrategie des Weltkriegs
, p. Jj-9.
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In order to protect British shipping around the British Isles an area dan-
gerous due to mines was declared by the Admiralty on November 27, 1939. This
area was roughly from Newcastle to Great Yarmouth. On December 23, an additional
area was declared from Rattray Head to the Thames. In both of these areas mines
were laid to deter German forces from making raids on the east coast, and against
shipping which was normally heavy in these waters. Also, false mines, ones which
looked similar to regular mines but were impotent, were sown instead of real mines,
This was done to convince the intelligence services that mines were in fact being
laid, but when the time came to lay larger operative fields these mines would not
J
„2
have to be swept. ohn Turner described the early British minefields as "propa-
ganda publications.
After the Fall of France plans to lay large mine barriers across the North
Sea and the Straits of Dover were discontinued because the German Army now oc-
cupied territory which had been one end of the earlier mine barrage. It was now
impractical to lay such a field because German naval and merchant vessels could
have escaped to the Atlantic from Norway, north of the Orkneys, or from France
and the Bay of Biscay. Also, Hitler T s Empire did not possess a battle-fleet simi-
lar to the High Seas Fleet and it would have been impractical to plant such a tre-
mendous number of mines (71,126) to stop the small flow of commerce that crept
in or the few warships that Germany possessed. J The World War I minefields were
orginally meant to stop submarines but they were able to escape through other
areas in 19-1-0.
Cowie, Nines, p. 130.
2
Turner, Service Host Silent
, p. 13.
3Cowie, Mines
, p. 70.
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The depth at which mines could be used effectively was the cause of con-
siderable controversy. Defensive fields wore usually moored mines and Admiral
Ruge in his history of the German Navy stated that moored mines could only be
used in depths of water up to two hundred fathoms, 1,200 feet. Yet at the out-
break of the war England possessed mines which could be moored in 6,000 feet of
2
water and remain 303 feet below the surface. A minefield was in fact laid
across the Iceland-Faroes Passage where the water was in some places considerably
deeper than 1,200 feet. It seemed that the limitation of 1,200 feet for the use
of moored mines was not accurate but at depths which greatly exceeded this limit
—
or for that matter, approached it—they lost a great deal of their effectiveness.
The largest and most extensive of the defensive minefields laid during the
war was the Iceland-Faroes barrier. During the war 6,100 mines were laid in this
area in an effort to curtail Germany transits through this area.-^ Roskill twice
noted the ineffectiveness of this barrier. It sank only one U-boat and no surface
vessels but was a source of constant trouble to the Allies. The passage around
the northern end of England was one of the primary escape routes of German ves-
sels but they passed through the Denmark Strait instead of the Iceland-Faroes
Passage.
Part of the problem of large defensive minefields was that the mathematical
odds of a ship striking a mine were not certain. Cowie developed formulae to
assess the chances. If a mine field was one lane wide and the ship approached
Ruge, Per Seekrieg
, p. 18.
p
Cowie, Mines
, p. 70.
^Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. I, p. 390.
^Ibid. f Vol. I, p. 268, Vol. II, p. 255.
tho field at right angles, the percentage chance of a ship escaping unharmed
shown by the following formula: s"w x 100. In this case "S" was the spacir
between minos and "WM was the width of the target at the depth the mines were
laid. In order to figure the chance of damage to the ship the figures derive
from the formula wore subtracted from a hundred. For example, suppose the sY
had a fifty foot beam and there was one hundred and fifty feet between mines.
150-50 x 100 = 66.6?$ chance of escape. Subtracting this from 100 gives a 3j
chance of destruction. In actuality the odds of destruction were somewhat gi
because of the width of the mines themselves. If there were more than one lc
(- u "\n
of mines the formula was ^ v < x 100 where MN" equals the number of lines.
the same figures as before and assuming two lanes the chances of destruction
somewhat greater. ^^'5°) x 100 = ¥l.44$ of escape or a 55.56$ chance of c
struction. If there were three lanes the percentage of escape unharmed was
29.63$; if there were four lanes the percentage of escape was 19.75^. Obvioi
until tho mines became closer together than the width of the ships there was
ways some chance that a vessel would be able to pass through unharmed. The c
tance between mines was determined by two things: (l) the number of mines ax
able in comparison with the distance which was to be covered, and (2) if an v
limited number of mines were available the distance was determined by how fai
the detonation of one would cause the explosion of its neighbor. If the expl
of one would have caused tho detonation of its neighbor at distances greater
the beam of passing ships, then the only method insuring the destruction of s
passing vessel was to insure the destruction of the whole field.
The figures presented above assumed a perfectly ordered minefield with r
drifting and each mine keeping its position in relation to its neighbor. If
the current was perfectly steady the relative distance between mines would ha
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remained the same but it was doubtful if the mines kept such an orderly arrange-
ment. Moored mines drifted in tides and currents relative to the depth of water
in which they were moored. Also, as thoy drifted the pull of the cable drug them
downwards until they were not at the determined depth to strike the bottom of a
passing vessel.
The Iceland-Faroes Passage was 283 miles across. Assuming one line of
mines perfectly placed, the mines were 216 feet apart. -^ Using the largest of
the German warships, Bismark and Tirpitz , which had beams of 118 feet, the chances
2
of getting caught in a passage through this minefield were:
216-118
x 100 = 45.37;'
216
With a threat of little more than fifty-fifty of getting caught when this field
was in perfect order, the field was sufficient to deter the sailing of German
warships through this passage. Bismark during its sortie into the Atlantic chose
Denmark Strait and the threat of mines may have contributed to this decision.
The other defensive field which compared to the barriers established by the
British during the First World War was one which crossed the Straits of Dover.
This field had more success than its northern counterpart. It sank two submarines,
U-12 and U-40 .^ Both of these losses occurred in October, 1939. After the
This has a number of assumptions in it. First the width of the minefield
has been limited to 250 miles. This was done on the assumption that some areas
were not covered because of their proximity to English held territory. The figure
of 250 miles has been translated into feet and divided by 6100 which was the figure
of the number of mines derived from Roskill (See page 28). Also, it assumed that
the mines were laid at the correct depth to catch the German warships at their
maximum width and the ships approached at right angles.
TThaddeus V. Tuleja, Twilight of the Sea Gods
,
(New York: W. W. Norton and
Co., 1958), p. 149.
-^Admiralty, German, Italian, and Japanese Submarine Losses
.
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successful German invasion of Norway, Low Countries, and Franco this field lost
its usefulness because it was outflanked. The German submarines no longer at-
tempted this passage because they could reach more satisfactory basses than those
in the Baltic; those along the French and Norwegian coast. The German battle-
cruisers during their dash up the English Channel in February, 19^2, were not
detered or stopped by the minefield placed across the Straits of Dover. Two
reasons probably played a large part in the decision to attempt a passage through
the traditionally British dominated channel. The first of these was the destruc-
tion of Bjsmark . The German leadership after having witnessed the destruction
of their most powerful warship by the overwhelming British sea power was more
reluctant to coirjnit a large portion of their remaining surface force to the threat
of the British surface fleet. The second consideration was the minefield could
be swept in such a narrow area to give the battle-cruisers a safe passage. The
laying of defensive minefields close to enemy held territory gave the Germans
the ability to sweep out narrow channels for passage of ships.
Cmdr. Lott has pointed out other objections to defensive minefields. Before
the 1939 War began the idea of protective minefields in American waters raised
horrified objections, even among naval officers. It was feared that these mines
would break loose and menace American shipping, but this was for the most part
unfounded because moored mines were equipped with a safety device which rendered
them inactive once the tension was taken off the cable. What was probably a more
dangerous threat to American shipping was that large defensive fields made ob-
stacles around which coastal traffic had to pass. German submarine captains,
hunting for the heaviest shipping concentrations were not above taking advantage
of this and concentrating their attacks along its edge.
Lott, Most Dangerous Sea
, p. ^5-6.
y>
The use of defensive fields was also taken advantage of by the British.
Marc' Bragadin noted that the minefields laid between Italy and Tunisia restricted
traffic to narrow fixed lanes which made the shipping more vulnerable to attack
by submarines and aircraft. Donald Macintyre in his study of the naval campaigns
of the Mediterranean said that the British countered the Italian protective mine-
fields by having the fast minelayers Abdiel and Welshman lay transverse lanes
2
across the protected path. It was difficult to determine, but the laying of a
mine protected lane from Italy to Tunisia may have been a mistake on the part of
the Italian Navy. The largest percentage of Italian ships were lost because of
air attacks. Of the Italian warships sunk 3^$ were lost because of air attacks.
Of the Italian merchant ships sunk 37$ were sunk by aircraft. How much the mines
made attacks on these ships easier was undertermined but the incorrect application
of mines should not be ignored.
7. The effect of mines during the Second World War.
The sinking of vessels was only part of the story of mine warfare in that,
while indirect effects may not have been quite as spectacular, they were, in
many respects, as important. As offensive mining campaign required the enemy
to spend large numbers of ships and men to combat it. Also, such a campaign
forced traffic from shallow waters and places where it would normally have been
safe into areas where it could be more easily attacked by other types of weapons.
While less than five percent of the German submarines lost during the war were
"Ttf. A. Bragadin, "Mediterranean Convoys in World War II," USNIP , February
1950, Vol. 76, no. 2, p. 155.
Donald Macintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean
,
(London: B. T. Batsford,
Ltd., 1964), p. 202.
^Marc 1 Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, Trans. Gale Hoffman, (Annapolis,
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1957), P. 360 and 366.
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because of mines, dislocation, and loss of time was one of the contributing fac-
tors to the victory over submarines. Finally, mines stopped traffic until sweep-
ing or other countcmeasures had been completed. In April, 19^<-, eleven mines
laid in the Kiel Canal were estimated to have caused the virtual loss to the
Axis powers of one million metric tons of cargo even though not one ship was lost
because of those mines. Also, during the first three months of the war the loss
and confusion caused by Germany f s laying of four hundred and seventy mines was,
according to Roskill, totally out of proportion to the number of mines laid. By
the middle of November, 1939, only one of the three deep water channels in the
Thames was open to traffic.
The effect of mine warfare on the U-boat war was difficult to objectively
examine. Considerable note has been made of the effect of the mining campaign
on the U-boat war in both the War at Sea and the Strategic Air Offensive . The
latter particularly noted that the U-boat training grounds were closed for sev-
eral periods because of the danger of mines in the Baltic during the latter part
of 19^*-. Webster and Frankland stated that no exact interpretation of how great
Derived from Admiralty: German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties
During the War. For the dislocation of the submarine effort see Roskill, War
at Sea . Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 140.
2
Buford Roi^land and William Boyd, U. S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World
War II
.
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), P. 158.
3Cowie, Nines t p. 189.
Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 100 and 102.
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this effoct was can bo made but speculated that perhaps as many as twenty of
the new Typo XXI submarines wero never operational because of the mining of the
Baltic.1
Tho effect of the mining campaign on the U-boat war can be more objectively
examined in terms of submarines sunk. During the Second World War thirty-eight
German and Italian submarines were either known to have been, or presumed to
have been mined. This figure was only six more than the number of boats lost
because of accidents on the part of the crei^s. The losses, even if it was ac-
cepted that all the "presumed mined" vessels did in fact meet their end because
of mines, amounted to a little more than four per cent of the total losses of
2German and Italian submarines. While any submarine lost contributed to the
defeat of the German U-boats, mines were not the major factor aiding this end.
Roskill took the view that throughout the war the contributions of mines to the
defeat of the U-boat was so much less than other methods—surface craft and air
attacks—that they seemed insignificant. 3 The Axis minelaying effort against
British submarines was more successful. Of the seventy-five British and Ameri-
can submarines lost during the war, twenty-two or twenty-nine per cent were sunk
Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 140 and Webster and Frankland
Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. Ill, p. 277. In a footnote Webster
and Frankland attributed the information concerning the closing. of the U-boat
training ground to Captain Peyton-Ward, R. N. , who examined the papers of Admiral
Freideberg who commanded the U-boat trials and training establishment. No men-
tion of the cessation, which surely had far reaching effects on the U-boat campaign
in the last days of Hitler 1 s Germany, was made in the Fuehrer Conferences . While
the papers of Admiral Fiedeberg have not been seen by this author it seemed that
such an important matter would have been brought to Hitler's attention.
2Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties During the War
.
^Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, p. 39^.
Vby mines. The explanation for the difference in losses may cone from the know-
ledge that while most of the German losses were in the Atlantic—including such \
areas as the Arctic, North Sea, and the Bay of Biscay—most British losses were
in the Mediterranean (sixteen out of twenty-two). German submarines operated
for the most part in mid-ocean where the waters were not mineable and only passed
through mineable waters en route to or from their hunting grounds. British sub-
marines, on the other hand, had to proceed in coastal waters to find significant
targets for their torpedoes. Nearly all the Mediterranean was so shallow that
mining was possible. In the Atlantic the British surface ships effectively con-
trolled the Axis deep water traffic and the submarines were forced to hunt in
shallow water for their targets.
The amount of delays and damage suffered indirectly because of mining opera-
tions through waters which U-boats had to pass was a contributing factor to the
victory by the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Roskill noted that the min-
ing of waters close to shore by aircraft and the mining of waters up to the hundred
fathom line by surface vessels caused the U-boats to travel on the surface a long
way from the coast. Because they had to travel on the surface they were more
vulnerable to other means of attack. Cowie noted this same aspect of mine war-
fare when he wrote that one of the main purposes of minefields was to make the
enemy take a course of action which in normal circumstances he would not have
2
adopted. By noting map II-3 on the following page which shows U-boat losses by
air attack during the period January 19^2 to May 19^3 it became evident that the
danger from air attack was not inside the hundred fathom line. Roskill seemed to
Derived from Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and Naval History Division:
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Submarine Losses, World
War II
,
(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963).
Cowie, Mines
, p. 82 and Roskill, War at So-*, Vol. II, p. 262.
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Map II-3 U-Boats Lost in Transit Through the Bay of Biscay, June 1942-
May 19-0 1 Shoving the Location of Loss and the Depth of Water
in Fathoms.
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Roskill, War at Sea t Vol. -II, between pages 368-9.
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contradict himself because he wrote that the mining operations caused U-boats
to remain on the surface and were more vulnerable to air attack, but the map
shows that not one submarine was lost during this period in shallow waters.
Table II-3 shoi-Js that the British losses of merchant vessels came for the
most part during the early part of the war. Table II-l showed German losses com-
ing during the latter part of the war. During the entire war only two British
vessels, totaling 8,597 tons, were sunk by mines laid in deep water. These deep
water losses amounted to a very small fraction of the total British losses due
to mines.
Part of the explanation of the British losses in the early part of the war
and the German losses in a latter was due to the sudden, though not altogether
unexpected, attack using a new influence type mine. The small scale of the German
attack with magnetic mines caused dislocations in British traffic which were to-
tally out of proportion to the number of mines laid. Roskill noted that four
hundred and seventy mines were laid during the first three months of the war.
The mines caused the loss of fifteen ships during the period September-November,
1939. This averaged out that for every thirty-one and a third mines laid, a ship
was lost. As already noted in the Allied attack on Axis shipping it took a little
more than forty-one mines to cause the loss of an enemy ship. The greater amount
of shipping preceding in and out of Allied countries and unpreparedness were cer-
tainly factors in the high rate of losses suffered at the beginning of the war.
Roskill noted that during November and December, 1939, mines were a more effec-
tive weapon than submarines. ^ This was true in the sense that during the period
mines sank 82,8^3 tons of British shipping as compared with submarines sinking
"See page 35.
2Roskill, War at Sea . Vol. I, p. 106.
40
o
4-39
1-40
2-40
3-40
4-40
1-41
2-41
3-41
!+-4l
1-42
E-42
3-42
C) W\ O Ui O U> Oiji OiJi OO h* •
0<j\ O v^r\
iv i\j \jj \x> »- -t-r
85,963
61,923
46,754
73,758
39,298
53,198
29,450
61 ,434
15,863
10,993
114,015
t-42
L-43
>-43
)-43
^-43
-44-
:-44
.-44
-44
-45
1,337
14,064
6,620
2,327
14,883
14,224
13,767
21,642
39,164
•-3
P>
crH
<D
MM
1
U)
fc) Co h* td O
f H c+ ^M O (-• c*
CD co a>
P. S 3- *
-
^ M
•-*> s; r<^i
*i P> W (D
C+ to * CO
y
tx» • O IB c+
4 3 3 0)
H- Co c-t- 3
c+ "• ©
H- < 3M Co © c+
tJ* £ w
3 CO
Ls< ?r © >-+>
CD M
4 H- CO t-1O 3 O
J3* O (/>
P> < CO3 ©
e+ >* O
<
*
<D
M
M
0)
CI
m37,990 tons. But this was only a temporary event. When the figures for the
four war months of 1939 were totaled, submarine kills were highest, 151,^86 tons
to 98,99^ tons. Certainly tho figures of ships destroyed by submarines were
artifically high during the months of September and October, 1939, because the
entire force was on war patrol. By the same token, the figures on November and
December were artifically low because the submarines during this period were in
port refitting, refueling and rearming.
Warships which were inherently different from merchant ships, being neither
of the same design nor the same purpose, were not included in the figures for
losses of British merchant vessels shown on table II-3. During the entire war
only one major warship, the cruiser HMS Neptune of 7,175 toms, was lost to a
mine. No battleship, battle-cruiser, or aircraft carrier was lost by the Allies
in the Atlantic because of mines. Of the hundred and sixty-four destroyers lost
during the war, thirty were sunk because of mines. Eighty-two trawlers out of
two hundred and fifty were lost because of mines. Seventy-nine minesweepers and
related vessels wero lost during the war. Thirty-seven were lost because of mines,
The percentages figured out to be:
Destroyers 18. 2$
Trawl ers 32
.
0%
Minesweepor s k6 . 8^
It was not suprising that while mines did not sink a majority of minesweepers,
thoy were responsible for more losses than any other method of attack. Also, it
should be noted that minecraft were the most vulnerable of the above mentioned
types of ships. This was not unusual because the primary job of minesweepers
was to hunt out and destroy mines where other ships attempted to avoid them.
Admiralty, British Merchant Ships
.
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
.
k2
Trawlers which had been recruited into the Royal Navy were still basically fishing
vessels and were the second most vulnerable type of ship to mines. The actual
steel warship had the least to fear from mines.
8. Conclusion.
Mine warfare during the Second World War proved to be a very potent method
of destroying commerce. The most effective method of attacking enemy commerce
with mines was an offensive campaign where the mines were delivered by aircraft.
Defensive fields achieved some worthwhile purposes during the war but sometimes
the enemy was able to take advantage of these fields. Perhaps the most important
aspect of mine warfare, which has not been discussed because it was impossible
to measure its effect, was psychological. Admiral Pugsley in his book with Donald
Macintyre commented that mines were the one fear which the commander of a vessel
could never ignore. The constant alert for mines and sudden unexpected destruc-
tion certainly caused mental anxiety to the captain and the crew of a ship. How
this affected their actions and lowered their efficiency was impossible to deter-
mine. The mine was a powerful weapon for detering actions of an enemy, destruc-
tion of his commerce vessels and causing an undetermined amount of psychological
restrictions.
J A. F. Pugsley and Donald Macintyre, Destroyer Man, p. 168.
CHAPTER III
AIRCRAFT
l fl Ideas about employing aircraft before the war.
The airplane which first saw use during the First World War was one of the
most controversial weapons of the period between the wars. A number of predic-
tions were made by both supporters and opponents of air power. Generally both
groups overstated their argument. The air power enthusiasts declared that the
Navy ! s capital ships could be sunk easily by planes. Naval leaders refused to
recognize this danger. Both sides of the controversy were right in part and
wrong in part. One of the most obvious errors was the failure to forsee the
value of aircraft in destroying submarines.
American General Billy Mitchell was a leader of the air power advocates.
He based his beliefs on the destruction of an old German dreadnau^ht Ostfricsland
.
This warship was attacked with 53 bombs weighing between 250 and 600 pounds.
When this first attack failed the ship was again bombarded the following day with
five 1,000 pound bombs and seven 2,000 pound bombs. The Ostfriesland sank twenty-
one minutes after the first ton bomb fell. Gen. Mitchell suffered disgrace and
court martial because of his remarks which offended some members of the establish-
ment.
A number of bombing tests were conducted on battleships. These tests had
one thing in common; they were unobjective. Target vessels were usually anchored
John Philips Cranwcll, The Destiny of Sea Power and Its Influence on Land
and Air Power
,
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 19^1), p. 113.
&unmanned and put up no resistance. These tests neither accurately depicted the
airci*aft's ability to destroy surface warships nor the battleship's ability to
survive aerial attack. During the Second World War no capital ship was sunk in
the Atlantic while at sea by air power. The aircraft's ability in attacking war-
ships was not against capital ships but against the smaller warships.
A number of theorists felt that sea power had been supplanted by air power.
Members of strategic air forces felt that aerial bombardment could force a country
into submission before sea power could exert its long range influence. Duncon
Grinnell-Milne in his study of the failure of the German armies to invade England
stated that the Luftwaffe was over confident about the effect of air power. He
mentioned several times that the German leadership thought that the invasion of
England would just be a take-over. According to Grinnell-Milne the only one who
correctly appreciated the naval situation was Raeder. The weapons of World War
II did not give the air forces the striking power to force a country into sur-
render.
The development of air forces between the war was marked by a series of con-
troversies about the command of planes over the sea. The Fleet Air Arm did not
come into existence until five months before the outbreak of the war. It took
actual war experience to convince the Air Ministry of the necessity of placing
2Coastal Command under the control of the Admiralty. The German leadership had
similar problems with a naval air force. Admiral Raeder and Field Marshal Goering
had a number of discussions about whose service was to control aircraft which
^-Ducan Grinnell-Milne, The Silent Victory
,
(London: The Bodley Head, 1958),
p. 46.
2
F. H. Hinsley, Command of the Sea: The Naval Side of British History from
1918 to the End of the Second World War
,
(London: Christophers, 1950), p. 28-9.
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operated over the sea. In the end the Luftwaffe vac left with sole control of
the air forces. This had serious repercusions for the development of German
naval air power.
Raymond O'Connor in his study of the naval disarmament controversies at-
tributed their failure in large part to a misconception of air power. He felt
that it was a logical assumption that carriers would be the source of controversy,
but it was cruisers that caused the most difficulties. According to O'Connor
this was because the role of aircraft in relation to sea power was not completely
understood. The failure to comprehend the place of air power created an unstable
2
and illusory equilibrium of armaments.
The role of aircraft in the Second World War was sharply divided by the sum-
mer of 19'0. Before this period they had made a number of stunning successes
—
the raid on Taranto and the destruction of Bismark
—
but airplanes had not yet be-
come an everyday influence on sea power. Before 19^3 their sole effect was to
contribute some brilliant victories. After the summer of 19*+3 their role was
changed to the more important and consistent exertion of force. There were few
outstanding victories but the constant application of air power contributed greatly
to the victory of the Allied sea power.
During the period before the war considerable discussion took place about
the most effective method of employing aircraft in attacks on ships. While tor-
pedo planes were accepted by the Admiralty little or no study was given to the
tactical use of this type of air attack. According to Commander Kemp the Admiralty
placed its faith in the torpedo because during the First World War it had sunk more
Office of Naval Intelligence, German Naval Air, 1933 to 19^-5 : A Report
Based, on Naval Staff Documents
,
(Washington, D. C. : Office of Naval Intelligence,
19 '47Jm
O'Connor, Perilious Equilibrium
.
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tonnage than all othermeans of attack combined. Had sufficient study been
given to the developing tactical operations with torpedo planer; thoy might havo
achieved much more than they did. Admiral Raeder thought if sufficiently equipped
and trainod torpedo planes had been available at the beginning they might have
vitally affected the course of the war. He noted in a conference with Hitler
that had a hundred torpedo planes attacked the Royal Navy at the beginning of
2the war the chances of a German naval success would have been much greater.
The bomber advocates were divided on their opinions of the most effective
way to employ bombing aircraft. Some felt that because dive-bombing was so
much more accurate than high-level bombing this was the correct method of at-
tacking warships. The problem with dive-bombers was that while more accurate
they could not carry the bomb load that the high-level bombers carried. Also,
the casualties were much heavier among low-level bombers than high-level. The
main advantages of high-level bombing were that the casualties from anti-aircraft
fire were less and the bomb load was considerably greater. Its disadvantage was
that it was inaccurate. From 12,000 feet it took a bomb 28 seconds to fall. In
this length of time a high speed warship moved nearly a 1,000 feet.-' With a fast
moving, zig-zagging warship under attack the odds of hitting them with a sufficiently
heavy bomb to cause their destruction was very slim. Billy Mitchell predicted
that the chances of hitting a battleship with aerial bombs was greater
Lt. Cmdr, P. K. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm
,
(London: Herbert Jenkins, 19^5)
i
P. 99.
2Fuehrer Conferences , Vol. II, 19^1, Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy
to the Fuehrer, 29 December, 19^1, p. 95.
-'Oscar Parkes, British Battleships: 'Warrior" to "Vanguard," A History of
Design, Construction and Armaments
,
(London: Seely Service and Co., 1966), p. 659.
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than with large caliber guns at 20,000 yards. This statement in itsolf can be
doubted somewhat, but even if it was true, he ignored a number of factors. The
aircraft once it had delivered its bomb load had to return to its base before
another attack could be made. Battleships corrected their shots until they re-
ceived straddles. They had the ability to take advantage of their misses while
aircraft did not.
During the period before the war the Admiralty and the Air Ministry derived
that ^3 medium bombors were the nearest equivalent in cost to a battleship.
This figure turned out to be a remarkably accurate estimation of the lossos
which were achieved in the destruction of some battleships. But ^3 aircraft
did not possess the striking power of one battleship.
This chapter has been arranged slightly different than others in this paper.
Aircraft were nearly always used offensively. Therefore the first section deals
with their defensive aspects in all forms. After this first section the offensive
nature of naval-ai" war in the Atlantic has been broken down into sections: stra-
tegic attacks, attacks on ports, attacks at sea, anti-submarine warfare, and air-
craft carriers. Carriers were generally considered capital ships but since they
had little striking power other than their aircraft, they have been included in
this chapter.
2. Aircraft in defensive war at sea.
Most aircraft used at sea in a defensive manner were defending ships from
attack by other aircraft. Seldom was the airplane used strictly as a defensive
Brigader-General William Mitchell, "America in the Air: The Future of Air-
plane and Air Ship, Economically and as Factors in National Defense," National
Geographic
, Vol. 39, no. 4, March, 1921, p. 3^7.
Parkes, British Battleships
, p. 660.
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weapon to influence the course of the war at sea. Nearly all the carriers had
fighters which they took with thcrn for air defense. Aircraft were used to warn
the fleet of approaching forces and attempt to weaken them before they could
make an attack. It was hard to see how an airplane could be used to defend the
fleet unless it was attacking other aircraft. Of course, planes could attack
warships but this verged on offensive action.
The main defense of the fleet against aerial attack was anti-aircraft fire.
Nearly all warships carried guns which were suitable for firing at attacking
planes. The main armament of the Rodney and Nelson , the only British battloships
designed and completed during the period between the wars, had the ability to
elevate to *J0 . This according to Parkes was done so they could fire at distant
aircraft. The maximum range for this type fire was 35*000 yards. More dis-
cussion was given to the defensive armament of surface ships in the chapters
dealing with them. War experience showed that the defensive armament on warships
was insufficient for the needs of driving off aircraft. One of the most notable
changes in armament on warships built during the war was the increased use of
guns which could deal with attacking aircraft.
3. Strategic air attacks on naval industrial targets.
The most difficult task in measuring the airplane f s effectiveness was its
ability to destroy the enemy's naval potential through strategic attacks on land
targets. In order to measure its effectiveness in the successful conclusion of,
for example, the U-boat war, some study has had to be given to determining how
much more dangerous Germany's attack would have been had it not been for the de-
struction of her industrial potential.
Parkes, British Battleships
, p. 657.
^9
A number of decisions were necessary in order to engage in a strategic at-
tack. If the war was going to bo short then strategic attacks would have been
of no value. The value of strategic attacks were long range in nature except
in very special circumstances. Also, the leadership had to make decisions
whether they might loose the war before their strategic attack had any success.
A quick tactical victory might have had long reaching consequences. Had the
strategic capabilities of the R.A.F. been used in attacks on U-boats it might
have deterred further uso of submarines to attack British commerce. These con-
siderations wore speculative and it was doubtful if there were any correct answers
but they vrerc decisions which the military leadership had to make.
Both Admiral Doenitz and Raeder complained throughout the war of shortages
of supplies. Sometimes the shortage ran as much as fifty percent of the needed
equipment. The lack of fuel oil was particularly serious to the German war
economy. Shortages were evident in December, 19^1* before the heavy strategic
air attacks on the petroleum industry had started and after Germany had had time
to absorb the countries which she had conquered. The German Navy was short of
oil in 19'H» and even with increased production and facilities during later years,
it was still operating with shortages. In Karch, 19'-*-2 f Raeder in the conference
with Hitler noted that the allocation of raw materials to the navy was insufficient
when compared with the demands placed on it. Further he stated that only those
vessels nearing completion could be made operational with the materials at hand
and if the allotment was not increased by the end of 19^-3 all construction of new
surface vessels, except one patrol-torpedo boat and two minesweepers per month
Fuehrer Conferences, 19^1 » Vol. II, Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy
to the Fuehrer, 12 December, 19'Q-, Annex *!-, The Fuel and Diesel Situation of the
Navy as of December 6, 19^1, p. 90.
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would cease. Also the production of torpedoes would drop from ^80 to 200 during
the third quartor of 19^2.
All this concern led to the belief that the German naval effort could bo
contained by concentrated air attacks on Gorman industry. Yet, it remained a
fact that the German Navy did not cease its activities because of strategic air
attacks on German industry, the production of armaments increased dramatically
p
under the direction of Albert Speer. A number of questions about how much the
German industrial machine would have produced had there never been a strategic
air attack has not yet been satisfactorily answered. Webster and Frankland listed
the losses of German submarines through strategic air attacks. These authors
emphasized that their figures were only approximately correct because the as-
sumptions necessary to derive the figures were arbitrary. The British Bombing
Survey Unit according to Webster and Frankland were only accurate to plus or
minus fifteen submarines. -* Using figures derived from the B.B.S.U., Webster
and Frankland noted that from May, 19^3 t to April 19^5 t twenty-nine Type VII,
three Type IX, sixty Type XXI, and nineteen Type XXIII or one hundred and eleven
5
U-boats were lost by strategic bombing. During the same period three hundred
and thirteen German submarines were lost through various means of air attacks.
This figure was artifically high because it included losses caused by aircraft
in combination with other means of attack. Since it has been impossible to de-
termine which method of attack contributed the most to the destruction of submarines,
Fuehrer Conferences , 19^2, Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the
Fuehrer, 12 March, 19**2, p. 29.
^Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany , II, p. ?.
3Ibid
.
, III, p. 276.
Ibid
.
, IV, Appendix ^9, p. 5#*.
^Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties .
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aircraft have beon credited as the sole attacking weapon. The two figures were
added together (313 and 111) and divided into the number of submarines lost be-
cause of raids on Gorman industry. The percentage losses of submarines because
of strategic attacks was derived as 26 percent. Assuming that the British sur-
vey figures were correct, the loss of more than one quarter of the German sub-
marines during this period because of strategic raids certainly justified the
effort.
The argument whether bombers were to be employed at sea or strategic attacks
was extremely volatile. The Naval Staff felt that large numbers of bombers should
have been committed to zones of encounter of submarines. R.A.F. Bomber Command,
on the other hand, felt that the level of bomber activity over the Atlantic
should have been kept to a minimum. The "industrialists" felt that if the German
war production was destroyed the naval power would have been ruined also. This
argument was more than just a disagreement about the tactical employment of air-
craft. It was a disagreement affecting the very nature of the use of aircraft.
This was one of the questions which was first suggested in the introduction to
this chapter. It seems that the attacks at sea delivered more results, but this
could have been subject to diminishing returns. The dichotomy between the ser-
vices was not easily settled, and only the building of enough aircraft so that
each group could have its way solved the problem.
In connection with the actual effect of strategic attacks on German industry
Admiral Doenitz stated in April 19-^3 » that he doubted whether bombing attacks
could vitally affect essential industries. Roughly a year later, he reversed
Vebstcr and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany , Vol. I, p. 327.
^Fuehrer Conferences
, 19^3. Minutes of the Conferences at the Fuehrer Head-
quarters, 19 August, 19^3* Annex I, Conversation with the Fuehrer, 19 August,
19^3, P. 126.
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himself and said that bombing affected the submarine war because under the system
of U-boat prefabrication a shipyard specializing in the producing a particular sec-
tion might be bombed and all that section of a submarine might be destroyed. De-
stroying only part, but a vital part, of submarines according to Docnitz might
cause the production of thirty or forty submarines to be stopped. This tended
to disagree with Webster and Frankland's comments that there were few components
in the submarine industry that wore "bottlenecks," The British historians further
disagreed with Doenitz when they noted that Bomber Command f s claim that it could
2do more attacking ports and construction yards was not substantiated.
The task of assessing the effect of strategic bombing attacks on German
industry in relation to the naval war was further complicated by not knowing
which planes were lost in contributing to the naval war. If, for example, it
could have been accurately determined that thirty percent of the aircraft lost
in attacks over Germany and Italy contributed to the successful conclusion of
the Battle of the Atlantic a correlation could have been derived which would
have shown the rate of losses in attacks on industrial targets as compared with
direct attacks at sea. Table III-l on the following page shows the number of sub-
marines that were operational and those on training and trials. It was obvious
that during the period from January 19^2 to the end of the war there was no
marked decrease in the number of submarines. On the other hand there was no
marked increase in the number of submarines once the bombing offensive got started
in 19^3. Table III-l also shows the total number of German submarines available
during the period from the first of 19^2 to the end of the war. During this period
1
Ibid
.
, Minutes of the Converstion of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the
Fuehrer, 4-6 May, 1944, p. 44.
Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany
, Vol. I, p.
481 and Vol. II, p. 216.
w*
440.
430
420
410
400
390
380
370
360
350
340
330
320
310
300
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Tabic TII-1
Quarterly Statement
Of German Submarines
January 1942-
May 1945.
1
C\2 i-1 CM 0^ -3"
* 3 * S ?
CV C^v
in
cm
Roskill, War at Sea . Vol. IT, p. 425, Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 3^, Vol. Ill, pt,
2, p. 456.
* Estimated.
5*
the total number of U-boats remained relatively steady after 19^3 whilo the num-
ber of operational boats declined. This seemed to point out that even with heavier
strategic raids on Gorman industry the production of underwater craft was not ser-
iously diminished. Also, it was interesting to note that whilo the number of op-
erational boats decreased they never reached the low level of 19^2. Yet, as it
was woll known and will later be shown, the U-boats 1 effectiveness as a naval
weapon declined markedly towards the end of the war. This seemed to show that
the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic by the Allies was more dependent on bet-
ter defensive methods and other means of attacking U-boats than strategic attacks on
production. One of the advantages of destroying submarines at sea was that the
trained crew was either killed or captured; attacks on industry did not remove
the crews from the scene.
The problem of the lack of crews became extremely serious to the German sub-
marine force. The lack of crews for the submarines, which were very highly trained,
may have been one of the factors which inhibited the offensive action of the German
submarine force.
4. Air raids on ports.
Still strategic raids, attacks on ports were significantly different than
attacks on industrial machinery. In these attacks some notable successes were
scored by the Allies along with some equally notable failures. The most glaring
failure of aircraft to sink warships was the running attack on the German battle-
cruisers during their stay in Brest. During the short period from 10 December,
19^1, to 20 January, 19^2, thirty-seven percent of Bomber Command's effort was
expended unrewardingly on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. These raids were almost
Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany
,
Vol. I,
p. 320.
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Tabic III-2
Combined Monthly Statement of German U~Boats Lost Through
Both Air Attacks and Production Losses Because of Strategic
Raids, April 19^3-May 19^5.
Solid ljno indicates losses through air attacks. Derived fro .
Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties.
Broken lino indicates production losses. Derived from Webster
and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Gerxnany , Vol. IV,
P. 524
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daily occurrences and yet neither of the ships was sunk or seriously damaged.
One of the reasons the dangerous dash up the English Channel was undertaken was
because if the ships had remained in Brest it was certain that eventually they
were going to be hit and sunk. The attack on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau showed
one of the advantages of aircraft which had not been available to previous naval
leaders. Mahan in his study on the proper use of an inferior fleet said that its
purpose was to remain in port and restrict the offensive operations of an opponent's
fleet. The superior naval forces could with aircraft not only blockade the in-
ferior fleet but now had the power to attack and eventually destroy the inferior
fleet if it refused to sail.
One of the most famous and important attacks on ships in port was the attack
by the Fleet Air Arm on the Italian Navy at Taranto, 11 November, 19^-0. This
attack by twenty-one Swordfish launched from carriers gave capital ship superiority
to Admiral Cunningham's force. Previously the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean
had been superior in many respects to British Mediterranean fleets. There was a
good chance that the Italian force could have sailed and destroyed a portion of
the British fleet in the central Mediterranean. The British success at Taranto
not only gave the British a temporary material advantage but had far reaching
psychological effects. The British seized the initiative from the Italians and
it was difficult for the latter to overcome this psychological disadvantage.
During this attack by carrier launched planes the Italian battleships Littorio
,
Duilio and Cavour were put out of action by torpedo hits. This attack left the
Italians with only Vittorio and Caesare serviceable. The effect of this daring
raid on the Italian home base was far-reaching. It restricted the Italian Navy's
"Slacintyre, The Battle of the Mediterranean
, p. 36-8.
5?
action throughout the war. Italy, which up until their surrender did not possess
any operational aircraft carriers, was restricted in the naval actions which they
could perform against British warships in the Mediterranean during the entire war.
The attacks on warships in port were mostly questions of the size of the
raids and the accuracy of the bombers. Also, weight and type of bomb made con-
siderable difference in the destruction of ships in port. The heavier the bomb
the more destruction it caused, but the chances of hitting a ship were decreased.
Armor piercing bombs were needed to penetrate the reinforced deck of a battleship
but had little or no mining effect. The decisions on what type of bombs to use
were necessitated by the circumstances of the time. If all that was desired was
that the warship remained in port until the naval situation became more favorable
then a large number of small bombs would do the job. On the other hand if the
object was to destroy the warship and enough bombers were on hand to keep up the
offensive, then heavy armor piercing bombs were satisfactory to complete the task.
The inaccuracy of bombs from high altitude aircraft was shown in its relation-
ship to Scharnhorst as map III-l which has been reproduced on the next page shows.
This map shows the Focke-Wulf factory at Bremen which was attacked 12 March, 1$&1.
The impact of bombs which fell within at least 1,250 yards of the factory are shown
by the dots with an outline of Scharnhorst superimposed in the center of the factory.
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Map III-l The Focke-Wulf factory at Bremen attacked 12 March 19^1, with
the impact of bomb hits and Scharnhorst superimposed.
• •
*
. .
•
The attack on German held ports by bomber aircraft was a great deal more
effective in terms of warships sunk than the earlier attacks on British ports
by German aircraft. The table below shows the number of each class sunk or dam-
aged beyond repair by raids on ports and the percentages of the German ships in
that class destroyed by air attacks on ports.
Number LostType of Ship
Battleships
Battle-cruisers
Pocket-battleships
Old Battleships
Heavy Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Destroyers
Torpedo Boats
Armed Merchant Cruisers
Minelayers
Submarines
1
1
2
1
1
2
21
7
65
Percentage Lost
67i
50<£
3398
0%
8i
^Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany
, Vol. II, p. 97,
^See Roskill, War at Sea
,
Appendix XX, German Warship Losses, 1939-19^-5, Vol.
Ill, pt. 2, p. 457-^-61 for the losses of German surface vessels. The losses of
German submarines came from Admiralty German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boat Casu-
alties During the War
,
59
The figures for the heavier ships, i.e. battleships through light cruisers,
were so sioall no accurate conclusion can be dravm from these losses. For torpedo-
boats and submarines the size of the force and the numbers destroyed allow some
speculation on the relative effectiveness of air attacks on ports. When looking
at the losses because of raids the most noticeable figures were with the excep-
tion of one submarine all the U-boat losses came after the first of 19^+. Of the
sixty-five submarines lost due to air raids forty-nine or seventy-five percent
wore lost after October, 19^, or after the French submarine bases had fallen
to the advancing Allied armies. This seems to indicate that the massive concrete
sub pens were an effective method of protecting the U-boats from air attack.
Webster and Frankland noted that it seemed that the attacks on the submarine pens
at St. Nazaire and Lorient destroyed everything but the pens. This should not
be construed to mean that the air attacks were ineffective in hampering submarine
operations because they caused logistical difficulties. This was the case but the
submarines themselves were not destroyed and a great deal of damage was done to
the surrounding area.
The difficulties of sinking heavy warships by aerial bombs perhaps can best
be illustrated by the attacks on the battleship Tirpitz . This ship, the sister
of Bismark , was, during the period from January, 19^2, until she was sunk in
November, 19'+'!-, attacked by 96 Halifaxes, 7 Stirlings, 12 Albacores, 121 Lancasters,
201 Barracudas, 132 Corsairs, 20 Hellcats, 44 Wildcats, 23 Seafircs, and 51 Fire-
flies for a total of 698 aircraft. Thirty-three aircraft were lost in attacks on
2
Tirpitz . The effect of those raids, until a special bomb was developed, was
p. 97.
Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany , Vol. II,
2Derived from Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 170-1.
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minimal. Added to these attacks was an operation using midget submarines. Tho
difficulties of sinking a warship in port were shown by the troubles to which
this ship put the Allies before it was sunk. In order for the bomb to achieve
enough velocity to pierce the armored decks on battleships and reach the vital
parts it was necessary for it to be dropped from a great height. But because
of inaccuracies in bombing from high altitudes the ship would more than likely
be missed completely. Dive bombing against heavily defended ports and well gunned
ships was to say the least a hazardous operation. The hits on Tirpitz during the
raid on 3 April, 19^1-, were shown by map III-2 reproduced on tho next page.
During this attack six aircraft carriers, Victorious , Searcher , Pursuer , Furious ,
Emperor , and Fencer took part in the operation launching forty Barracudas, twenty-
one Corsairs, twenty Hellcats, and forty Wildcats. All this activity which caused
2
fourteen hits on the Tirpitz put her out of action only three months. Further
evidence of the futility of attacking ships in harbor without launching massive
raids was shown by the raids on naval targets during August, September, and October,
19^-0. Over a thousand sorties were flown in which 683 tons of bombs were dropped
on naval targets at Wilhemshaven, ( Tirpitz in construction and Scheer ) , Kiel
( Scharnhorst, Gneiscnau , Lutzow , and Prinz Bugen ) , and Hamburg ( Bjsmark in con-
struction)
.
The effect was some minor damage to the construction facilities but
no important damage to the ships themselves.-^ Further when Hipper returned to
Brest in December 19^-0, a hundred and seventy-five sorties and eighty-five tons
1+
of bombs were launched at her without effect. The list of failures of bombers
For the development of the special bombs see Paul Brinkhill, The Dam Busters
,
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1^1),
2Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 26? and Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 170.
3Ibid., Vol. I, p. 261.
^Ibid. , Vol. I, p. 292.
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Hap III-?. Hits o\ I on Tirplte in Attack by Fleet Air Arm Aircraft
3 April 19V'.
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to contribute significantly to the destruction of warships could have been ex-
tended indefinitely. The one major exception to the list of failures of attacks '
on ports, Taranto, was accomplished not with either dive bombers or high level
bombers but with torpedo planes. In a later section of this chapter the com-
parative value of torpedoes and bombs will be studied; in certain cases each had
distinct advantages.
5. Direct attacks at sea.
There were few attacks on capital ships while they were at sea during the
war in the Atlantic. The Bismark episode was one of the most famous actions but
others took place, notably the Second Battle of Cape Matapan. This theater dif-
fered significantly from the Pacific. In the Pacific there were numerous attacks
by aircraft on surface ships and in one of these battles the fleets never saw
each other. The Pacific Theater would have been a better area of study to deter-
mine the effectiveness of direct attacks at sea.
The one action in the Atlantic where aircraft played a vital role was the
Bismark tale. In this action torpedo planes from the Fleet Air Ann attacked Bis -
mark numerous times. One of these torpedoes struck the steering and propulsion
gear and rendered the ship unmaneuverable. While the main destruction of Bismark
was accomplished by heavy units of the Royal Navy this destruction was only pos-
sible because of attacks by aircraft. Other than this action aerial attacks at
sea in the Atlantic were limited mostly to scouting roles and attempts to harass
the heavy units of the fleet.
A few general observations seemed worthwhile about direct attacks at sea
by aircraft in the Atlantic. For the most part the failure of this type of at-
tack was caused by a lack of study during the period between the wars. The ac-
tions jji the Atlantic were divided by both tine and country employing this method
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of aerial attack. During the earlier period of the war Germany attacked numerous
ocean going ships in the waters surrounding the British Isles. Large numbers of',
ships were damaged but few were sunk by this attack. The ships that were attacked
were generally larger than the Axis ones attacked later in the war. The British
attacks were against the smaller coastal vessels which plied their trade in the
shallow waters off the coast of France and the Low Countries. These attacks late
in the war were more successful than earlier ones because of increased effort and
study in the best tactical method of attacking merchant ships at sea.
The use of aerial attacks at sea in the Mediterranean was about equally em-
ployed by both sides. A number of highly successful attacks were made on British
merchant and warships in the Mediterranean during the period up to the middle of
19^-2. These attacks centered around two definite areas. One of the areas was
the attacks around Crete. During the German invasion of Crete the British learned
that surface warships could not operate far from their bases with no air cover.
A large number of British warships were sunk because of the virtually absolute
German aerial superiority. The second area of attack was convoys proceeding to
Malta. Several times the Allied convoys were forced to turn back by the combined
threat of heavy Italian units and German aircraft. The invasion of Russia in 19^1
drew off the crack German attack units and relieved the pressure on convoys to
Malta. Still serious losses were suffered because of aerial attack on Allied con-
voys proceeding to Malta,
The Allies had their revenge late in the war. After the summer of 19^2 Allied
air superiority gained virtually complete control of the air. During this period
the land campaign in North Africa was vitally affected because of the destruction
of numerous ships attempting to supply the German and Italian armies fighting in
the desert.
^See page ?2.
0\
6. Torpedoes vs. Bombs.
Before the Second World War tho Admiralty placed its faith in torpedoes
as the major weapons for aircraft to use against ships at sea. According to
Lt. Cmdr. P. K. Kamp the Admiralty accepted this weapon because during the First
World War the torpedo had sunk more tonnage than all other means of attack com-
bined. While the leaders of the naval staff recognized the power of the tor-
pedo as a ship-killing weapon, they did noting to develop an efficient delivery
system or attack tactics. This failure of sufficient study may have been in-
volved in the lack of control which the Admiralty exerted over the air force for
a long period during the time between wars.
During the war the advocates and supporters of bombers learned that they
suffered numerous handicaps. As already pointed out high-level bombers were not
accurate enough to hit warships in harbors, much less moving targets at sea.
Dive-bombers suffered a high rate of casualties in low-level attacks. The dan-
ger of using medium bombers was shown in the Mediterranean in attacks on convoys.
Because of the inaccuracies of attacks from great altitudes British Blenheims
came in low over the waters and dropped their bombs so that they struck the ship
nearly horizontally. These practically suicidal tactics were caused by the lack
of effective dive-bombers and torpedo planes.-' Donald Kacintyre in his book on
the history of battleships noted limitations of bombers and felt that high-level
attacks were less effective than dive bombing attacks.
Lt. Cmdr. P. K. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm
,
(London: Herbert Jenkins, 195^0, P. 99.
^Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime
,
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books,
1962), p. 228-9.
-Tiacintyre, Battle for the Mediterranean
, p. 90.
Donald llacintyre, The Thunder of Guns: A Century of Battleships
,
(New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 275.
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The torpedo might have been the most lethal form of air attack. Admiral
Racder thought that torpedo planes could havo vitally affected the course of the
war. In the same conference in which he commented on the difficulties of co-
operation between the air force and the navy on torpedo planes, he expressed the
beliof that if the Royal Navy had been attacked by a hundred torpedo planes at
the beginning of the war the chances of German success at sea would have been
much greater. Throughout the war the only major British warship sunk as the
result of a hit by an air launched torpedo was the cruiser Trinidad (8,000 tons)
which was finished off by Allied forces after sustaining damage in the Barents
Sea.
The Russian, Korotkin, the only one who appears to have dealt with battle
damage to surface ships, summarized the affect of aerial bombs and torpedoes.
He recognized that since bombs destroyed the above water parts of ships and also
the underwater hull, the effects were different than torpedoes which destroyed
just underwater sections. Shock, damage far from the location of the hit, was
not one of the characteristics of damage on armored warships hit by armor-piercing
bombs. Wartime experience showed that direct hits by armor-piercing bombs were
more effectivo than near misses. This effect was because bombs designed to break
through armor plate on warships did not carry enough explosive to cause serious
complications when exploding in the water. The effect of high explosive bombs
was mostly topside. The first and second deck were usually damaged as were the
engines if the bombs fell in the vicinity of the machinery rooms. When high ex-
plosive bombs landed near the ship the underwater damage was similar to mines.
Fuehrer Conferences , Vol. II, 19^1, Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy
to the Fuehrer, 29 December,, 19^1
,
p. 95.
2
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
.
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In order to destroy a large World War II vintage battleship about eight high
explosive bombs of 5,000 kilograms (11,000 pounds) each were necessary. Mostly
hits with some explosion near the ship were required to complete the destruction.
*
Torpedoes exploding against the side of a ship had a greater tendency to
destroy the watertight integrity of the ship. Other than allowing water to
enter, the damage was characterized by the locality wherethe hit took place;
i.e. in the boiler rooms it put out fires, in the after extremities it ruined
the propulsion and steering, etc. The damage to the armaments was characterized
by the flooding of magazines and cutting off of electrical power. Korotkin
devised a chart showing the number of hits necessary to destroy or seriously
3disable different classes of battleships.
Type of Battleship Displacement
Standard Tons
Number of Torpedoes Necessary
To:
Sink Put Out of Action
Heavy Construction
(World War II)
Light Construction
(World War II)
Construction during
(World War I)
(Modernized)
45,000-60,000
30,000-35,000
25,000-30,000
8-10
4-6
2-3
4-6
3-4
1-2
It seemed that torpedoes were much more effective weapons to attack armored
ships than were bombs. In order to deliver a 11,000 pound bomb a heavy four
engined bomber would have been necessary. This plane would have had to bomb
"Korotkin, Battle Damage to Surface Ships During World War II
, p. 199-
202.
2Ibid
. , p. 194-6.
3Ibid.
, p. 197.
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froM high altitude because of its vulnerability to ack-ack and size. This would
have made its accuracy minimal. Torpedoes, on the other hand, caused at least
as much damage as a 11,000 pound bomb and were carried by smaller planes. While
the figures are not available to perform a satisfactory comparison it seems that
torpedo planes may have been more accurate than high-level bombing. Also while
the losses were higher for torpedo planes they were much cheaper aircraft than
four-engined bombers. The torpedo plane's effectiveness was limited because of
insufficient inter-war study and a lack of proper delivery systems.
7. Anti-aircraft fire and defensive measures against aircraft.
During the war the gunlayers were disappointed because of the inability of
their weapon to bring aircraft down. The volume of fire needed to bring down
aircraft or deter one from driving home its attack surpassed all estimates made
before the war. The increased need for anti-aircraft armament was shown by the
increase of guns suitable for this type of work on Rodney and Nelson . These two
battleships were completed in 1927 with six, 4.7 anti-aircraft guns and eight,
2 pound pom-poms. The final anti-aircraft armament on the two battleships was
six, 4.7 anti-aircraft guns; sixteen, 40 millimeter guns; forty-eight, 2 pound
2
pom-poms; and sixty-one, 20 millimeters. It was found that not only was accuracy
needed to bring down aircraft but great quantities of fire were also needed.
Edgar March, who wrote the history of British destroyers, noted that before the
war eye-sighted weapons were considered sufficient to bring down aircraft. During
the war it was discovered that this was not the case.-'
Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime
, p. 228.
2
Parkes, British Pattl eshi ps
, p. 654.
-'Edgar J. March, British Destroyers; A History of DevelopTient, 1892-1953
.
(London: Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 402.
6ft
Admiral Pugslcy, who was closely associated with destroyers both before
and during the war, noted that destroyers lacked sufficient anti-aircraft arma-
mont. Destroyers at the beginning of the war were very nearly unarmed in weapons
to attack airplanes. They usually included a number of 4.7 inch guns which could
not elevate above 40° , and were thorofore unsuitable for this employment. The
only othor armament was two, 0.5 inch machine guns and one, 2 pound pom-pom.
Pugsley implied that the Admiralty laughed at the threat from aircraft and con-
2
centrated on low angle guns. If this was the case it seems to illustrate the
disbelief that the airpower enthusiasts' ideas wore viewed by the Admiralty.
Conversely, the supporters of airpower disbelieved a warship could survive at
all under the threat of air attack.
The importance of sufficient anti-aircraft fire was shown many times in the
Mediterranean. This closed sea was perhaps the ideal place for aircraft to op-
erate against ships, narrow with both sides of the shoreline occupied many times
by Britain's enemys. During the operations around Crete in 1941 a task force
comprising the cruisers Ajax and Orion was compelled to withdraw from a sweep
along the north side of the island because of a shortage of anti-aircraft am-
3
munition. During the trials before the war the effect of anti-aircraft guns
was greatly over-rated by the Admiralty and under-rated by the air force. Roskill
noted that when anti-aircraft guns were used as a convoy escort, particularly on
the Arctic route, they were valuable, but when they attempted to replace shore-
based guns they were extremely vulnerable.
1Pugsley, Destroyer Man
, p. 33.
2Ibid
. , p. 68.
\t. Cmdr. P. K. Kemp, Victory at Sea, (London: Frederick Kuller, Ltd., 1957),
P. 13^-5.
\oskill, War at Sea, Vol. I, p. 84.
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Anothor Means of defcnso of surface ships was swift evasive action or zig-
zagging. When, during tho test before the war, aircraft wore sent out to attack
.
the old battleship Agamemnon tho effects of evasive action were not considered.
In 1923 this ship was attacked by R.A.F. bombers and out of six bombs two hits
were scored and four misses were close enough to have caused some damage. This
caused tho leaders to believe that battleships were obsolete when in range of
enemy aircraft. But this test did not include evasive action, anti-aircraft
fire, escorts and fighter protection.
During the war new tactics were developed in attempts to diminish the effects
of evasive action and of anti-aircraft fire. One of these was the flooding of
the defenses with more aircraft than warships could handle. Successful attacks
were made on capital ships provided that the defenses could be saturated. A
successful attack tactic was developed by Pat Gillis where several Beauforts at-
tacked from different directions to spread out the defensive fire and confuse
2
the ships trying to evade torpedoes. This was the method employed by the Japa-
nese in December 19'f-l, when they sank the British capital ships Prince of Wales
and Repulse in the Pacific.
Bernard Brodie had little faith in evasive action as a method to protect
surface ships from aircraft. He felt that it might cause the enemy to make many
misses but tho enemy could keep coming and one hit paid for many misses. ^ He
failed to realize that every miss moved the ship closer to a safe position and
caused the aircraft to make another attack so that it had more chances to be
shot down,
Kemp, Fleet Air Arm
, p. 110.
2Flight Lt. Ralph Barker, Tho Ship-Busters: The Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo
Bombers
,
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1957)
. P. 195-6.
^Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Kachine Age
,
(Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 19^3), P. ^1^.
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8. The effect of aircraft durlll the Second World War,
Aircraft during the war in the Atlantic varied greatly. Until about the
summer of 1943 aircraft were seldom employed as anti-submarine weapons. After
this period they replaced destroyers as the prime antagonists of the U-boats.
Their importance as weapons to destroy ships in port and logistical facilities
increased after this period as did nearly every othor method of using aircraft.
Since only two British battleships and one battle-cruiser wore lost in the
Atlantic the number fails to justify any broad generalizations. The first of
the battleships lost was Royal Oak (29,150 tons) completed in May 1916. The
other was Barham (31,100 tons) commissioned in 1915. Both of these ships were
sunk by torpedoes but the torpedoes were not launched by aircraft. Hood (42,100
tons) was the battle-cruiser which was lost in a gunnery duel with the German
battleship Bismark.
The German battleships Tirpitz and Bismark (41, 674 tons each) and the
battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gnesienau (31,857 tons each) were similarily
too few in number to make any generalizations about the effectiveness of air-
craft. Torpedo planes played a prominent role in the destruction of Bismark in
that they destroyed the propulsion and steering gear of the ship and allowed
the British pursuers to catch up. Tirpitz was sunk by a special force of high-
level bombers in Norway. Scharnhorst was sunk by destroyers and the British
battleship Duke of York
.
Gneisenau was scuttled after suffering a bomb hit while
undergoing repairs after striking a mine.
The following table shows the percentages of ships belonging to the Royal
Navy that were lost due to air attack in the Atlantic out of the total number
lost because of enemy action.
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
.
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Typo of Ship Number Lost Percent*
Battleships 0*
Aircraft Carriers 0*
Cruisers 8 352
Destroyers ^8 362
Subioarines k 52
Armed Merchant 02
Cruisers
Monitors 1 100/,
Anti-aircraft ships 7 642
Mine vcssels^- 18 272
Corvettes, Sloops, 9 182
Cutters , Frigates
Trawlers 72 292
HfB-MGB-Launches 27 122
Other2 60 13^
The one type of ship whose primary duty was to protect other vessels from
aircraft, the anti-aircraft ship, was in a percentage sense, the most vulnerable
of all the ships that had any percentage figures except monitors. An author in
an argument for the retention of anti-aircraft cruisers noted that no British
capital ship was lost because of either Italian or German air attack when ac-
3
companied by anti-aircraft cruisers. While admittedly some of the anti-aircraft
ships were quite small and old, others were new and large. The anti-aircraft
ship Pozarica displaced 4,5^0 tons and was commissioned in 19^1. This loss of
AA ships seemed to mean that they could protect others from air attack but were
themselves vulnerable. V/hile no proof has been found it was almost certain that
the German and Italian pilots picked out anti-aircraft ships in order to make their
later attacks on other vessels easier.
Mine vessels include layers, sweepers, detonation and other vessels which
dealt with mines more or less exclusively.
T'he "other" term is a catch-all phrase for everything from whalers to barges.
-^Norman Friedman, "Anti-aircraft Cruisers," USNIP , Vol. 91 1 no. 1, January,
1965, P. 91-2.
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Destroyers and cruisers suffered the noxt highest rate of lossos. This
fact might be explained by their being high priority targots not possessing the
heavy armor plate of battleships. Other vessels were sunk in varying proportions
by aircraft. The British lost remarkably few submarines because of Axis air at-
tacks. This phenomenon was explained because aircraft as anti-submarine weapons
did not achieve full potential until the Axis air forces had been defeated.
The proof of the impossibility of surface craft to operate without air
protection in waters controlled by enemy aircraft was found in the operations
off Crete during 19^-1. In May of that year the cruisers Fiji , Gloucester , York
,
and Calcutta and the destroyers Juno , Greyhound , Kashimir , Kelly , Hereward ,
and Imperial were lost because of air attacks in the eastern Mediterranean.
In a period of a little more than a week over 36,000 tons of British warships
were lost during the evacuation of Crete. If the same rate of loss had occurred
throughout the war, over ten million tons of British cruisers and destroyers alone
would have been lost to air attacks; these losses would have eliminated the Royal
Navy several times over. Admittedly the figures for this one period were arti-
fically high because of the necessity of evacuating troops from Crete no matter
what the losses. Naval leaders got the point that it was certainly dangerous to
operate surface vessels far from air cover.
The comparative effectiveness of direct attacks and mine attacks on merchant
shipping were such that except for the very short period at the start of the war
when German shipping was being rounded up by surface units of the British Navy,
air attacks were second only to mining operations in the total tonnage lost to
the Axis Powers.
-"-Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy.
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An interesting correlation was found by comparing the two tables (III-3
and III-4) on the following page. Generally, the earlier parts of the year
were the most favorable for direct attacks at sea by R.A.F. aircraft during the
war. It was noticablo that when more sorties were undertaken during this time
of year more vessels were sunk or damaged. The number of aircraft was not in
direct relation to the number of sorties. Sometimes a great many aircraft were
lost while participating in operations against enemy ships per sortie. During
other periods, such as the high period during the war; the first quarter of 19^+
,
when 5,382 sorties were flown only ^4 aircraft were lost, the number of aircraft
lost were small compared to the number of sorties.
The same figures which were performed in the analysis of mines in chapter
two led to the following figures.
Average tonnage of each ship lost 1,10?. 0000
Average tonnage of each ship damaged 3,^10.0000
Average tonnage sunk por sortie 7.7836
Average tonnage damaged per sortie 7.7390
Average tonnage sunk per attack1- ^+.27^0
Average tonnage damaged per attack 37.6950
Average tonnage sunk per plane lost '+18.5000
Average tonnage damaged per piano lost '+16.0000
It was readily noticeable by comparing the two tables that the tonnage of
the average ship lost to aircraft was considerably greater than those sunk by
mines. At the same time the attacks for mines had a greater tonnage sunk per
sortie than direct attacks at sea. When an airplane did attack ships the tonnage
lost was greater than when an airplane planted a nine. It was evident that the
'-This information for the attacks made was only available for the period
from January 19^-2 to March 19^5. All other figures such as tonnage lost or
damaged have been reduced for this one figure to cover only this period. It is
quite possible that a change might be evident if the information were available
for attacks made during the period from April 19^0 to December 19'*1.
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figures for the tonnage damaged per attack differed significantly from the ton-
nages lost and damaged per plane lost or per sortie. This was in large part due',
to tho fact that the average tonnage per ship lost during the latter part of the
war was significantly lower than at the first of the war. During 19^4 and the
first quarter of 19'<-5 the average tonnage per ship lost by direct attacks in the
Atlantic was 866.66. This was significantly lower than the 1,107.0 average for
the entire war. The figures for the average ship damaged were lower for the last
two years of the war; they were 3»072.53 as compared with 3»4l0.0 for the entire
war. This leads to the conclusion that while attacks and sorties remained rela-
tively steady during this period the targets were becoming smaller. Mines laid
by aircraft sank and damaged more tonnage than did aircraft. Direct attacks at
sea sank 452,815 tons and damaged a further 450,125 tons of Axis shipping. Mines
sank 704,711 tons and damaged 476,676 tons. Compared to aircraft lost per ton
sunk, mine-laying aircraft were more effective than were attack planes. For each
plane lost during air attacks 418.50 tons were sunk, and for each plane lost during
minelaying operations over 1,300 tons were sunk.
Mines wore more effective than direct attacks at sea by aircraft, but this
did not exclude the air attacks as an effective method. On many occasions air-
craft while attacking at sea could accomplish tasks which mines could not. Per-
haps the most obvious of these were attacks on ships which were sailing in waters
too deep to bo mined. Also, given proper identification, which was a problem, air-
craft were selective in their targets; being able to distinguish friend from foe
and detect the most worthwhile of several targets. The most blatant ability of
aircraft was its ability to recoimoiter and find targets. An airplane performing
direct attacks at sea could- spot enemy movements or even shift its position un-
til it found better hunting; tho mine remained stationary or drifted aimlessly.
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Perhaps one of the best examples of the aircraft's unusual ability in at-
tacks at sea was seen in the attacks upon U-boats in the Atlantic. In this can- •
paign the aircraft started meagerly and finished as the nemesis of the German
submarines. Table III-6 shows the losses of German U-boats because of aerial
attack by quarters and clearly illustrates the rising losses. During the latter
parts of the war, particularly during 19^ and early 19^5 1 the losses of subma-
rines declined. This was due, in large part, to declining tactical losses while
strategic losses, which are not especially delineated, increased. During the
entire war 218 German submarines were lost because of air attack alone and air-
planes assisted surface vessels in a further ^-3 kills. Aircraft by themselves
sank 27.9$ of German U-boats and these losses added to the assists made aircraft
the greatest killer of submarines. But as was noted in Table III-6 there were
no kills in 1939 and only four assists in 19-K); aircraft took some time to come
into its rightful place as a U-boat killer.
Grand Admiral Doenitz throughout the Fuehrer Conferences complained that
r>
aircraft were the greatest threat to his submarines. The use of aircraft was
a double edged sword for the Germans. They not only used aircraft for attacks
on ships but they assisted the submarines in finding and shadowing convoys so
the U-boats could concentrate against them. The most coiiimorily used aircraft for
these operations was the Focke-Wulf 200, more commonly known as the "Condor."
This aircraft had little to recommend it except its long endurance. It took off
from bases in France and flew around the British Isles and often returned to
^•Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties .
Fuehrer Conferences
, 19^-2, Report of the Conference with the Furhrer, 28
September 19^2, p. 119. This particular conference has been chosen for the foot-
note because it showed that the German leadership recognized the threat to their
submarine forces from air attacks at sea before these attacks really reached their
peak.
43
hz
k\
4a
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
3
2
78
Tabic III-6
German U-Boats Lost by-
Air Attacks at Sea by
Quarters
.
Admiralty, German, Italian
and_ Japanese U-Boa
i
Casualties.
ZZv
o o o in -r-i in t) co co co co r\r\ c^ o --j- ct -^ -^ v>\
ihf 1 1- 1 ^r -? i i ^i i i i ii^^t i ^ -?
ri wr\4 n N r\^- t-h co c">-^h -t-i co c^ -^ ^h
ON O
^- t-i co r> ^j
79
Norway. Green noted that it sank hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping
p
and gave the Atlantic convoys a real battering. This was not exactly true in the
sense that tho aircraft did it themselves, but that the submarines which they called
to attack convoys did sink hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping. In
an indirect sense the ''Condors" were responsible for many of the Allied ships which
were sunk by Axis submarines because had they not spotted the convoy and reported
its position the submarines would not have been able to attack the ships.
Part of the problems of attacks by submarines, and shadowing "Condors," were
alleviated by increasingly long-range aircraft and escort carriers for the mer-
chantmen. Even if aircraft, either shore based or carrier-borne, did not sink
tho submarine, they often forced it to submerge and once a submarine had submerged
it could no longer move to an attack position or follow the convoys while report-
ing its movements. The figures on how many Allied ships were saved because sub-
marines were forced to operate defensively do not exist but there was little ques-
tion that a substantial portion of the Allied ships crossing the Atlantic were
saved by this tactic. Figures which were presented on page 68 listed air attacks
launched from carriers as attacks solely as air attacks and not as assists. Of
the U-boats sunk solely by aircraft during the war 18.3^ of these attacks originated
on a carrier and of the submarines sunk by both aircraft and surface vessels 27.9'
of the aircraft participating came from carriers. -^
A study of the British merchant vessels revealed some interesting aspects
of air attacks on shipping. From the four tables (III-7, 1II-S, III-9, III-10)
William Green, Famous Bombers of the Second World War
,
(Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. , I960) , Vol. II, p. 72.
2
Ibid., p. 72.
-'Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties
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>n the foregoing pages it was evident that the torpedo as a weapon for airplanes
m merchant ships came late in the war. These figures for losses from torpedo
.ttacks ran consistently lower than figures for attacks with bombers. In nearly
;very case the figures for torpedo losses started aftor those for bombers and
'aded out sooner. How much the lack of training and tactics for torpedo-bombers
tontributed to its virtual impotence is questionable but supposing training had
>een present at the first of the war, the German air forces would have been able
;o make better use of this weapon. As it vras, the victory in the air was virtually
ron before the torpedoes as weapons to attack ships appeared.
After looking and comparing the table for air attacks in shallow water and
leep water the bomb and torpedo, when used with aircraft, were basically shallow
rater weapons. This was due in large part to the fact that the British Isles,
rhere the heaviest concentrations of shipping met, wore surrounded by shallow
rater. It was also interesting to note that the losses suffered were highest
luring the attacks on Britain. Particularly interesting, was that the German
.ttacks on shipping in shallow water damaged several times more ships than they
ictually sank. The high points for damaging ships occurred during the period
'rom the second quarter of 19^-0 to the second quarter of 19^1. It was much better
;o sink a ship than damage one; it took the British repair yards an average of
.90 days to repair a ship that was damaged by enemy action. The Admiralty figured
ifter the war that 1^-2,500 ship days were lost to British shipping which was equal
;o 65 ships or 3^0,000 tons lost for the entire war.
>. Aircraft Carriers.
While carriers should be included in the next chapter on capital
ships it seemed that because of their close connection with aircraft they should
Admiralty, British and Foreign Merchant Vessels
, p. 12.
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bo included in this section. The airc?\ift carrier's main advantage was that its
striking range was much greater than the most powerful gun on a battleship. The
most powerful of battleships could not strike an effective blow much over 25,000
yards. The aircraft carrier on the other hand could launch its aircraft and
strike at ranges of perhaps 200 miles. The difficulty with aircraft carriers
was that they had no inherent striking power of their own. The one time a capital
ship approached within gunnery range of a carrier the flattop was easily destroyed.
The British carrier Glorius returning from Norway with a load of planes was dis-
covered by the German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisonau in the spring of
19^0. They approached within gunnery range before the Glorius launched its planes
2
and opened fire at 27,000 yards. Glorius was quickly destroyed.
While the aircraft carrier played notable roles in the Atlantic their use-
fulness in fleet actions was not equal to the campaigns in the Pacific. Aircraft
carriers played prominent roles in the destruction of Bismark and a number of
the "convoy" battles in the Mediterranean, but never in the Atlantic were they
responsible for the destruction of an opposing fleet.
The aircraft carrier achieved great successes in the anti-submarine war.
It was traditionally used by the American forces as the center of the hunter-
killer groups. The British used them more often to escort convoys. Terence
Robertson, who wrote the biography of Capt. Walker, felt that using carriers
as close escort for convoys was dangerous and had little value. He felt this
way because most submarine attacks came at night when air spotting was ineffec-
tive.-^ The first kill by an aircraft launched from an American escort carrier
Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age
, p. ^28.
n^arch, British Destroyers t p. 257.
-^Robertson, Walker, R. N.
, p. 15 : .
mwas the U-569 . The plane was launcehd from USS Boguo May 22, 1943.1 After
this first sinking there were increased numbers of U-boats which wero sunk by-
aircraft from carriers. Not only did the escort carriers cause a large number
of sinkings but they kept the pressure on tho German submarine crews and allowed
them no safe area to rest and recuperate until the next attack. More will be 1
said about hunter-killer groups in a later section but in tho American use of
this tactic the carrier was a very central piece.
Carriers had two advantages. Land based planes had to return to their bases
on shore which often left the fleet without aircover for long periods of time.
The land based planes had to stay over the fleet constantly and use up fuel be-
fore an attack by an opposing air force of the land based planes arrived. The
second ability was explicitly stated by the German Admiral commanding the Gorman
naval forces in the Mediterranean. In Adm. Weichold's essey which he wrote after
his capture, he noted that the British aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean
3
gave them the ability to rapidally exploit any naval situation. The aircraft's
main feature was versitility and the carrier added to this by taking the planes
with the fleet.
The aircraft carrier may have become the new "queen of the seas" during the
Second World War but this was not due to its inherent destructive ability but be-
cause of the planes which it carried.
Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United
States Submarine Losses , World War II, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), p. I63.
Macintyre, Battle for the Mediterranean
, p. 15^.
•^Adri. Eberhard Weichold, The War at Sea in the Mediterranean
,
(Washington,
D. C.: 'Office of Naval Intelligence, 19^7 ), p. 23.
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10. Conclusion about aircraft in the Atlantic naval war.
The one facit which soems safe to say about the air war in the Atlantic was
that none of the predictions about air power before the war were correct. The
air power enthusiasts were wrong on two counts: their weapons could not force
a country into submission solely through the efforts of strategic attacks nor
were capital ships seriously threatened when at sea. The naval leaders erred
because they failed to recognize the extreme potency of this new weapon. Whether
or not it was possible to destroy a fleet solely with air power made no difference,
air power became an additional factor which had to be considered in tactical and
strategical dispositions. The airplane during the Second World War in the Atlantic
became the primary but not the only weapon of naval warfare.
The question on the value of strategic air attacks is still open to a num-
ber of different interpretations but it seems that perhaps a number of mistakes
were made. The most important question which needs to be answered was whether
the emphasis on strategic raids was important enough to shortchange the needs of
the service actually combating ships at sea. Since the bombing offensive failed
to produce expected results and in fact the results did not start until late in
19^+ it was not worthwhile. Because of this Roskill in his Lees-PCnowles lectures
felt that the Bomber Command's priorities were wrong.
The airplane achieved its greatest success against the heavy units, not at
sea as they did in the Pacific, but while the heavy ships were in port. The one
ship that was sunk in part because of aircraft at sea was done so by torpedoes,
not bombs. In order for bombing attacks to be successful it was necessary for
heavy bombers to be used so that heavy bombs could be dropped from high altitudes
S. W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application
,
(London: Collins, 1962), p. 180.
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where they achieved enough velocity to poi' e the armor deck. After the Ger-
man submarines were forced out of their reinforced pens thoy too became vulnerable
to aerial attacks on ports.
In attacks at sea the lighter ships were vulnerable to aerial attack. This
was due to a lack of armor protection and sufficient gunfire to drive off aircraft,
The losses of merchant ships were mostly in shallow waters, but aircraft were
much better weapons to damage ships than to sink them. In one field airplanes
as weapons of naval warfare became dominate. Little study had been given to the
airplane as a weapon to destroy submarines but this was the area where its impor-
tance really showed. After sufficient aircraft became available and tactics had
been developed for aerial anti-submarine warfare the airplane overshadowed all
other methods of destroying submarines.
CHAPTER IV
CAPITAL SHIPS
1. Battleships between the wars.
The battleship was one of the few weapons that had been a major weapon dur-
ing the First World War. Other weapons which became paramount during Hitler's
War had played only minor parts in tho 191^ War. True, the submarine had caused
a great many casualties but not nearly as many as they contributed during the
latter war. Airplanes in the 191^ War had really been minor weapons as far as
naval tactics and strategy were concerned. Mines also contributed to the naval
effort of the First World War but were not considered dominent weapons. There-
fore the battleship was one of the few naval weapons which was considered impor-
tant during the earlier war but had lost their importance in the last European
war. The tactics of how to use capital ships against other largo naval weapons
were well understood during the period between the wars, but how these vessels
were to be applied during the coming war, considering the new developments in
naval technology, was not completely understood.
The battleship according to Mahan's doctrines was the prime weapon of naval
warfare. All other vessels existed only so that capital ships could cone in
contact with their opposite members. This was because Kalian defined the sea as
a broad flat plain. In this definition the battleship's power was supreme be-
cause it could bring the heaviest force to bear. The new developments of aircraft
Admiral Jellicoe was afraid of the German Zoppelins but they never made an
appearance at the Battle of Jutland. During the first war the airplane was too
unpredictable to be able to influence naval operations.
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and submarines gave these weapons the ability to evade capital ships 1 force; one
through altitude and the other through depth. Tho new weapons which vrere not
vulnerable to battleships' overwhelming power were both types which wuro ac-
cepted by the Jeune Ecole
.
Tho surface ship of the type which had held command of the seas for centuries
was the center of considerable discussion during the period between the wars.
Advocates of both air power and submarines expressed their belief that the battle-
ships which had sailed so valiantly into the Battle of Jutland were no longer
worth the money. They felt that these immensely and increasingly expensive ships
were too vulnerable. The increased cost was shown by the prices for battleships
built during the First World War and the ones built between the wars. The battle-
ships Resolution , Revenge , Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign were completed in 1916
and 191?. Their cost was between &2,406,368 and L2, 570, 504. The battleships
Nelson and Rodney were both completed in 1927 and cost respectively L-6,4l0,0?l
and L6,414,653. The cost of battleships had more than doubled during the ten
years after the completion of the latest World War I battleships. Even by
1920 the battle-cruiser Hood , which was for its time an immensely expensive ship,
cost L5, 698, 946. The increasing cost of British battleships was due in large
part to the devaluation of the pound and increasing costs of labor. Several de-
stroyers of the Tribal class, costing Lr467,000 apiece, could be built for the
3price of one battleship. Not only vrere battleships increasing in cost because
Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield, Brassey's Naval Annual, 1938
.
(Hereafter
referred to as Brassey's)
,
(London: Willian Clowes), p. 218-9. Francis E. Kc-
Kurtie, Jane's Fighting Ships , 1941 , (Hereafter referred to as Jane's ) , (New York
MacMillan, 1942), lists the cost of the Nelson and Rodney as L7, 504, 000 and
fc?, 617,000 respectively.
brassey's, 1938 , p. 218.
3Jane's, 1941 , p. 36.
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of changes in the economic situation but they became much more complicated and
consequently more expensive. The fire control system for the Kinr George V
class battleships in 1912 cost fell, 000. For the Kiry* George V f s in 1939 the
cost of the gunnery control was L213,000. Other developments were built into
1918-1939 vintage battleships; radar, anti-aircraft guns, horizontal armor
plate, high speed steam turbines, and increased sub-division.
During the First World War the naval staff of England witnessed the rapid
destruction of several of their best capital ships at Jutland. Several of the
newest British battle-cruisers of the Third Cruiser Squadron were blown out of
the water in the opening minutes of the Battle of Jutland. The vulnerability
of these vessels, which were then the pride of the British fleet, led to the
conclusion that the battleship was vulnerable to its own kind. The public felt
that any battleship that was built could easily be destroyed by an opponents
equal. What they failed to realize was that the problem with the British battle-
ships was not that they had outlived their usefulness, but they had been poorly
designed. A well conceived ship such as Bismark and. Tirpitz showed during the
1939 War that considerable punishment could be absorbed by battleships.
The evidence for the disillusionment with battleships was found in the dis-
armament conferences of 1921 and 1930. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921
2
limited only capital ships and this x>ras at the time thought to be sufficient.
The battleship was supposed to be an example for the continued disarmament of
all types of military weapons. It was chosen because it seemed at first that
this would be the one weapon which all the powers could agree to eliminate.
Brodic, Sea Power in the Machine Age
, p. 233.
n)' Connor, Perilous Equilibrium
,
p. 6-7.
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Later another conference was called because the naval powers were still construct-
ing large fleets of cruisors and other warships. Roskill in his overall study of
sea poxtfer noted that Britain, along with the other powers, felt required to bujld
the largest ships allowed by the limitation treaties. This was one of the handi-
caps of the disarmament conferences. The question of the usefulness of battleships
was pointed out by the leading naval power of the inter-war years. In a memorandum
issued Fobruary 7, 1930, the British government asked for an agreement that would
do away with the battleship because they were expensive and of "doubtful utility. "^
This seems to give credence to the view that naval leaders were unsure of the value
of battleships. At least one British naval theoretician wanted the complete aband-
onment of battleships. Sir Herbert Richmond wanted the largest size of surface
ship to be limited to 10,000 tons. In his article in the Nineteenth Century he
3
expressed the opinion that large ships were no more protected than smaller ones.
This view was wrong, but it was one belief of many about the failure of battleships.
He thought that the battleship was no longer necessary for the protection of British
commerce and the most effective weapon was a cruiser type weapon.
Another of the limitation treaties was only effective against the defeated
powers of the First World VJar. The Treaty of Versailles limited the size of the
German Navy in many ways. One of the limitations placed on it was that they could
build no battleships larger than 10,000 tons. Admiral Raeder who was responsible
for the rejuvenation of the German Navy pointed out that with this limitation two
types of ships could be constructed: (l) a stoutly armored and slow vessel similar
Roskill, Strategy of Sea Power
, p. 1^-6.
2
0' Conner, Perilous Equilibrium
, p. 72-3.
<Adm. Herbert Richmond, "The Case Against Big Battleships," Nineteenth Century
and After
,
Vol. 116, August, 193^, P. 189.
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to a monitor or (?.) a lightly amorcd ship with high speed and medium guns with
a greater versatility of action. During the period between the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 the Germans chose the latter.
This gavo than the "pocket-battleships" which were troublesome to the Admiralty
planning office.
After the Anglo-German Treaty the German Navy was allowed to build up to
35* of the strength of the Royal Navy. Immediately afterwards Germany started
construction of a navy including submarines, carriers, and heavy units. This
fleet was probably intended to challenge Britain on the sea at a later date than
1939. At any rate the German naval leaders were convinced of the usefulness of
battleships in the navy.
It seems that throughout the period between the wars the naval leaders fail-
ed to recognize the value and place of the capital ships. It was one of O'Connor's
contentions, and seemingly a valid one, that the failure to understand the role
of airpower led to the unstable and illusory equilibrium of armaments. He used
as evidence for this that in the 1930 Conference carriers were not discussed.
The changed role of the battleship was not fully recognized. The battleship
during the Second World V.rar was not the prime weapon of naval warfare, but the
largest member of the naval team and best suited for leading the attack on its
3
equal. This seems to be the real role of the battleship and it was a mistake
on the part of the airpower advocates and the naval leaders not to have recognized
the changed situation.
1Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, I'y Life , Trans. Henry W. Drexel (Annapolis,
Maryland: U. S. Naval Institute, I960), p. 14-6.
2O'Connor, Poriljous Equilibrium
, p. 76 and p. 118.
•'Parks, British 3attleships
, p. 675.
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2. Capital ships in defensive actions.
During the Second World War battleships and battlo-cruisers were used in a
defensive manner mostly by the Allies. Since most of the defensive actions by
the British were fleet actions this section tends to be a study in the employ-
ment of capital ships in this type of action.' The defensive fleet actions by
the Allied navies were usually attempts to protect commerce from commerce raiders,
or in the Mediterranean from Italian attacks on convoys. Until the surrender of
the Italian Fleet in 19^3 Allied warships were consistently used in a defensive
manner. Even after the Italian defeat, capital ships were still used to protect
convoys to Russia.
The one true fleet action was the Battle of Cape Matapan, 28-29 Karch, 19^-1.
This battle between two major fleets involved both air attacks from British air-
craft-carriers and operations with battleships. Losses for the Italians were
three cruisers and a number of smaller vessels. In neither case were capital
ships damaged beyond repair, and the only reason three cruisers were lost was
because one of their comrades was dead in the water and two others were attempt-
ing to aid him when suprised by the British battleships. Had these cruisers pos-
sessed radar these losses might have been avoided.
In the Atlantic the largest capital ship lost to gunfire alone from another
capital, ship was Hood (^2,100 tons). Hood had sailed out to meet Bismark and
Prim; Eugen during their brief sortie into the Atlantic. Accompanying the Hood
was one of the new King George V battleships, Princ e of Wal e
s
. During the brief
but sharp action Hood blew up and sank and Prince of Wales was damaged. This
action was particularly interesting because it showed the increase of modern
There was one real fleet action in the Pacific which foreshadowed the
Battle of Jutland. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf the American Fleet crossed
the , T I of the Japanese Fleet in Surigao Strait. This battle between capital
ships was a crushing defeat for the Japanese.
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fire-power and accuracy since the 191'* War. Hood was laid down during the first
war and completed in 1920. Officially Hood was classed as a battle-cruiser, which
had tho same armament as battleships, but amor had been sacrificed for speed.
She was deficient in armor protection when compared with Bismark. The latter
had been laid down after the Anglo-German Naval Treaty and incorporated the latest
improvements in naval architecture. Hood was almost immediately straddled and
shortly after the beginning of the action a shell penetrated to the magazines
and she blew up, broke in half, and sank. Prince of Wales was just barely out
of the builder's yard. Due to mechanical defects she took little part in the
proceedings and while being damaged, she managed to inflict some damage on Bisr.ark
.
During the long chase that ensued after the sinking of Hood there were many
interesting aspects of naval war. Bismark was finally sunk while trying to re-
gain the safety of French waters. In this operation, units from both Hone Fleet
and Force H from Gibraltar took part and damage which allowed the pursuers to
Admiral Holland, commanding the task force sent out after Bismark , cer-
tainly knew the liabilities of his ships. But, it seems to this author that
even though his plan took into consideration these disadvantages a more effec-
tive tactical operation was possible. Holland failed to make use of his three
advantages; numerical superiority, superior speed in one of his major ships
(the Hood was officially a little less than two knots faster than Bismark), and
a relatively new untried ship. According to Oscar Parks', British Battleships
,
p. 6?8 the Hood's protection increased because of the vertical armor as the
range decreased from 12,000 yards. The Prince of Wal es was safe from heavy guns
down to 13,000 yards. Holland approached at a small angle from behind. It sec
that it would have been better had the two shadowing cruisers joined tne battle-
and engaged the Prinze Eup;en . The Prince of Wales could have then engaged Bismark
at extreme ranges until Hood gained a position in front of the Bismark . Once
the Hood had gained such a position it could have closed head on at a closing
rate of 60 knots and presenting a very difficult target until the range was under
12,000 yards. As it was the first salvo was at 26,500 yards and the last at 14,600
yards and the Hood never achieved its maximum protection.
9^
Ltch up was caused by a torpedo from the Fleet Air Arm. After Bismark had
Lsappeared an airplane spotted it and reported its position to tho British units.
The ability of Bismark to absorb punishment from surface vessels and othor
*ans of attack was phenomenal. Over ninety torpedoes were launched by various
*ans; eight struck home in various places. Further about 2,900 shells were
Lred at Bismark of which about 700 were either fourteen or sixteen inches in
.ameter. The information about the number of hits was not available but it
m be assumed that most of them struck home because during the final minutes
* the battle the British battleships were firing at virtually point-blank range,
•obably more important to her survival was that of the eight torpedo hits; four
ire in each side which tended to keep her trimmed on an even keel.
The action during the sortie of the German ships involved only two ships,
.smark and Prim Eugen , on the Axis side. From the Axis standpoint it was
jubtful if this was a fleet action. The British action on the other hand was
;rtainly a fleet action; involving the capital ships Hood, Prince of Wales
,
_ng George V , Rodney ; the aircraft carriers Victorious and Ark Royal; the
•uisers Doresetshire , Norfolk , Suffolk ; and a number of destroyers. All this
'fort simply for the destruction of one ship showed the threat that this battle-
lip posed to the lifeline of the British Empire, commerce.
Another action involving capital ships xcas the damaging of the Graf Spee
*f the coast of South America and her final scuttling. This German vessel was
.oser to a heavy cruiser, but since her generic name, pocket-battleship, in-
.uded the term battleship, she has been included in this section rather than
lother. The pocket-battleships—which were called by the Germans Panzerschiff
^•Korotkin, Battle Damage to Surface Ships
, p. 176-185.
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or "armored ships"—were a new and radical design of surface warships. Mounting
six, eleven inch guns they had diesel engines for long cruising ranges and steam
.
for battle speeds. Three of those ships, Graf Spec , Scheer, and Deutschland
(later Lutzow ) were built during the period from 1928 to 1939. The principle
behind their construction was that they could out-gun anything they could not
out-run and out-run anything they could not out-gun. This theory did not hold
up in practice because the British battle-cruisers Hood , Repulse and Renown
all had superior speed and armaments. The most reliable sources said that the
pocket-battleships could do 28 knots. The British battleships while had probably
lost some of their speed because of age did 31.^5 knots on their trials. Nor
were the German pocket-battleships superior in either speed or armament to the
French battleships Dunkerque and Strasborg . Other than the above mentioned ships
the pocket-battleships exceeded either in speed or armament all other Allied war-
ships. Their long cruising radius made them supposedly ideal as commerce raiders.
V/hile on a commerce raiding operation Graf Spee met the British heavy cruiser
Exeter and the light cruisers A.iax and Achilles . After a running gun battle with
the cruisers, Graf Spee put into Montivedeo and after remaining for three days the
crew scuttled her in the River Plate. In this action Exeter , the heaviest of the
British ships, suffered extensive damage while the other two ships were only slight-
ly damaged. This action, whereby Graf Suee was forced to scuttle, seemed to show
that perhaps the Gorman Naval Staff was correct in their idea that the pocket-battle-
ships were superior to any single Allied warship except those already mentioned. The
other pocket-battleships were sunk in port by attacks by the Royal Air Force in 19^5.
Erich Groner, Die Schiffc Per Deutschen Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe
,
(I'unchen:
J. F. Lehamanns Verlag, 195'+), P. 70.
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The last of the major warships lost because of an action againnb it by noro
:han one type of vessel was tho German battleship Scharnhorsb . Famous for her
Channel dash, she was set upon by several cruisers and destroyers and the battle-
ship Duke of York off the coast of Norway. With her radar out of action Scharn-
lorst had difficulties firing at British warships during the Arctic night. Due
X) several torpedo attacks launched by the Allied destroyers the superior speed
>f the German battle-cruiser was lowered until the British battleship's heavier
;uns could be brought to bear. After suffering fifteen shell hits (eight and
fourteen inch shells) and six torpedo hits the Scharnhorst sank on the night of
>6 December, 19^3.
During the war in the Mediterranean no Italian battleships or battle-cruisers
rere lost because of surface actions with an Allied fleet. Several Italian cruis-
ers and destroyers were lost but these will be dealt with in a later section.
No other British battleships were lost because of gunfire than the already
icntioned Hood . Two Allied battleships were lost in the Atlantic because of sub-
larine attacks and two more because of special operations in Alexandria.
The age of the battleship had passed by the Second World War. Only in the
lediterranean did two fleets meet and neither side lost any capital ships in
:hese actions. The losses of battleships and battle-cruisers on both sides were
rhat could be called either task force operations or small weapon attacks. These
ictions were not small in the size of the ships involved but small in the number
jf ships participating in the action. Most cases were decided by only one ship
seing lost. The only exception to the studies made in this short segment on
It seems that in heavy Ai'ctic seas the Scharnhorst should have been able
to outrun the lighter destroyers which delivered the torpedo attacks. Edgar
'arch, British Destroyers
, p. hOG noted that on their respective trials the
Scharnhorst was only half a knot slower than the destroyers but at least one
lestroyer, Saumarez
, exceeded its trial speed.
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battleships was during the actions between the German ships Bisnark and Prinz
Euflon and the British ships Hood and Prince of Wales . Yet, by the time the over-
whelming forces of the British had caught up with the Bisnark , Prinz Eugen had
escaped.
The conclusion derived was that the battleship was still an effective weap-
on to destroy other battleships. But during the war other means were perfected
which were effective in sinking capital ships. During the Second World War the
battleship changed fron virtually the only weapon of naval warfare to the heaviest
member of the team.
3. Capital ships in offensive actions.
The offensive capabilities of the capital ship was of two types. One method
was of vital importance to the naval war; commerce raiding. The other method was
more important to the land war, shore bombardment.
The German Navy spent a great deal of effort developing commerce raiders
during the period between the wars. Before the treaty with Britain which allowed
them to start construction of a fleet, the emphasis in capital ship production
was on the pocket-battleship. Any belief that Graf Spee and her sister ships
were built purely for the protection of the Baltic and perhaps operations in the
North Sea was disproved by their cruising radius. Equipped with diesel engines
they had sufficient range to allow them to remain at sea in far distant areas
for long periods of time. The major warships built after the signing of the Anglo-
German Naval Treaty were generally of the usual type with shorter ranges and great-
er fighting power. This was the common type of battleship as differed from the
radical pocket-battleships. They were characterized by Tirpitz and Bismark
.
Once again whether this was the correct application of capital ships hinges
on the quostion of how much damage did they do the Allied supply system. Durj ng
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,he war in the Atlantic the surface raiders Scharnhorst . Gnoisenau , Graf Spec ,
)eutschland , Scheer, and Hipper sank forty-four ships x^hich totaled 270,859 tons,
'his figure while seemingly large in no way compared to the over seven million
,ons of British shipping sunk by submarines. The interesting thing to note about
.he losses of merchant ships was that very few of them were small ships which
>roved that the surface raiders could be selective in the ships which they sank,
'artially the explanation that few small ships were sunk was that they usually
>lied their trade in shallow waters close to shore where a radio warning would
lave brought instant retaliation to the attacker. When ships were met during
,he break out into the Atlantic, they were avoided as swiftly as possible.
In order to protect the shipping from German commerce raiders, battleships
rere used as escort for important convoys when there was a threat of German sur-
'ace actions. One aspect of convoy operation was that until the warship was
dther sunk or had returned to port the convoy system stopped. This incredibly
:omplicated system came to a virtual halt because in a few minutes a powerful
surface raider could destroy large numbers of ships. Because of the pocket-battle-
;hip Scheer *s attack on the convoy from Halifax, HX 84, in which the armed merchant
:ruiser Jervis Bay was sunk defending the convoy, the system was stopped for nearly
;wo weeks. This stoppage, according to RoskiU, caused more damage than the actual
lumber of ships sunk by Scheer . If the convoy system was stopped for some time
>y warships it might have been difficult to get it started again. The ports which
rere supposed to be empty so another convoy could start forming would not have
Admiralty, British Merchant Vessels Lost . This listing includes the losses
:aused by the German cruiser Hipper . While not actually a capital ship because
>he engaged in commerce raiding she has been included as causing part of the losses,
^osldll, War at Sea , Vol. I, p. 289.
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been empty and a massive pile up could have developed. Other ports or anchorages
could have been used as temporary measures but the complications of this would
have multiplied rapidly.
The raiders when they did go into the ocean found it highly dangerous as a
rule to attack convoys. First, when a convoy was attacked their position was
certain to bo reported by the escort. Second, if the escort was not too weak
the raider might have suffered damage and not have been able to return to port.
The best possible place for the warships was the convoys. If the escort was
dealt with satisfactorily large numbers of merchant ships could have been sunk
in a few minutes. After the sinking of the Graf Spee early in the war, the raid-
ers had strict orders never to attack heavily escorted convoys. The use of
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
,
according to Woodward, to attack single merchantmen
during the war was not worth the effort. Woodward was referring to the time when
the two battle-cruisers came upon a convoy escorted by the old battleship
Ramillies . This British battleship was completed during the First World War
and was armed with eight, fifteen inch guns. She might not have been a match
for the two modern and considerably faster German battle-cruisers. Gneisenau
was apparently maneuvering to engage Ramillies when Admiral Lutjens, who later
commanded Bismark force s ordered a withdrawal, David Woodward forgot to rec-
ognize that part of the task of battle-cruisers was to insure their continued
existence. Germany did not have many major warships and the chance of damage
to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was too great. Ramillies with fifteen inch guns
versus eleven inch for the battle-cruisers was practically guaranteed to cause
Woodward, Tirpitz
, p. 50. For the story of the Scharnhorst f s and Gneisenau*
s
commerce raiding activities .see Philip Lundeberg, "The Scharnhorst-Gneisenau Team
at its Peak," USNIP
, August, 1956, p. 852-860.
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some damage. The heavier armor plate also gave the British ship added advantages,
[f one of the hits on the battle-cruisers was in a vital area which would have
sither stopped the ships or slowed them considerably they almost certainly would
lave been lost. Also, their task was not to attack battleships but to sink mer-
chantmen and they might have been jeopardizing their mission.
The surface ships as commerce raiders had the ability to draw off large
lumbers of British capital ships much as did the capital ships as "fleets In
:>eing." Examples of this were the large numbers of task forces that were pa-
trolling the oceans in order to catch Graf Spee and Deutschland . And while
battleships were necessary to protect certain convoys—such as troop transports
—
:hey could have been well employed elsewhere.
Commerce raiding battleships caused more havoc than was justified by the
lumber of ships that they sank. Perhaps if the Allies had not been so powerful
In capital ships they might have caused more damage. This was pure speculation
because the capital ships did not sink a large number of ships.
J-. Capital ships as "fleets in being."
A battleship when used as a fleet in being was neither offensive nor de-
fensive but just a method of tying down large amounts of force. A fleet in be-
ing's main purpose was to tie down forces so that other means of attack could
ichieve success. In this operation the ships seldom sailed but remained in port
threatening the commerce routes and sailing only from time to time to keep their
Dresence remembered.
Perhaps the effect of large battleships used in this method of employment
jas shewn by the sister ship of Bismark , Tirpitz . Of nearly ^-2,000 tons, this
battleship caused the Allies untold effort and worry until she was sunk in Novem-
Der of 19^*-. Yet, the most remarkable fact was that this warship never fired her
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main armament at an Allied warship. Upon completion she remained in various
fjords in Norway vihere her presence was enough of a threat to make the Allies
keep strong forces in waters close by when they were urgently needed elsewhere.
Had the British Navy been able to remove the covering forces from the convoys
to Russia the battle for the supremacy of the Mediterranean would have been
settles much easier. Tirpitz ! s position in Norway caused her to be a serious
threat on the flank of the convoys carrying supplies to Russia. Heavy covering
forces always accompanied these convoys when there was a chance that the battle-
ship would attack them. It was hoped that they would be able to protect the con-
voys from Tirpitz and even better the German battleship would have been sunk.
The two convoys, PQ 15 (to Russia) and QP 11 (from Russia), had as escorts the
battleships HMS King George V, and USS Washington
, the aircraft carrier HM5
Victorious , one British and two American cruisers and ten destroyers. These
warships were sent to protect the two convoys in the latter half of April, 19^2.
This was when the threat in the Mediterranean reached its height and American
warships were desperately needed in the Pacific to stop the advance of the Japa-
nese Navy. Yet, Tirpitz never weighed its anchor during the passage of this pair
of convoys.
Other vessels of the German Navy played the same role as the Tirpitz , in-
cluding the battle-cruiser Scharnhorst , the pocket-battleships Scheer and
Lutzow, and tho heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen and Hipper . These vessels, which
were in serious danger on the open sea, caused on the other hand innumerable air
attacks to be launched against them and the retention of superior forces when
they could have been more profitably employed elsewhere.
'•Woodward, The Tirpitz
. p. 83.
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The Italian forces in the Mediterranean might have been similarly employed
is their German counterparts. At times they had enough battleships to challenge
,he British movements in the central basin of the Mediterranean. By allowing
,he fleet to remain in port when there were ample opportunities to score a dc-
sisive victory and gain control of the convoy routes to Africa shov/ed that they
rere something less than a fleet in being; they were an unused fleet. It is
[uite noticeable that the Gorman ships have been caXled by name partially be-
:ause there were so few that given a normal war-time situation they did not
jonstitute a fleet. The Italians on the other hand had several battleships,
mcluding the new and modern Littorio and Vittorio Vento . Where it seemed that
Jhe failure to employ the Italian fleet in offensive operations was a failure
;o use its forces; the failure to use the German warships was an economy effort
lirected by the necessity of not losing the few ships they did have.
There can be some question of the usefulness of the German heavy forces as
fleets in being. It was dangerous for the warships to sail and they took little
Dart in the operations. At the same time they occupied large numbers of men
md material. In a report presented by the Quartermaster Division of the German
Javal Staff to Hitler it was cited that by scrapping the warships left to the
Jerman Navy in 19^3 over 125 » 000 tons of steel and nearly 9,000 trained officers
md men would have been gained. Over 125,000 tons of steel would have been an
addition to the German war economy and nearly 9,000 men would have been able to
2
tiake crews for 180 Type Vli C submarines.'
1
Fuehrer Conferences
,
19-1-3, Report presented by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster
Division concerning the dismantling of the battleships Tirpitz , Scharnhorst
,
foeisenau , and the heavy cruisers Hipper , Prinze Eugen , Admiral Scheer , and Lutzow
,
I January, 19^-3, p. 5.
'
2
Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, p. ^75 stated that this type of submarine re-
hired a crew of forty-four. This divided in 9,000 more than 180 times but it
ia.s doubtful if the crews for 180 submarines could be gained from the crews of
the battleships. This example has been used only to accent what might have been
oossible.
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Tho question of whether fleets in being were more valuable remaining in
action or being scrapped depended on the amount of effort and confusion they
required the enemy to exert* Both Admiral Raeder and Doenitz argued for their
retention while Hitler wished to have them cut up and used for scrap. A formula
can be derived which showes whether or not tho surface ships should have been
retained. Such a formula is:
AXIS
Amount of effort
required to support
and operate surface
craft
Amount of material
gained by scrapping
surface craft
VS.
ALLIES
Amount of effort
required to contain
surface craft
Added effort
needed elsewhere
because of in-
creased material
The difficulty of this formula was that there were no objective units of measur-
ment. If the figures on the left hand side of tho formula exceeded the figures
on the right, then the surface craft should have been destroyed. On the other
hand, if the figures on the right exceeded those on the left, the surface craft
should have been retained. The figures do not exist which would allow this for-
mula to be implemented . No one has determined how many more destroyers would
have been necessary to restrict the extra number of submarines gained because
of the scrapping of the battleships. Using hindsight, it can be determined that
the battleships were valuable to the Germans because the British were expend:
considerable amounts of effort trying to destroy them. The air attacks on Tirpitz
,
small as they were compared to the strategic raids, absorbed some of the Allied
air povrer. liore important was the need to keep throe battleships in the home
ion
fleet. Not only were the crews, fuel and munitions for the battleships neces-
sary but also destroyers were required to be in constant readiness and could not
be released for convoy duty.
Not only was the amount of effort required for surface ships difficult, if
not impossible, to determine, but it was equally difficult to determine the los;.
suffered because of the presence of the battleships. The German ships in Norway
sometimes made the attack of other weapons easier. Convoy PQ 17 (to Russia)
was ordered to scatter because of the threat of German surface ships which never
made contact. Since the escort was removed and the ships were in ones and twos
the German Air Force and submarines had a great number of succosses, 200,000 tons
of supplies and 21 ships were lost from this one convoy by means other than sur-
2
face attack. Certainly some losses would have been suffered by this convoy but
the withdrawal of the escorts and the scattering of the convoy made the individual
merchantmen much more vulnerable to attack by aircraft and submarines.
It seemed that because of the effort required to contain the German warships
in Norway the Allied forces greatly exceeded the necessary German effort to sup-
ply the warships. Warships, which were not integrated with a fleet but few in
number and opposed by greatly superior forces, caused serious dislocations and
losses out of proportion to their number.
5. The influence of battleships during the Second World War.
The capital ship had one use which has only been mentioned in this section;
its power for shore bombardment was unequal ed by any other weapon. During the
period before 19^-3 and the surrender of Italy, battleships were a scarce commodity
Woodward, The Tirpitz
. p. 86.
2
Jbid.
, p. 93.
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and necessary for the command of the sea. After the Italian Fleet surrendered
during the sunmer of 19^3 the capital ships which had been used to contain them
were no longer needed. There was a surplus of Allied battleships after this
period and they could now be used for the more dangerous task of shore bombard-
ment. This uso of battleships for primarily land work shows one of the main
influences of naval power. While the war may not yet have been won the command
of the sea had relinquished its importance and it was now time for the army to
conquer the territory and force the enemy to surrender.
The battleship durinc the Second World War still had valuable tasks to per-
form. Its prime task was the destruction or containment of eneny battleships.
It was no longer the only weapon which could perform this task but the largest
member of the naval team engaged in protecting the sea lanes. While it could
not defend the sea lanes from submarines and mines, and aircraft only in a
limited sence, they still could destroy surface ships and protect the sea lanes
from them.
Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy
,
(New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1965), p. 76.
CHAPTKR V
OTHER SURFACE WARSHIPS
1, Cruisers during the period between the wars.
Edward Altham in the article "Cruiser" in the Britannica said the cruisers *
functions were to guard the sea routes and to act as the advance guards of the
fleet. During peacetime the cruiser had a duty which was not particularly im-
portant during wartime. This was showing the flag throughout various ports and
harbors of foreign nations. During the period between the wars some naval think-
ers proposed that the British Navy concentrate on cruisers and neglect the battle-
ship.
During the period of the naval limitation treaties, 1922-1936, cruisers were
subject to nearly as much discussion as battleships. The prime question between
the wars was whether large cruisers as the London and Norfolk class of 9,759 tons
2
and 9.900 tons respectively were the most practical. Larger cruisers generally
possessed heavier armament but little armor protection. They were built by Britain
in an effort to compete with the large American cruisers being built at the time.
Generally the American cruisers displaced 9,000 tons.-^ American cruisers were
built to operate in the Pacific where distances were considerably greater than
those in the Atlantic. These new cruisers, laid down between 1929 and 1930, cost
nearly as much as a World War I battleship. Queen Elizabeth , Resolution , Revenge ,
Capt. Edward Altham, "Cruiser," Encyclopaedia Britannica , Vol. 6, (Chicago:
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 19^3), p. 768.
o
Brassey's^ 1935 , p. 219. Brassey's, 1938 , P. 223 lists the cruisers some- •
what larger.
3Ibid.
. 1938, p. 256-8.
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Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign cost between L2, 204,368 and L2, 570, 504. Devonshire
cost b2, 007, 275 and Doresctshiro 172,101,951. These cruisers during the last
European war were not particularly useful and may have been a waste of money and
effort.
Seventy cruisers were considered necessary for the maintenance of British
naval strength but Admiral Beatty (who had led the battle-cruisers at Jutland)
supported Churchill's desire for fewer, larger cruisers; consequently larger ships,
2but smaller in number, were accepted.
The bickering between the powers over cruisers led generally to nothing.
Each of the powers engaged in the naval conferences was primarily interested in
their own naval needs. After the reconstruction of the German Navy and the de-
velopment of the pocket-battleships the need in Britain was not for large lightly
armored cruisers, but for ships which could protect the sea lanes and have the
gun power and armor to do battle with the more heavily armed German warships.
British cruisers needed less range and speed and more gun power and heavier armor
to deal with pocket-battleships. The eight, 8-inch guns of the London class
cruisers threw a projectile weighing 256 pounds for a total broadside of 2,048
pounds. The German pocket-battleships had six, 11-inch guns, each hurling a
shell weighing 670 pounds for a total broadside of 4,020 pounds. It took nearly
two British heavy cruisers to equal one of the German commerce raiders in gun
power alone. Brasscy's Naval Annual does not list the armor protection of the
'
Ibid
.
, 1935 * P. 219, and Higham, Armed Forces , p. 131.
Higham, Armed Forces
, p. 128.
3Brassoy f s, 193?
. p. 318, 327.
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jondon class cruisers but according to Hjgham the new cruisers were relatively
marmored. Since obviously the German pocket-battleships were designed to raid
lommorce it would have been more logical for heavier armed and armored cruisers,
jven though somewhat smaller, to have been built for protecting convoys.
Admiral Sir Horbert Richmond was one of the prime advocates of cruisers,
fe felt for the defense of British shipping, vessels which were able to patrol
.he lanes, even in the most distant areas were needed. Richmond like so many
>ther military authors tended to ignore the threat from German submarines. This
teemed somewhat unusual because during his earlier years he belonged to what might
>e called the liberal school of the navy. He graduated from the torpedo school
[MS Vernon in 1897 and was a member of the "fishpond."' Richmond wanted a ship
rith a displacement of 10,000 tons, capable of speeds up to 28 knots, and at 15
mots could have cruised 8,000 miles. * This was satisfactory for operations in
;he Channel and North Sea but during the war failed to exert satisfactory influ-
ence
.
During the war with Hitler cruisers were distinctly neglected. Few battles
mvolving them are well known today and as a class they have been nearly forgotten,
Jsually cruisers when engaging German warships were only participating in a de-
.aying action until battleships could catch up. Few of the cruisers had the fame
md glory of the battleships because their larger brethern were considered to have
>een the cause of victory. The part Prinz Eugen played during the sortie of
Higham, Armed Forces
, p. 127.
2
D. M. Shurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval
Strategic Thought
, 1897-191^, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), p.
.11 and 122.
^Higham, Military Intellectuals
, p. 3^~5.
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Bismark has been ignored by moot historians, as was the role of the cruisers
shadowing the Bismark
. As a class they have not nearly the fane as destroyers
which can, with somo justification, be held to have won the Battle of the Atlantic.
Few major actions involving cruisers were mentioned and it seems that surely more
emphasis and information is available than has yet been published. As a general
statement it can bo assumed that the cruiser operations were for a large part
similar in nature, and diminished in size, to those of battleships. The one ex-
ception to this was the cruisers were used as scouts for the fleet, and battleships
never were because they were part of the fleet itself.
2. Defensive operations with cruisers.
The most famous battle of cruisers during the war was the elimination of
the Graf Spec in the mouth of the River Plate. This pocket-battleship had made
its break into mid-ocean before the declaration of hostilities and until she was
sunk raided commerce shipping in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. While
hunting for a heavy concentration of shipping off the South American coast she
came across the British heavy cruiser Exeter—somewhat smaller than the London
class cruisers and armed with six, 8-inch guns—and the light cruisers Achilles
and Ajax.
The British cruisers were out gunned by their superior opponent but it was
necessary for the Graf Spoe to put into Nontivedeo in order to make repairs.
During the period that the Graf Spec was undergoing repairs the Admiralty rushed
forces to the area to prevent her escape. Because of the damage received, Exeter
was replaced by the heavy cruiser Cumberland . Rather than face the fire of the
British cruisers again the captain of the Graf Spee scuttled his ship. Certainly
S. D. Waters, New Zealand in the Second World V/ar , Vol. I, no. b, "Achilles
at the River Plate," (Wellington, New Zealand: War Historical Branch, Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs, 19^8).
110
?he Graf Spec lost the battle but she was not damaged to the point that she could
iot have inflicted more damage to the British cruisers. Becauso Captain Langsdorff
-ealized the fight was hopeless he decided to save his men. This battle pointed
>ut one disadvantage of the German position. The British ships when damaged could
3ut into a number of ports and remain until the damage had been corrected; the
rermans could not.
In several other operations in the Atlantic cruisers played secondary roles
Ln the defense of merchant shipping. Three different cruisers participated at
>ne time or another in the events that led to the destruction of Bismark. Four
jruisers took part in the sinking of the battlf -cruiser Scharnhorst . These
>perations were the only time that cruisers were within gunnery range when a
iajor warship was sunk in the Atlantic. In all these operations a major Allied
ship was present and caused more destruction than the cruisers. But the sinking
>f Bismark 'showed one of the cruiser's main advantages and perhaps its primary
;ask. The cruiser with its longer range could and was used as a means of re-
connaissance. In the case of Bismark it was cruisers that found her and managed
;o shadow her until the British fleet caught up. In the sinking of Graf Spee
:he cruisers were patrolling a certain area in hopes of catching her and if un-
ible to destroy the Graf Spee would have shadowed her until heavier fleet units
;aught up.
J. Cruisers in offensive actions.
Only one of the German heavy cruisers, Hipper , attacked commerce in the
Atlantic. At this job she was not particularly successful; because of defects
Ln her engines she caused few losses before being forced to return to port. The
yther German cruisers Blucher and Prinz Rugen, played minor roles in the Atlantic-.
JIucher was sunk by Norwegian shore batteries and torpedoes during the surprise
Ill
attack on Norway in 19^0. And Prinz Eugen , which survived the war, was famous
only for operations in which she took part; with Bismark during her brief foray '
into the Atlantic and with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during their dash up the
English Channel.
While not exactly offensive operations the war in the Mediterranean showed
another use of cruisers. During operations in the Mediterranean cruisers were
used most often to escort convoys. This was due partially to the threat from
aircraft. While the battleships Nelson and Rodney had eight and six, 4.7-inch
anti-aircraft guns, respectively, on their original designs, the cruisers Devon-
shire and Doresetshire while being less than a third the size of the battleships
had eight, 4-inch anti-aircraft guns each. If multiplied times three they would
have had 24 anti-aircraft guns as compared with the battleships which had either
six or eight.
In the Mediterranean three cruisers were lost in a matter of minutes when
they were approached by British battleships. During the Battle of Cape Matapan
(March, 1941) the Italian cruisers Fiume , Zara and Pola were lost primarily be-
cause of Warspite's fifteen inch guns. This one action accounted for 25 « of the
twelve Italian cruisers lost during the war. Four Italian cruisers ( San Giorgia ,
January, 19*11: Attendolo , December, 1942; Trieste , April, 1943; Bari , June, 1943)
were lost because of air attack, one cruiser (Trento , June, 1942) was lost by a
combination of air attack and submarine, one cruiser ( Ulpio Traino , January, 1943)
was lost because of human torpedo, and the remaining three (Colleoni, July, 1940;
Da Barbiano , December, 1941; and Pi Guissano , December, 1941 ) were lost because of
2
surface action at various places in the Mediterranean.
1
Bras9ey's
, 1938, P. 218-219.
2Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 379.
112
The British Mediterranean cruiser losses were all from weapons of Jeune Ec
Eight British cruisers ( Calypso , June, 19't-O; Bonaventure , March, l^ll Dunedln,
November, 19^1; Galatea , December, 19^1; Naiad , March, 19zf-2 ; Edinburgh , May, 19^2;
Hermoinc , June, 19'+2; Penelope . February, 19^-0 were lost becauso of submarine
attack; six because of air attack ( Southampton , January, 19^1; Fiji , May, 19^1;
Glouchester . May, 19^1; York , May, 19^1; Trinidad , May, 19' 1-2; Spartan, January,
19z^); one becauso of mine ( Neptune , December, 19^-1); and two because of E-boat
torpedoes (Manchester , August, 19^2 and Charybids , October, 19^3).
*+. Cruisers during the war.
The majority of the cruisers lost in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean
were sunk because of underwater explosions. Of the nineteen British cruisers
lost in either the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Theaters, eleven were lost be-
cause of torpedoes or mines. The British losses were as follows: one ( Effingham )
struck a submerged rock, eight ( Calypso, Bonaventure , Galatea , Naiad , Hermoine ,
Dunedin , Edinburgh , Penelope ) because of submarines, six ( Southampton , Fi.ji ,
Gloucester , York , Trinidad , Spartan) because of aerial attack, tx^o (Charybids ,
Manchester ) because of E-boat torpedoes, one ( Neptune ) because of mine, and one
(Dragon) because of human torpedo. Fourteen of the British cruisers lost were
sunk because of damage beloxtf the water line. Because of the necessity of using
cruisers for convoy escorts, evacuation ships, shore bombardment, and commerce
raiders in the Mediterranean, the losses were correspondingly higher than losses
in the Atlantic. Five of the British losses were in the Atlantic and one of those
was by accident. Korotkin, in his work on damage to surface ships, stated that
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
.
2Ibid.
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two-thirds of the cruisers lost (in both the Pacific and Atlantic) were lost
because of underwater explosions, a figure he derived by adding torpedo losses,
mine losses, and aerial bombs, some of which exploded underwater. Further he
noted that more cruisers sank from underwater explosions than remained afloat.
The last argument was the most telling argument against the continued use of
cruisers. The World War II cruisers were unable to withstand the heavy caliber
shells of modern battleships; witness the destruction of three Italian cruisers
by Warspitc's guns and the severe damage to the Exeter caused by Graf Spee's guns.
At the same time cruisers could not compete with their own kind because where
there were cruisers there were usually battleships. The cruiser was of little
value for the protection of convoys because it was vulnerable to the main commerce
raiders and had no means of attacking submarines. The only apparent value of
the cruiser was driving off attacks of aircraft, but in this section only those
cruisers built to engage in surface actions have been mentioned and the cruisers
especially developed for anti-aircraft work were much more effective. It was
argued during the poriod of the naval conferences that cruisers were needed to
protect British commerce but as the matter turned out it was not cruisers that
were needed, but destroyers.
2
5. Escorts during the period between the wars.
During the period before the Second World War a number of mistakes were
made concerning escorts and their effectiveness. The first of these was the
' Korotkin, Battle Damage
, p. 296.
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The term escort throughout this chapter will include destroyers, corvettes,
frigates, sloops, trawlers, coast guard cutters, sub-chasers, and other small
vessels used primarily as anti-submarine ships. When it has been necessary to
denote some special characteristic of these vessels they will be called by their
real name and not just destroyers as a general class.
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thought that submarines as commerce raiders had boon effectively limited by dip-
lomatic agreements and particularly the condemnation of tho German First World
War submarine effort. It was assumed that submarines would act in the same
manner as surface vossels. Submarines were supposed to surface, signal the
vessel to stop, search the ship for contraband and if it then had such contra-
band sink it after having placed its crew in a safe position. Such a method of
operation would have made submarines extremely vulnerable. Even a merchant ship
mounting one, four-inch gun could either puncture the submarine's pressure hull
or ram it and cause it to sink. Nevertheless some members of the naval staffs
believed that the submarine would operate according to the standards established.
In part the problems arose from the fact that tho Admiralty was comparatively
uninterested in the tactics and strategy of using submarines as commerce raiders.'
The leaders of the naval staff in Britain were concerned about how they were go-
ing to combat the German pocket-battleships. Hector Bywater, who was a prescient
observer of naval affairs, noted in 1935 that the pocket-battleships were "a
thorn in the side of the British naval staff."2 Some developments in submarines
led the Admiralty to believe that the tactics for submarines would be similar
to the rules laid down. The French submarine Surcouf mounted two, eight-inch
guns and with such heavy armament it was hoped would be able to do battle as a
surface raider, but Jane's in 19^1 described it as an experiment not likely to
3be repeated. The British also built the X-l with a similar purpose in mind but
it too was a failure.
Robertson, Walker, R. N.
, p. 23.
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Hecter C. Bywater, "The German Naval Renaissance," Nineteenth Century , Vol.
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3Jane's , 19^1, p. 184.
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The Admiralty made a serious error in the development of nethods to attack
submarines. During the period between the wars a great deal of faith v;as placed
.
in the ability of asdic to detect submarines. This device, known to Americans
as sonar, sent out a sound beam which bounced off submarines and returned to the
sender. In this method submerged submarines could be located and attacked. The
problem arose when it was discovered that the Admiralty was only partially correct
in their interpretation of how submarines would operate in the next war. Admiral
Doonitz and other members of the U-boat arm realized that the submarine was most
effective when delivering attacks on the surface, where they could not be detected.
Part of the agreements stated that the submarines must surface before attack} n~
a merchant ship. Since the submarine cast such a low silhouette and was much
more mancuverable and faster on the surface, their standard attack practice was
for the submarines to attack on the surface during the night without warning.
3The asdic operation worked only on submerged submarines. Asdic during the war
turned out to be a very effective method of locating submarines once other means
had been used to force them to submerge. But on the surface the detection of
submarines was, until radar was developed, a matter of eyesight.
Another problem with asdic was its effective range. Edgar March, who wrote
the definitive history of British destroyers, said the furthest detection of a
submarine with asdic was at 15 knots 3*300 yards and at 2.0 knots 2,700 yards.
These figures were under ideal conditions. Most submarine attacks were at ranges
Robert E. Kuennn, The Attack Submarine: A Study in Strategy
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under 2,700 yards but even slow moving escorts would have had difficulty picking
up an unlocated submarine at the shorter ranges. Theso figures, while probably
quite valid, were unrealistic under war conditions.
Like so many other vessels the escorts were unprepared to deal with air at-
tacks. During operations in Norway the importance of sufficient air protection
was suddenly and dramatically brought home to destroyer commanders. Admiral
Pugsley has noted that the destroyer's main ^-.7-inch armament was totally un-
suited against German dive bombers because they could not elevate above forty
degrees. The only other anti-aircraft armament that tho destroyer possessed was
two, 0.5-inch machine guns and one pom-pom. Because of the lack of anti-air-
craft weapons, which were ignored throughout the period before the war, destroyers
were very vulnerable to aircraft when working close to enemy held waters.
6. Escorts in defensive actions.
When the war opened in 1939 » the liner Athena was sunk without warning by
a German submarine. It did not take the Admiralty long to realize that the mer-
chant ships were going to have to be convoyed. The only satisfactory vessels
for convoy duty during the early days of the war were destroyers and there were
all too few of these. The convoy was a tactic with a single purpose; to get mer-
chant ships safely through to England. The problem arose when arguments broke
out whether this was the most effective means of protecting merchantmen.
The argument was over two questions: (l) whether convoys would concentrate
shipping so that large numbers could be sunk in short order, and (2) the losses
inherent because of the convoy system. Even though the Admiralty was quick to
realize the potential of convoys as a means to combat commerce raiders, members
Pugsley, Destroyer Man
, p. 33.
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of tho naval staff were reluctant to employ them during the opening months of
World V/ar II. Convoys were imposed on the slower ships early in the war but
some unwillingness was shown in making them effective for all vessels. There
were some valid reasons for looking on convoys with disfavor. The primary rea-
son was convoys caused delays in shipping and unloading. This caused serious
congestion in ports and other facilities. According to Behrens, importing ca-
pacity was reduced by 20-25$ becauso of delays caused by the convoy system.
The figures of shipping for the British Empire in June, 193^, were 20,841,218
gross tons. Because of the convoy system, the services of between 4,168,436 and
5,510.204 gross tons of shipping were lost to the British war effort. These
high losses of importing capacity because of the convoy system could only be tol-
erated on two conditions. First it was necessary that the war be a long one.
If it seemed to naval planners that the war was going to last only a short while
the absolute losses because of enemy action probably would not have exceeded the
losses in shipping capacity caused by the establishment of the convoy system.
The second condition was that the enemy had to have available means to attack
commerce shipping and causo serious damage. If for example, the war was goi-
to last ten years and losses of 10,000 tons per year were expected there would
have been little reason to establish a convoy system. Also if the war was only
going to last a year and a million tons of independently routed shipping would
have been lost during the year there would have been no reason to employ convoys.
But if, as it did, it look like the war was going to last a number of years and the
*E. M, Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, The Great Sea War
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(Englowoods Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., Co., I960), p. 3.
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Losses were going to be heavy each year, then the convoy system would insure
that enough ships would be available for the long haul.. After the sudden fall
of France it was obvious that the defeat of Germany was going to take a consider-
able amount of effort and that to maintain the fighting capacity of the British
Isles it was necessary to institute convoys.
Captain Rosklll in an article arguing for the use of convoys pointed out
that the losses suffered from convoys were considerably less than with indepen-
dently routed ships. The losses from unescorted ships made up 72$ of the losses
caused by U-boats; the other 28$ were ships in convoy. Also, he noted that great-
er losses were suffered by submarines in attempting to attack convoys. Although
some ships, particularly fast ones, were routed independently, the average mer-
chant ships needed to be defended by convoys. Important ships were routed in-
dependently because it was felt that their high speed, would allow them to avoid
submarines, where convoys would have slowed them down and made their chances of
being torpedoed about the same as the average merchant ship. If the high speed
vessels were unable to avoid submarines altogether their speed might allow them
to zig-zag sufficiently to keep the submarine from attaining an attack position.
The importance of convoys can be graphically illustrated by comparing charts
\f-2 and V-3. Chart V-2 shows the shipping of the British Empire on a normal day
before the war. Chart V-3 shows the position of convoys during a normal day when
the convoy system was in full swing. Since, as will be discussed later, the sub-
marines had difficulties finding targets the concentration of all the ships into
a few small areas vastly added to these difficulties. Also, the problems of at-
tacking convoys were increased by the defensive escorts patrolling the edge of
1Capt. S. W. Roskill, "Capros not Convoy," USNI.P , Vol. 87, no. 10, October,
1956, p. 1052.
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Tabic V-2 The Distribution of I h Shipping in H< '.tors, Atlantic
an' rranean on an Average Day before the Introduction
of Convoys.
o£v~
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•
Donald Macintyre, U-Boat Killer, (Lonrlon: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
195^) between pages 60-61
.
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Table V-3 The Distribution of/ British Convoy. Ships
Sailing Independently in Home Waters, Atlantic and M< ona
in Mid-Augusl 19-13 f when the Convoy System v?as in Full Operation.
V
Macintyre, U-Boat Killer, between p. 60--61.
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the group. There escorts could, if they spotted the submarine , force it to sub-
merge where they were no longer effective attack weapons and vulnerable to the
escort's weapons.
The escort's prime attack weapon during the early part of the war was the
depth charge, a container filled with several hundred pounds of explosives set
to detonate at a predetermined depth. They were either fired off the side of
the ship or dropped off the stern. Since some time elapsed before the charges
sank to the predetermined depth at which they were supposed to explode, there
was a chance that the submarine would maneuver away from the sinking charges and
not be within the leathai radius when they exploded. Depending on a number of con-
ditions, U-boats could be detected by asdic at an angle of 65° from the horizontal.
Depending on the depth of the U-boat, speed of the attacking escort, rate at
which the depth charge fell and other conditions the submarine could have traveled
several hundred yards before the escort's explosives firec. In order to evade
this problem the tactic was developed whereby two escorts worked in conjunction.
Captain Walker, who may have been the most successful escort commander of the
war, developed the use of two escorts to a fine point. One escort stood off
from the submarine and retained contact, while another passed over the submarine.
The escort maintaining contact with the submarine talked to the attacking one and
informed it when the correct position to launch its charges was attained. Since
the U-boat commander had difficulties hearing the approaching attack escort he
was many times unaware that an attack had been launched until he was blanketed
by depth charge explosions. Also, if he maneuvered during the period when the
attacking ship's asdic was inoperative the other destroyer immediately relayed
•^Robertson, Walker, R. M.
, p. 116.
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the change In position and corrections were made before the charges were launched.
In order to understand this operation better a diagram (V-4) has been reproduced
on the next page.
Another role of the escorts in convoy action was the destruction of at-
tacking aircraft. As already noted, at the first of the war destroyers were
ill-equipped to deal with aerial attack because they had not received sufficient
anti-aircraft armament. After studying the design of destroyers in the 19^3
Brassey ! s and comparing them with the 1939 design it became readily apparent
that the anti-aircraft armament had increased.* They were no longer equipped
with armament which was only satisfactory for firing at surface targets but had
been issued dual purpose guns.
Destroyers were from time to time used as anti-aircraft support for convoys,
particularly in two areas, the Arctic runs to Russia and the Mediterranean runs to
Malta. They escorted convoys to Russia from 19^2 to late 19^ and convoys to
Malta from the latter part of 19^0 to the latter part of 19^-2. Table V-5 on
the next page shows the general cruising formation of escorts and the change
in formation when aerial attack threatened. Since destroyers were used for so
many vital and different operations in the Mediterranean, including evacuation,
escort and shore bombardment, it was necessary for them to have sufficient anti-
aircraft armament for their own protection. During operations in the Mediterranean
it was repeatedly shown that it was impossible for destroyers to survive in an
2
area controlled by enemy aircraft without high angle guns.
In the Atlantic and Mediterranean destroyers suffered their heaviest losses
from aerial attack. Of the 126 British destroyers lost in the Atlantic theater
1
Brassey's, 1.9*1-3
. p. 213.
2
Pugsley, Destroyer Man
, p. 95.
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Table V-4 aa of a Two Ship Co-ordinated Attack on a Su oat.
SUB
ATTACKING /
SHIP "
Rogcoo, U. S 1 Destroyers, back cover.
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Table V-5 Diagram of Convoy FQ 18 Showing the Typical Cruising Order
of the Escorts and the Change in Position when Air Attack
Threatened.
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^8 or 38.1^ were lost because of air attacks. Only four out of forty frigates
and corvettes were lost because of aerial bombs and torpedoes. The reasons for
the smaller losses for frigates and corvettes were because they came into the
war later and for their size were better equipped with anti-aircraft armament.
Also, the smaller ships seldom worked in the narrow seas where the threat fr-
aircraft was more prevalent than in mid-Atlantic. They seldom operated near in-
shore waters or went on shipping sweeps in the Channel. The destroyers worked
in the narrow seas of the Mediterranean, escorted ships in the shallow waters
around England, and were used to attack enemy inshore shipping.
7. Destroyers in Offensive actions.
Throughout the war destroyers engaged in many serious and valuable surface
actions with opponents far exceeding them in size. It was not the small and
relatively ineffectual guns which the destroyers carried, but their torpedoes
that made them dangerous to the larger surface ships.
Two cases in particular showed the ability of the modern destroyers to hold
its own with far larger antagonists. The first of these actions was their par-
ticipation in the sinking of Bismark . After the great German battleship had been
slowed and severely damaged by aerial torpedoes the British destroyers Cossack
and Maori attacked and two of their torpedoes struck home. These two hits, ac-
cording to Korotkin, caused Bismark temporarily to come to a complete stop and
2
the bow section was enveloped in flames. Certainly Bismark was a doomed ship
when the attacks were launched but the next morning when the British battleships
arrived she still had enough fight in her to engage in a main armament gun duel.
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
.
2Korotkin, Battle Damage , p. 178-80.
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Tho 21-inch torpedoes which were launched by the destroyers wore h r than
the 18-inch torpedoes launched by aircraft by more than 280 pounds of explosives.-.
While the damage caused by the aerial torpedoes was responsible for the stopping
of Bismark in her flight for hirae, the effect of the destroyers in adding further
damage should not be underrated.
A more clear case where a battleship would not have been sunk at all if it
had not been for the actions of destroyers was the sinking of Scharnhorst in
arctic waters in December, 19-C During a gun duel with the battleship Duke
of York and the cruisers, Norfolk , Sheffield , Belfast, and Jamaica , Scharnhorst
suffered several major caliber hits but other than making the forward turret in-
operable and destroying the radar apparatus Scharnhorst'
s
fighting capacity was
not impared. Destroyers in this operation were used to slow Scharnhorst so the
heavier ships could catch up.' This at first seemed strange because while
Scharnhorst was faster than any of the heavy British ships the destroyers in a
heavy sea would have had difficulties catching a Jl knot battle-cruiser. Apparent- *
ly they were able to overtake the battle-cruiser because for a period of nearly
an hour Duke of York ceased fire because of the opening range. Edgar March noted
that at least one destroyer, Saumarez
,
got seven more revolutions that she had
2
on her trials. In all probability had the destroyers not been successful in
their attack on the German battle-cruiser, she would have made it back safely to
Norway.
Throughout the war both in the Atlantic and more particularly in the Medi-
terranean destroyers operated with the fleet. In the Mediterranean they
shrouded British convoys with smoke to lower visability and conceal them from
Korotkin, Battle Damage, p. 188.
March, British Destroyers
, p. ^-06.
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tho attacks of heavier warships. The Italians, recogdzin^ the danger from
torpedo attacks, consistently refused to pass through the smoke screen.
In order for torpedo attacks to be successful they had to be launched in
periods of low visibility. Eithor weather, smoke or nightfall gave the destroyers
the protection necessary to approach to practically point-blank ran^c. Such short
ranges worenecessary to launch torpedoes accurately. One major caliber hit, and
not more than a few, were enough to sink most destroyers. One instance where
they did not have the advantages of bad visability was the action against the
battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau . In April of 19-+0 the two battle-
cruisers were steaming off Norway when they approached the carrier Glorious re-
turning with a load of airplanes which were being evacuated. The destroyers
Acasta and Ardent , escorting the carrier, attempted to attack the German warships.
They were sunk in short order. Valiant as the attack was the visibility was too
good. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau opened fire on Glorious at 27,000 yards.
Another offensive use of escorts was hunter-killer groups. The defensive
method of employing escorts, convoys, had already been mentioned. Hunter-killer
groups roamed the ocean finding submarines and were not tied down to the protec-
tion of a convoy. The American hunter-killer groups were formed around an escort
carrier. The British groups were usually several sloops or corvettes. At any
rate, they were brought into being by three developments: High Frequency Direc-
tional Finders (HF/DF or Huff-Duff ) , large numbers of escorts and air surveillance.
The radio directional finders gave the Admiralty the ability to discover
the area where submarines had gathered. Since it was part of Admiral Doenitz's
March, British Destroyers
, p. 25?.
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plan that the submarines maintain close contact v;ith headquarters, the British
monitored their radio broadcasts and determined their location. Once this in-
formation had been gathered the hunter-killer groups wero directed to the general
area.
Large numbers of escorts gave the Allies the ability to maintain these task
forces. Before 19^3 there were not enough escorts to sufficiently protect the
merchant ships. During the period before 19^3 the purpose of escorts was to
protect the merchant ships. After the summer of 19^3 there were enough ships
to satisfactorily defend the convoys and it became possible for the extra ships
to attempt to sink the submarines.
Air surveillance had two abilities in the hunter-killer operations. Air-
planes either from shore or from the American carriers could attack the U-boats
and shadow them until the destroyers arrived to finish the job. Aircraft were
a vital part of the hunter-killer group.
The advantages of hunter-killer groups were that they found the submarines
before they were in a position to attack the convoy. Also, they allowed the crews
of the submarines no place to withdraw from the battle and relax for a few days
until another convoy approached. Captain Rayner expressed the opinion of the
supporters of convoys in noting that the protection of shipping was primary and
the destruction of submarines was only secondary.'
Whether the protection of convoys could best be achieved by close escort
or by groups hunting submarines long distances from convoys is still a matter of
discussion. Close escort for the convoys gave the captains of merchant ships a
sense of security or at least if they were sunk an immediate method of retribution
Rayner, Escort, p. 87.
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was available The pro' t the escorts for a convoy could not be spared
long enough to insure the kill of an attacking submarine. Convoys had the ad-
vantage of concentrating the submarines in an area where they would not have to
be hunted down. It scons that the solution, which was a compromise, was to have
two escort groups for the convoy. One would stay with the convoy throughout the
voyago and the other would engage submarines until they were destroyed even though
the convoy passed on. During the early stages of the war there were not enough
escort vessels to provide two seperato groups.
After 19'f-3t when escorts were plentiful enough, the use of hunter-killer
groups brought results. Still convoys had to be protected but there were con-
siderably fewer offensive captains of the nature of Gunther Prien. The hunter-
killer groups removed the submarines before they could attack the convoys and
made the escort's job that much easier.
Destroyers performed other offensive actions, although they were somewhat
less important than torpedo attacks on surface ships and hunter-killer groups.
They were used in special commando operations such as the raid against the Nor-
mandie Dock at St. Nazaire. During this raid the destroyer Campbeltown was filled
with explosives and rammed into the only dry dock in occupied Europe large enough
to hold the Tirpitz . While ramming into the dock a number of troops were landed
and destroyed pumping facilities and other important parts of this dry dock.
Heavy casualties were suffered by the attending craft and troops but after the
delayed mechanism fired the explosives in the Campbeltown the dry dock was damaged
1
beyond repair."
For the complete story. of the operation sec C. E. Lucas Phillips, The
Greatest Raid of All
,
(London: Heinenann, 1958).
The destroyer during the Second World War also was used for close shore
bombardment and evacuation. While the battleships fired at troop concentration:,
far inland tho destroyers shelled enemy implacemonts on shore. It must be ro-
membered while the average five inch gun of a destroyer was a small naval piece
they would have been very large guns for the land forces. During the various
evacuations that were performed by the British services during the war destroyors
bore the lion's share of tho work. They not only fought off attacks at the re-
ceeding beach heads but also transported troops out of danger.
8. Escort operations during World War II.
During operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean escorts sank 2^6 German
submarines out of the total 781 that were lost. A further 46 German submarines
were lost due to the efforts of destroyers and aircraft. All told escorts ac-
counted for 292 German submarines and most of these were lost during or shortly
after attacks on convoys. The added advantage over sinkings at sea by escorts
and attacks on submarines in harbor was that the trained crews, which in many
cases were more difficult to replace than the submarine, were either killed or
captured. Further when the escorts were protecting a convoy and sank a German
submarine the losses were double because not only a submarine was lost but the
chance for a successful attack was lost also. During the war JL,5$> of all Ger-
man submarines sunk were lost to escorts. When the losses because of combined
attack were added to those solely because of escorts the percentage rose to 37.&$•
The larger portion of the German submarines lost because of destroyers came during
the early part of the war. Later in the war when the air attacks began to take
effect, both the actual numbers and the percentages of German submarines lost be-
cause of escort attacks declined.
Admiralty, German Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties
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Italian submarine: losses because of attack by destroyers numbered 37 and
when assisted by aircraft a further five sumbarines were lost during the war.
The Italian submarines losses because of attack by surface ships amounted to
^3.5$ of the Italian losses. When escorts and aircraft were added the figure
rose to ^9.4$. The higher percentages of Italian submarines lost because of es-
corts were explained by noting that Italy surrendered in September, 19^-3 » be-
fore the Allied airpower began to exert its overpowering influence on the sub-
marine war.
The British losses of submarines because of attacks by Axis vessels were
lower than either German or Italian losses. During the war in both the Atlantic
and Mediterranean ?2 British sTibmarines were lost by enemy action. Only 15,
or 20.5^ of the losses were caused by surface vessels in any manner. Strangely
the majority of these losses were in 19^2 and 19'*-3. The ten submarines sunk by
surface action during 19^2 and 19^3 were lost in the shallow waters of the Medi-
terranean. There were certain advantages for submarines working the Mediterranean
but it was also dangerous. In the Mediterranean the water was clear enourh to
see a submarine from an aircraft at about 120 feet, compared with 30 feet in the
North Atlantic. Also, the bottom of the sea was white and the submarine con-
trasted easily in the Mediterranean.
Table V-6 on the opposite page shows the losses of British, German and
Italian destroyers and escorts. From this table it was possible to derive some
meaningful statements about the ability of destroyers and escorts. The orily
Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties
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Table V-6 British, Italian, and German. Destroyer Losses During the Second World
War in the Atlantic Theater.
Losses Due To
Destroyers
Number Percent
Escorts
Number Percent
Aircraft
British 48
German 9
Italian 17
Submarines
British 33
German
Italian 6
Surface
Actions
British 9
German 20
Italian 12
Mines
British 9
German 6
Italian 6
E-Boats
British 8
German 1
Italian
Shore Batteries
British 2
German
Italian 1
Accidents
British 9
German 6
Italian 13
38.0$
20.0;2
28.8$
26.6$
0.0$
10.1$
7.2$
44.4$
20.3$
7.2#
13.3*
10.1$
6M
2.2$
0.0$
1.6%
O.Oi
1.6$
7.2$
13.3$
22.3$
56
67
13
jiM
38.0$
5.1$
7.4$
4
13
4.5^
2.1$
7.4$
Derived from Admiralty, Ships
i
of the Royal Navy , S. W. Roskill, War at Sea
,
Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 457-461., "Official Recapitulation of Italian Losses: Navy
Department Press Release,: USNIP, July, 1946, p. 1006-9. The losses for German
and Italian corvettes, frigates, sloops, cutters, and other related vessels
are not available. Also it will be noticed in this table that from time to time
the percentages add up to make more than a hundred percent. This phenomenon arises
because if a vessel has been lost because of more than one cause both causes are
included in the tally.
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really worthwhile statements can be made about destroyers because the figures
for Gorman and Italian losses of escort craft only listed destroyers. Because
of aircraft, losses of British destroyers were considerably higher than the
Italian and German losses. This seems to indicate that the British needed ad-
ditional anti-aircraft weapons on their destroyers during the early part of the
war. By the time that aircraft had become a powerful British naval weapon Ger-
many and Italy had witnessed the necessity of possessing guns capable of bringing
down aircraft. The German figures showed no losses because of submarines which
indicated that the British did not place so much emphasis on this type weapon.
The second highest source of British destroyer losses was submarines. The tre-
mendous jump of nearly half of the destroyers lost because of surface action
by the Germans shows the importance of strength of the British surface fleet.
Mines sunk about an even proportion of each of the fleet's destroyers.
Through this section on destroyers and other escort vessels their prime
antagonist has been the submarine. At this occupation they were unexcelled by
any other seagoing weapon. This was their main job and until aircraft came into
prominence in 19^3 they were nearly the sole weapon of anti-submarine warfare.
Even after the arrival of aircraft, escorts were still extremely useful in anti-
submarine warfare Destroyers, perhaps because they were a cheap and expendable
commodity, were used for a niwiber of other tasks. Shore bombardment, anti-air-
craft work, attacks on capital ships, evacuation, and commando raids were only
a few of the many jobs which the destroyers performed during the Second World
War. When the final analysis was done it was found that perhaps destroyers were
not the most effective of naval weapons but it was one of the most versatile.
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9. Armed Merchant Cruisers.
Anued morchant cruisers were an odd breed of ship left over from the days
of privateers. They looked like merchant ships but were armed with various
assorted guns. The idea behind these ships was they could fool other vessels
into believing that they were merchant ships and manage to approach them un-
suspected.
The British used theirs in a defensive manner protecting other merchant ships,
They operated in the ocean and hoped that they could fool submarines into at-
tacking them. The British merchant cruisers hoped that a submarine would sur-
face near them and they could then sink the U-boat with their hidden guns. The
Second World War in the Atlantic showed that they were remarkably effective at
finding submarines. During the war 70.1$ of the British armed merchant cruisers
were sunk by Axis submarines. Another 21.*$ were sunk by surface raiders and
one was lost because of an accident.' While they were effective at finding sub-
marines they were not effective at destroying them; the Admiralty listing of
Axis submarines lost showed none were sunk by armed merchant cruisers.
The German armed merchant cruisers were used, in the 1939-^5 War, in a com-
pletely different manner. They were used offensively as surface commerce raiders.
Several of these ships armed with five inch guns and perhaps a torpedo tube were
sent out on commerce raiding missions during the war. In the Atlantic they sank
213,617 gross tons of British merchant shipping and several thousand tons in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, mostly in the far reaches of the ocean away from both
3
shore and commerce lanes. Their method was to approach an unsuspecting merchant
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
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ship and cither have it surrender or sink it before a radio message could be
sent out. Since they did not have enough fire power to conpete with r.odern war-
ships a radio message would virtually insure their destruction if a warship was
in the area. Also, the German merchant raiders could not attack convoys, even
though shipping was heaviest there because of the danger of the escorts and once
again a radio message was certain to bring retaliation.
10. Kotor boats.
The motor torpedo boats, or E-boats as the Germans called them were sjiall
fast craft usually made out of wood and carrying one or two torpedoes and a feu
machine guns. These small wooden craft did not operate in oceanic waters but
along the east and south coast of Britain and in the Mediterranean. They at-
tacked small coastal shipping and convoys which were gathering near ports in these
areas. One of the German tactics was to lie in shallow waters close to the English
shore; the boat would remain unseen because of the darkness of the land to their
back until a target passed near them. Then with a sudden burst of speed the
E-boats would rush out and attack the merchant ships launching torpedoes on their
2
way. High speed and maneuverability made these craft very difficult to hit even
under the best of conditions. Given a hazy night or bad weather they could be
reasonably certain of escaping destruction. The British 5n an effort to develop
a weapon that would be effective against the German E-boats built the motor-gun-
boat. Usually known by its initials I'GB, it carried no torpedoes but was similar
to the torpedo boats. I :GB's carried only guns to attack E-boats.
The Australian cruiser Sydney was sunk by the German commerce raider
Komet in the Indian Ocean but not before the raider itself was sunk.
^William G. Scholfield, Eastward the Convoys
,
(Chicago: Rand KcNally and
Coip., 19^5), P. 88-9.
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Darkness was the best hunting time for snail torpedo boat.s. Peter Scott,
a former commander, listed four reasons for the small craft hunting at night:
(l) the enemy convoys which were harassed by aircraft during the day sailed at
night, (2) surprise was essential against escorted convoys, (3) during daylight
the fire-power of the escorts was too powerful for the close approach necessary
for successful torpedo actions, and (^) aircraft and shore batteries could be
used against the MTB's during the day.'
Table V-7 on the opposite page shows the losses of British and German motor
boats in both Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters. This table showes that it
was not enemy action that destroyed the largest number of British motor boats
but that accidents of one sort or another caused kyfo of the British losses. The
German losses on the other hand, including those scuttled, were considerably
smaller than the British accident losses. Mines and other surface ships were
about equal in the number of E-boats they sank. The Germans suffered their heav-
iest losses from air attack, but of the 27 boats sunk by this method 23 were in
harbor when they were lost.
During the Second Vforld War the British lost lf&, 922 gross tons of shipping
in both Atlantic and Mediterranean waters because of E-boat attacks. Nearly all
of the ships lost because of E-boat attacks were sunk in the shallow waters around
2
England, particularly the North Sea and English Channel.
E-boats were mostly nuisance and psychological weapons. They caused the
diversion of forces needed elsewhere and never allowed the pressure to be taken
off convoy escorts. During the period in the middle of the war when submarines
Lt. Cmdr. Peter Scott, The Battle of the Narrow Sea
,
(London: Country
Life Ltd., 19^5), P. 11.
2
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were attacking in mid-ocean E-boats nade it necessary to continue to convoy-
ships when they wero merely passing from port to port along the cast coast of
England. During the invasion of Europe they were a threat because of the heavy
concentration of shipping in tho narrow waters of the invasion area. Even
though they were a threat, the losses suffered by the landing forces were minir. '
11. Other weapons used in naval warfare.
Numerous other weapons need to be mentioned but did not cause enough damage
or confusion to deserve a seperate section by themselves. Among these weapons
were: one-man torpedoes, minature submarines, frogmen, explosive motor boats,
sabotage, shore batteries, and defensive armaments on merchant ships. T'ost of
these weapons wore one time affairs; they could dramatically influence the nature
of the war once or twice but their long range value was nearly non-existent. The
only reason they have been mentioned at all is so readers of this paper would rec-
ognize that they did exist but it must be warned that their effectiveness duri*
the war was seriously limited.
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Table V-7 Losses Of. British and German Motor Boats in Atlantic and Meditorrar
Theaters.
MTB MGB
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Mines
British 18
German 8
Aircraft
British 13
German 27
Surface
Action
British 19
German 8
E-Boats
British 5
German **
Shore Bat-
teries
British 1
German 2
Accident
British 53
German 5
16. 7# 7 25.0,1
12.0$ 3 10.7$
^5.3$
17.6$ 5 17.8$
4.6$ 1 3.5$
7.1$
0.9$ 1 3.5$
3.6$
^9.0$ 8 28.5$
8.9$
Derived from Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and Roskill, War at Sea ,
Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. ^58~'-f-6l. The losses of German torpedo boats in Roskill are
not broken doxm into MTB and MGB.
CHAPTE-t VI
SUBMARINES
1. Submarines before World War II and the nature of undersea warfare.
In 1902, when submarines were first becoming operational weapons of war,
Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, who became First Sea Lord in 1910, described the nc;.T
weapons as "underhanded, unfair, and damned un-English." Wilson did not rec-
ognize hoi; un-English these weapons were to become later in the hands of England's
enemies. During the period of unlimited submarine warfare in the 191^ War the
U-boat nearly brought victory to the Germans. During the second war with Germany
the submarine was in terms of tons of ships sunk far more dangerous than in World
War I. Not only were submarines more destructive than any other Axis naval weap-
on but they sank more Allied shipping than all other weapons in the German and
Italian naval arsenals combined.
After the defeat of the German submarines, along with the rest of the
Kaiser 1 s forces, the Admiralty seemed to sink into complaisancy. The Treaty of
Versailles forbade Germany from ever again building submarines. Like so many
other portions of the treaty this section was evaded by Germany. During the
period when Germany could not build submarines or have a force of them, German
owned and operated building yards in foreign countries built submarines for vari-
ous other nations. By this evasive means Hitler^ regime had a trained construc-
tion and design staff available. After the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935
Germany was allowed to build submarines, under certain conditions, up to IOC
parity with the British. Thus after this treaty there was a sudden building of
a submarine force with little or no time lost for design.
Kucnne, Attack Submarine
, p. 125.
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During the period when Germany had no submarine force of its own, a numbr
of officers spent their time in surface vessels. Admiral Doe-nits who until 19^3
commanded the U-boat arm, and later was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy,
served his time in the light cruiser Emdem . There was no evidence to show how
valuable this experience in surface ships was to the leaders of the German sub-
marine program, but certainly they understood the problems of surface ships and
could better devise means of attacking them. Also a number of submarine commanders,
such as Gunther Prien, who took his U-boat into the British base of Scapa Flow
and sank the battleship Royal Oak , were sailors who had gotten their original
training in the merchant marine. This was put to good use during the war against
British commerce in the Atlantic.
Britain during the period botween the wars spent little time worrying about
the best possible method of countering submarines. Placing their faith in asdic
they believed that the German U-boats were no longer a threat to their maritime
2
security. Far too much confidence was placed in this new means of detection.
Numerous difficulties were experienced with asdic diiring the war. Among them
was its inability to detect submarines in shallow water, on the surface and out-
side the range of torpedoes. All this will be discussed in a later section of
this chapter but it has been brought up here to illustrate the lack of compre-
hensive thinking shox-m by the Allies during the inter-war years.
One of the most potent weapons used in anti-submarine warfare was all but
ignored in American naval journals, and probably British ones too. There was only
one article in the United States Mayal Institute Proceedings which studied the
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, My Life, Trans. Henry W. Drexel, (Annapolis,
liaryland: United States Naval Institute, I960), p. 172.
2
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effect of aerial attack on submarines during the First World War, Admittedly
there was little information which would have been useful for historical analysis.
Perhaps the lack of historical information was a valid reason for little study
of the aerial attack on submarines during World War I but it still does not excuse
the failure to derive their effectiveness in training exercises. Air Chief Kar-
shal Sir Philip Joubert, who during part of the war commanded Coastal Command,
criticized the leadership of the British Naval Staff for failing to pay attention
to attacking submarines from the air during the combined defense exercise in 193?.
This lack of study on methods of destroying submarines from the air was one of the
failures of British naval planning. Had sufficient attention been paid to this
problem the success of airplanes might have been realized at the start of the
war instead of in 19^-3.
The submarine was commonly viewed as a weapon which stealthly approached
its victum underwater and launched a torpedo. This common misconception about
the ability of World War II submarines to stalk their enemy without surfacing
was disproved by Atlantic operations during Hitler 1 s war. U-boats had a very
low underwater speed and could not easily attain attack positions while submerged.
They were not true submersibles, like the nuclear submarines of today, but sur-
3
face craft which could, for short periods of time, proceed underwater . Usually
submarines submerged only to escape detection and to evade attackers. Their
underwater speed was seldom more than seven or eight knots and this was only for
limited periods of time. The ability of the submarine to stay underwater decreased
Robert M. Grant, "Aircraft Against U-Boats," USNIP , Vol. 65, no. 6, June,
1939, p. 824-828.
2Joubert, Birds and Fishes
, p. 109.
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out of proportion to the speed it used whilo submorgod. At very slovr speeds, per-
haps not more than a knot or two a submarine could have stayed down for more than
24 hours, but at higher rates of speed the submarine's underwater enduranco de-
creased rapidly.
The underwater endurance of a submarino was determined by two factors, bat-
teries and oxygen. Unless the submarine could rest on the bottom, its motors
had to be constantly turning so that it would neither rise to the surface nor
sink below a depth where its pressure hull would have collapsed. A submarine
could not stop dead in the water and remain at the same depth. Therefore through-
out its journey underwater it was necessary for the submerged vessel to run its
engines and consequently deplete its batteries. On the other hand, the factor
which caused submarines to surface after staying down for long periods of time
was not the need for recharging the batteries but the need to replenish the air.
The method of extracting oxygen from the water had not been invented in World
War II. Although a number of methods of expanding the air supply—such as air
purifiers and compressed oxygen—were tried, none allowed the submarine to remain
underwater indefinitely.
Also while proceeding underwater submarines lost a great deal of their of-
»
fensive capabilities. The periscope, which is so commonly used for attacks in
war movies, had a very small range of vision and could not search wide reaches
of the oceans. Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the periscope it was
difficult for submarines to develop an effective attack on a moving target. In
order to gain the data necessary to launch a torpedo accurately, submarines had
to make a number of observations on the ship which was being approached. Using
the periscope there was no chance to keep an eye out for the escorts which were
usually patrolling the area. The periscope also was only effective during daylight
3M
and when the sea was calm. During other periods the submarined periscope was
either sticking so high out of the wator that it became easily noticed, or dur-
ing darkness not enough light was available to make targets show up distinctly
through the periscope. These probloms were alleviated somewhat. During excep-
tionally rough seas the periscope and its accompaning "feather"—the water thrown
up by the scope—were hidden by the waves. Also, during exceptionally bright
nights enough light was present to make the periscope effective.
W. J. Holmes in his work on American submarines in the Pacific described
the problems of attack by submarines. He noted that while the submarine was
underwater it could have gained attack position but a sudden burst of speed
depleted its batteries. This depletion caused by increased speed to arrange
a correct attack position allowed the submarine a small reserve in case it was
counter-attacked by an escort. Also, if the target zig-zagged or changed its
pattern of movement the chance of a successful attack was lost. Diagrams 011
the next page (Charts VI-1 and VI-2) show the standard method of attack by
subioarincs on surface ships. It will be readily noticed that torpedoes suffered
from a disadvantage not common to artillery shells. During an attack by gunfire
the projectiles flew towards their target at several hundred miles an hour. Tor-
pedoes on the other hand moved only a few knots faster than the targets they were
supposed to sink, perhaps 35 to ^1-0 knots. This caused certain difficulties in
accurate aiming because the lead time was so much greater for torpedoes than it
was for shells. Also, torpedoes left a track of their progress through the water
which allowed the captain of a vessel to maneuver his ship in a manner so that
-H7. J. Holmes, Undersea Victory; The Influence of Submarine Operations
in the War in the Pacific
,
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1966), p. 12.
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it would not bo struck; the development of electric powered torpedoes, which
left no wake alleviated this pro' ] . Ships that were engaged by gunfire manouve-
swiftly to throw off the enemy's aim, but not to maneuver out of the path of the
projectiles. Rapid maneuvering under torpedo attack caused the torpedo to miss
even though it had been aimed correctly.
Submarines had many attributes vihich made them ideal for commerce raiding.
One of these was their extremely long range. It was nothing for submarines to
sail 12,000 to 15,000 miles on war patrol during the Second World War. This
gave them the ability to strike at unprotected areas far from their homeland,
such as the coasts of North America, South America, and South Africa. Later in
the war, in order to increase the capacity of submarines to stay on patrol, a
number of supply U-boats or "milch cows" were built. These large submersibles
carried food, fuel, torpedoes and other stores to U-boats on station so that
they would not have to return to their base of operations.
Geographical factors affected the amount of time spent on war patrol. Dur-
ing the sudden military campaigns of 19^-0 Germany gained many advantages. The
coast of Norway and the French coast were occupied by the German armies in 19^0.
This made it a great deal easier for the German U-boats to escape into the Atlantic.
They no longer had to make the dangerous passage through the minefields in the
Straits of Dover nor the long trip around the Northern tip of England. By cutting
down the traveling time to the zone of operations submarines stayed on station
longer. The geographical advantages of the conquests made by the German Army to
the U-boat war can be shown by studying two reports made to Hitler in 1939 and
19^-2. In a survey of planned submarime construction made in 1939 the number of
U-boats which it predicted would be available was rouglily one-third of the total
1*7
submarine force.' As noted this report was made before any advantages had been
gained by the conquest of Franco and Norway. In a report made in 19*2, 32 out
>f 10o submarines available were in ports in France and Germany undergoing re-
pair. A further 12 submarines were in Italian ports replenishing. Only four
>ut of seventeen not in port were en route to their zone of operations. Com-
pare this figure with the 26 out of 35 submarines that were either en route or
*eturning from operations off the American coast during February, 19*2. The
success of the submarine war was partially dependent on the number of submarines
:hat could be kept on station during any given period. If enough submarines
xere attacking British commerce the defenses were fLooded and the successes were
jut of proportion to the increased number of U-boats. But conversely if the
lumber of attacking craft fell below a certain level, the losses of shipping
'ell out of proportion to the decrease of submarines.
The U-boat's ability to stay on patrol was limited by the distance to the
irea of operations. Many times as much as one-third or one-half of the U-boat 1 s
operational time was lost during transit to its patrol area. Taking into con-
sideration the amount of time necessary to refresh the crews and repair the sub-
aarines in port one-third of their effective lives were lost. Three hundred sub-
narines were required to keep one hundred on patrol in their operational area..
I. Submarines in defensive operations.
The submarine during the Second World War was basically an offensive weapon,
[t had neither heavy guns to do battle with its opponents nor armor protection
Fuehrer Conferences, 1939 , Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the
<\iehrer, 22 November, 1939, p. *2.
2Ibid. t Report to the Fuehrer made by the Commander in Chief, Navy 13
February, 19*2, p. 13.
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necessary to withstand the superior gunfire of the attacking escorts. Its main
defensive tactic was to hide after being sighted and even better never to be
seen. Kuenne noted that while the typical vessel gained advantages against its
own kind by increases in size, firepower, or defensive armament submarines were
not designed to fight their own kind. The submarine gained very little from an
increase in any of these factors. Brodie in the 19^3 edition of Sea Power felt
that the larger the subinarine was the more vulnerable it was to attack by escorts.
He noted that the primary determinate of the submarine's ability to withstand
punishment was how much its pressure hull could withstand. Noting that the
larger submarine had more hull area without any increase in ability to take
2punishment he concluded that larger submarines were more vulnerable. If, for
instance, a submarine had been built which could have effectively competed with
surface warships in a gunnery duel its offensive capabilities would have been
severely limited. Because submarines were the only vessels which could sink
below the surface to evade superior power, numerous sophisticated types of gear
were developed during the war so that they could in a sense be "seen." I'ost
of these inventions dealt with sending sound through the water. Either hydro-
phones, which were very sensitive listening devices, or asdic used sound to pin-
point the submarines. The hydrophones "listened" to the noises coming from the
submerged submarines and the asdic sent out sonic vibrations which bounced off
the U-boat and told its position. Both of these methods were only effective when
used by surface ships. Escorts were the only weapons with the ability to remain
on the spot long enough to force submarines io surface after having bombarded
them with depth charges. Aircraft could by making sudden attacks on submarines
that were just submerging force them to the top of the water but seldom saw a
^•Kuenne, Attack Sul
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completely submerged submarine. Also, aircraft could spot submarines only when
they were on the surface, either by eye-sight or radar. Tho escort was the only .
weapon which carried the gear necessary to detect a submarine underwater.
The British learned during the war that the German U-boat was a great deal
more difficult to destroy than had previously been thought. Several times
mention was made in different works about the difficulties encountered early
in the war with weapons which were given to the anti-submarine force. One of
the first difficulties was that it had been thought that modern submarines could
not go much below 500 feet. The German U-boats in emergencies went considerably
below 500 feet, in fact sometimes as much as 800 feet. This caused the British
depth charges to have too shallow a depth setting. Also, the lethal radius of
the depth charge needed to be improved in order for the British escorts to have
a better chance of collapsing the submarined pressure hull. With the develop-
ment of now explosives and heavier charges these problems were eliminated. Be-
cause the depth charge when it exploded ruined the ability of the attacking sur-
face ships to use their listening gear a number of weapons, such as the "hedge-
hog" and "mouse trap," which were smaller than the depth charge but exploded
only on contact, were developed. Aircraft had difficulties with the depth charge
also. Usually aerial depth charges were pre-set to explode around sixty feet,
roughly periscope depth of a submarine. It was not until late in the war that
it was realized when airplanes attacked, submarines were usually just beginning
to submerge and not yet at their periscope depth. The hunting of a U-boat dur-
ing the war was a lengthy affair, requiring three to four escort vessels to insure
2
success.
'"Robertson, Walker, R. N.
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Table VI-3 German Submarine Losses by Cause.
Cause of loss Number Percentage
Surface Ships Zk6 31.6*
2
Aircraft 290| 37.2*
in attacks at sea
Aircraft in 63 8.0*
bombing raids
Ships and Aircraft k6 5.9*
combined
Submarines 21 2.-
Mines 321- fc.l*
Other and Unknown-* 82 1^.9*
German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boat Casualties.
2One submarine was shared by mines and air attacks at sea.
3Includes marine and training losses.
3. Submarines in offensive actions.
U-boats, offensive weapons, proved beyond all doubt their offensive capa-
bilities in attacks on Allied ships in the Atlantic. Tho Admiralty history
of the Battle of the Atlantic described the U-boat war as "one of the most
vital, protracted and bitterly fought sea and air campaigns in which the British
Empire and her Allies have ever been engaged." John Herington in tho Official.
History of the Royal Australian Air Force noted although the winning of the
battle against U-boats would not in itself have won the vrar; the war most surely
would have been lost by the Allies if they had not succeeded in defeating the
2
German submarine threat. For the most part the submarine vrar was fought in and
around the convoys traveling to and from England. Although a number of serious
threats arose in other parts of the ocean than the North Atlantic the threats
were seldom as serious and protracted as those on the route between the United
States and England.
Throughout the war one of the German U-boat's major preoccupations was find-
ing the convoys. The early German submarines, not equipped with radar had very
low freeboards. Sitting so low in the ocean, enemy vessels had to approach
very close to a U-boat before it was seen. Later in the war when aircraft and
escorts were patrolling the seas in large number, U-boats were forced to sub-
*
merge. Once the U-boat was underwater it was very possible that a convoy would
pass by unnoticed. The convoys, large as they were, could easily pass between
1
Great Britain Central Office of Information, Prepared for the Admiralty and
the Air Ministry, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Official Account of the Fight
against U-boats, 1939-19^-5
.
(London: HMSO, 19^6), p. 5.
John Herington, The Air War Against Germany and Italy, 1939-19^3 » (Canberra:
Australian War Memorial, 1962) , Series 3» Vol. Ill, p. 140.
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two j\itrolling submarines in the vast reaches of the North Atlantic. Numerous
methods and tactics were tried during the war so that it would be easier for con-"
voys to be found.
In 1939 Admiral Doenitz, one of the few leaders who seemed to have a definrr
idea about how the war was going to be fought, argued for the concentration of
submarines off the sailing ports of convoys, south-west England, Gibraltar and
other locations where ships were easy to find. By this means he hoped to gain
contact with the convoys before they were lost in the vast reaches of the Atlantic.
In this manner his U-boats did not have to spend much of their limited, time on
patrol trying to find the ships, but followed them as they left the ports. Be-
cause of inshore patrols, aircraft and other weapons which controlled the shall ov;
waters it became increasingly difficult to make successful attacks on nerchant
vessels in and around the points of arrival and departure. Later in the war sub-
marines derived certain advantages from operating in shallow waters, but discussion
of this will be left to a later part of this chapter.
Before the war Admiral Doenitz, in order to alleviate the problem of the
small reconnaissance ability of the submarine, developed theories and tactics
which later became known as the "wolf pack." Doenitz was impressed with the in-
ability of the submarine to search for and find targets. Consequently the Ger-
2
man Admiral argued for the construction of many smaller submarines. SeveiMl
sinall submarines could more effectively cover an area than one large submarine.
Also, during the war Doenitz was constantly arguing for trained aircrews and air-
craft with sufficient range to spot convoys. He was seldom able to get effective
air reconnaissance because many of the German aircrews were not trained to
Doenitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days
, p. 6l.
2
Kuenne, Attack Submarine
, p. 26.
1 eJi
navigate accurately over the vast reaches of the oc< . Because of the sul
narines' inability to see ships, a snail error in navigation by the pile ant
that the convoy was never spotted by submarines. Apparently radio direction find-
ing during the war was not accurate enough to pinpoint the convoys from the air-
plane's radio communications with Germany.
By knowing the weather conditions and by intelligence information gathered
oy various means the German Naval Staff predicted the path of convoys. Accord-
ingly submarines were arranged in a line across the projected path of approach-
ing convoys in hopes that it would not pass unnoticed. It was necessary for
Large numbers of submarines to be available to the German Navy. A guide for navy
officers stated the visability of objects at sea from a ^0 foot height was 7.1
1
nautical miles. It seems that this figure can be used to measure the distance
i submarine could see a ship. The masts of a ship were somewhat higher than
forty feet but against the sky they did not show up well. Also, some height was
gained from the conning tower of the submarine, but other factors entered the
discussion. In the area bounded by 20-40° West and ^0-60° North there was less
than 50$ chance of the visibility being greater than 10 nautical miles. There-
fore while it may not have been accurate that submarines could spot merchant
vessels at seven nautical miles it at least presents a reasonable figure to give
a basis of judging the difficulties of finding ships. One submarine would have
to be placed every fourteen miles to insure that a convoy did not pass unnoticed,
rherefore seven submarines were needed every hundred miles. Since convoys could
Bureau of Naval Personnel, A Navigation Compendium, (NAVPSR3, 10^9^, 1966)
,
p. 108.
2
Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy: Marine Climatic Atlas of the World.
Vol. I, North Atlantic Ocean, (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office,
L955).
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take any number of different paths lo their destination large areas needed to
be covered. Also, in order for the Geman submrines to be effective in their
wolf-pack tactics constant radio communications with Admiral Doenitz was neces-
sary. The Allies using Huff-Duff found where the submarines were patrolling and
avoided areas of concentration.
Once a submarine made contact with the convoy it reported to command head-
quarters in France the location, direction and speed of the ships it had spotted.
The submarine command then ordored the U-boat to continue to report its position
as it shadowed the convoy. While this submarine was following the convoy other
submarines were ordered to gather around it until there were enough vessels to
make an effective attack. After enough U-boats had reached the area surrounding
the convoy a concerted and simultaneous attack was launched. This attack, usually
began at night on the surface, was aimed at splitting up the escorts. While some
of the escorts were counter-attacking the submarines, other German boats were
torpedoing unprotected merchant ships.
Robert II. Grant, who was one of the few authors which has comprehensively
studied submarine tactics during the First World War, held that the wolf-pack idea
was not original with Admiral Doenitz. Admiral Eauer, who commanded the German
U-boats in World War I, suggested a plan similar to the wolf-packs, but they
were never fully accepted by the high command. There seems to be sufficient
evidence that Doenitz was one of the few leaders who had correctly predicted the
method of operation his weapons would use. Doenitz had a tactical plan at the
first of the war to combat what he suspected would be the British countermeasures
to submarine attacks. The wolf-pack was specificly designed to lessen the
Grant, U-Roats Destroyed
, p. ^3.
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Table VI-3 on the next page shows tho number and percentage of the Ger-
man U-boats lost by cause. It can be seen that the various advantage:; of air-
craft and surface vessels nearly equaled themsolvos out. Destroyers and other
escort vessels sank a larger portion of U-boats in the early part of the war
while aircraft were more effective after the summer of 19'0. The escort's ad-
vantage in attacking submarines was that it could carry more depth charges and
remain on tho spot if necessary until the U-boat was forced to surface. There
was slow realization of the need to hold the submarine down for at least Zk hours
and get positive evidence of a kill. Aircraft's advantages were tho suddenness
of attack, which was launched while submarines were on the surface, and its su-
perior reconnaissance ability. Combined together the two methods only sank a
further h6 submarines. The lowest figures for German U-boats lost x^ere those sunk
by Allied submarines. The submarine was not basically a weapon which was designed
to fight its own kind like the battleship. Mines sank a small portion of the Ger-
man submarines but not a large enough number to worry the German Naval Staff.
Their effectiveness was in denying certain areas to U-boats.
The U-boat had small potential for defensive action. In contrast to the
envisioned role of the submarine before World War I, they sank few ships that
were blockading the shores. They changed tactics and forced the superior naval
powers to withdraw from close blockade. No longer was Great Britain able to
blockade a fleet in port by remaining just outside the port. This change in
tactics effectively ended all hopes of the submarines destroying the blockading
force. At any rate during the Second World War submarines were offensive weap-
ons; other weapons had offensive capabilities but none of the others were so
powerful in one method of warfare and weak in the other.
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problems of submarine operations and increase the ability of U-boats to pene-
trate the escort screen. The wolf-pack after the middle part of 19^-0 was vir-
tually the only tactic of sul :••' nes until late in the war. Fror: a technical
view, Docnitz operated a brilliant offensive campaign. Whenever he found the
defenses stiffening in an area he switched and attacked another undefended plac
.
There were a number of difficulties with the wolf-pack system but it was the
most effective method of employing submarines against convoyed merchant ships.
During the Second V/orld War U-boat operations in the Atlantic constantly
moved westward from England. After the entrance of the United States into the
war, submarine attacks gradually moved eastward from the shores of North America.
This left a relative concentrated area in mid-North Atlantic where most of the
submarine attacks occurred. During the opening months of the war U-boats generally
operated in the North Sea and along the Western Approaches. This was due in some
small part, to the limited range of U-boats and the inability to find targets in
mid-ocean. As aircraft patrols became more effective with longer ranges and
heavier loads the U-boats were forced, to move constantly westward from the British
Isles. Also the destroyer, which in the early months of the war was the primary
anti-submarine vessel, did not have the range to cross the Atlantic on war patrol.
Soon a gap formed off the southern coast of Greenland where neither airplanes
nor escorts could cover the convoys. This area was known by various names dur:
the vrar, "submarine alley, 1 ' "black-hole," and the like. The map (VI-l) on the
next page shows the areas, not only around Greenland, but around other major
convoy routes, where the protection of traffic was impossible in 19^1. The maps
(VJ-2, VI-3, VI-4, VI-5, VI-6, VI-7, VI-3, VI-9) at the end of this chapter show
the varying locations of war losses during eight different periods. As the air
gap between aircraft flying from the northern parts of England, Newfoundland,
Map VI-1 Principal Atlantic Convoys Routes and Zones of Close Anti-
Subnarino Escort, June 19^0-December 19^1
Limit of air cover in June 19^-1 shown by brokon line.
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Iceland, and Azores gradually narrowed during the war, the entire path of the
convoys was covered by air patrols. Part of the gap was closed by carriers op- '•
orating in or near the convoys. As soon as smaller but longer ranged vessels,
such as frigates and corvettes, became available, escorts began to accompany
convoys clear across the Atlantic. Also during the war the techniques of mid-
ocean refueling wore refined until it became standard operating procedure. This
in many ways allowed the escorts to accompany convoys throughout their entire
voyage.
The submarine, even when attacking on the surface, stood a good chance of
success against escorted convoys. Captain Walker, in his instructions to the
36th Escort Group, realized the danger from U-boats when he noted that it was
not possible to completely protect a convoy from submarine attack. The sub-
marine's favorite method of attack in the Atlantic was at night on the surface.
Riding on the vents with just the conning tower out of the water the submarine
2
was very difficult to see. While on the surface it could see both the targets
which it was preparing to attack and keep an eye out for avenging escorts. In
effect the submarine on the surface became another torpedo boat. The most strik-
ing difference was that rather than working in shallow coastal waters where move-
ment was restricted the U-boat was stalking its prey in mid-Atlantic. Before
the advent of radar U-boats on the surface were inconspicuous and a great deal
more dangerous.
Another method, which must have been exceptionally unnerving, of evading
the escorts was submerging and diving under the escorts and surfacing in the
Robertson, Walker, R. N. « p. 37.
2
The term "riding of the vents" was the naval term for being ready to quickly
submergo. The submarine was only held up because the vent which allowed the air
to escape from the tanks were closed. The valves at the bottom of the air tanks
which allowed water to run in were open.
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tiiddle of the convoy. This greatly hampored the countor-attack. Not only did
Lt make it difficult to determine where the attack was coming from, but the
surfaced U-boat dodged in and around tho merchant ships, firing torpedoes along
the way, hampering the escort gunnery crews. Many times they could not fire
for fear of hitting their own ships.
While the U-boat was a very suitable torpedo carrier it was unsatisfactory
is a gun platform. Its very low freeboard and restricted field of vision limited
Its ability as a gun carrying weapon. Nevertheless, nearly all of the German
J-boats carried a gun which was available for engaging surface targets. " When
forced to the surface by depth charges the German submarine stood little chance
sf success against a more heavily armed escort. A number of vessels were sunk
sither by guns or guns and torpedoes combined, but while the figures were not
ivailable, it seems certain that all the ships lost by submarine guns were sail-
ing out of convoy. The figures were available to show that losses from submarines
In which gunfire played a part were in the oceans that normally did not carry
leavy traffic or away from the commonly used shipping lanes. If the ships had
Deen in convoy there was little doubt that the submarine would not have had time
to sink a merchant ship with gunfire before the heavily armed escorts arrived.
Vgainst unescorted ships the submarine's guns cost a further loss of ships and
Doenitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days
, p. 1^.
2
A. Cecil Hampshire, Lilliput Fleet: The Story of the Royal Naval Patrol.
Service
.
(London: William Kimber, 1957)
. P. 36 » disagrees. According to
iampshire the trawlers stood little chance against the guns of a German sub-
marine. This may be true with the lightly armed trawlers but against the four
to six, 5~inch guns of a destroyer it was highly doubtful that the submarine
Lasted long. There was no mention in the official losses of the Royal Navy of
i destroyer, corvette, or frigate being lost because of gunfire from a sub-
marine
-^Admiralty, British Merchant Vessels
.
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saved the submarine's torpedoes until a later date. The shelling of shore
facilities in America shortly after the entrance of the United States into the
war, while probably causing a sever case of jitters, was doubtful that it con-
tributed greatly to the war effort.
So far most of the discussion on submarines operating in the mid-Atlantic
has been on the operations against convoys. If the figures are correct, and
there was no reason to doubt that they were not, the large majority of merchant
ships lost were sailing independently. This type of action on the part of the
captains and officers who allowed their ships to sail without escort was court-
ing disaster. Submarines stood very good chances of success against independent
ships. The merchantman's guns were mounted on the rear of the ship and could
not for the most part fire forward. Although there were a number of problems
in attacking unescorted merchant ships submarines with their superior speed over
the average tramp had only to gain a position in front of the ship and launch
a torpedo. Ships sailing independently were usually found in areas where support
was not readily available. A number of easy targets were found by submarines
sailing more or less independently. Some merchant ships which were pressed into
service because they were desperately needed in order to keep the British Isles
supplied were not in the best condition. There were cases on record where mer-
chant ships over fifty years old were used in convoys. These older ships could
not keep up with the steady pace of the convoys and fell out of line because of
mechanical failure and became stragglers. This made them particularly opportune
targets for the submarines. Also, damage was suffered because of storms and
othe>* accidents or malfunctions which caused the merchantmen to fall back. Sto:
•^S. W. Roskill, "Capros not Convoy: Counter-Attack and Destroy," USHIP
Vol. ?^ t no. 10, October, 1956, p. 1052.
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caused the convoys to scatter which made a larger number of easy targets, es-
pecially after the U-boats had boon packing for an attack.
Ships sailing independently wore more difficult to find if the submarine
was looking for one particular ship. But since hundreds of ships were roaming
the ocean in all sorts of different paths and directions a number of single ships
were found by the submariners and consequently sunk. Convoys concentrated the
ships and while a convoy was easier to spot than one particular ship a number
of roaming ships were practically predetermined to run into a submarine some-
where.
The intensity of the U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic was shown by the
Losses of German submarines in this area. During the Second World War 218 out
of 781 German submarines were lost in the North Atlantic. This listing did not
include losses in areas such as south of Iceland, West Hebrides, Azores and the
Like, even though by geography these areas could properly have been called
tforth Atlantic. In no other single area were so many German submarines sunk.
During the war 27. 9# of the German submarines lost were sunk in the Battle of
the North Atlantic. Most of these losses were in or around convoys. The losses
of British merchant vessels also showed the intensity of the campaign. The
British merchant shipping losses by submarine attack in the North Atlantic amounted
to 3»332,856 tons. During the war in all areas 5 > 991 ,139 tons of Empire shipping
were lost because of submarine attack in deep water. The overall British losses
of merchant vessels over 1,000 tons because of U-boats were 7.550,098 tons,
rhis figures out that 55>^>% of the British merchant vessels over 1,000 tons were
Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties
.
Admiralty, British Merchant Ships . I have arbitrarily divided the North
Atlantic for this figure into that areas which is bounded by 0° and 50° west
and ^0° and 70° north. This includes only those areas where the water is more
than one hundred fathoms deep.
3Ibid.
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lost because of submerged attack in the North Atlantic. Of the total British
losses because of submarines in all areas bj.^j were sunk in the North Atlantic.
This high rate of losses in one relatively small area showed ha/ important the
war in the North Atlantic was for the continued movement of supplies to Great
Britain. After the U-boats were defeated in the North Atlantic in 19^3 the
losses of British merchant ships while grevious were not impossible to suffer.
Many important attacks wore made by German submarines in areas other than the
one already mentioned, particularly along the coast of North America, but none
were so important that the entire success or failure of the war depended on
them.
All of the discussions of the offensive capabilities of submarines has so
far been directed to deep water attacks. During three specific periods in the
war the German submarine offensive moved to shallow water. The first of these
periods was during the early months of the war before the British had time to
organize their coastal defenses. The second was similar only during the early
part of 19^2. The German submarines then operated off the American coast before
the United States had organized its defenses. The last period was shortly be-
fore and after the invasion of France.
While the submarines were able to operate close inshore during the early
months of the war, the increasing number of escorts and anti-submarine vessels
forced them to move to deeper waters. Also air cover over the water closest to
English bases was a great deal more effective than over the far reaches of the
ocean. The submarines were only able to come back to these shallow waters late
in the war because of the invention of the schnorkel. This device, which x^as
a breather tube for the diesel engines, allowed a submarine to charge its bat-
teries xvhile moving underwater. It stuck up like a periscope and drew fresh air
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from the surface. This tube did not show much of a blip on the radar scope
and allowed the submarine to remain underwater although at greatly reduced
effectiveness.
During World War II, 1, 558 , 959 tons of British merchant shipping were sunk
by submarines in shallow waters, as compared with 2,569,093 tons because of at-
tack by all other weapons in the German arsenal. Axis submarines sank 60.06/,
of the British merchant vessels lost in shallow water. Therefore 39.9^ of the
vessels sunk in shallow water were lost because of aircraft, surface attack,
mines and other weapons. Submarines were the most effective method of destroy-
ing commerce shipping in shallow water.
2
The Germans lost 1^5 U-boats in the shallow waters of the Atlantic Theater.
This figure, which was considerably lower than losses in Mid-Atlantic , does not
accurately describe the situation during the war. For the larger part of the
war the submarine did not operate in the narrow seas. During the first eight
months of the war and from 19^ to the end of the war—with particular emphasis
on the latter period—submarines operated in shallow water. There were 23 months
in the period just mentioned. Also, there were 69 months in the whole war. If
the 1^5 submarines lost during the 23 months that submarines woi'ked in shallow
water area were extrapolated to include the entire war (multiplied times three)
,
4-35 German submarines would have been lost in shallow water. This figure was
still somewhat less than the 536 U-boats lost in non-shallow areas during the
war. There was no evidence to support the view that had the submarines increased
their efforts in the shallow waters no increase in losses would have occurred.
Also, if the German U-boats had increased their efforts their high effectiveness
Admiralty, British Merchant Vessels
.
Naval History Division, U. S. Submarine Losses World War II
, p. 159~?^.
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in shallow wators would probably have disappeared. This was because when U-boats
moved into shallow waters they were always driven out after short periods. The
campaigns in the inshore areas were sudden attacks and a method of keeping the
enemy off balanco, not a sustained offensive attack. In deep water 11,177.6 tons
of British merchant shipping were sunk per submarine lost by the Germans. In
shallow water 10,758.5 tons of British merchant shipping were lost for every
U-boat destroyed.
The loss ratio for sinkings in shallow water dropped off considerably dur-
ing the last months of the war. In the period from the start of 19^ to the end
of the war 113 German submarines were lost. During the same period 177 , 328 tons
of British merchant shipping were sunk by submarines. The ratio of tons sunk
per submarine lost during this period was 1,568.8 sunk for every German submarine
lost. It was evident by this time the U-boat menace was no longer a threat to
British shipping but at no period during the war did German submarines present
the problems in shallow waters that they did in the deeper waters of mid-ocean.
Practically every author who dealt with submarines as an offensive weapon
noted some of the advantages which submarines found while operating in coastal
waters off England.
Admiral Doenitz seemed surprised in his memoirs that the submarine really
did have certain advantages when operating in shallow waters off coastlines.
Most of the advantages achieved by submarines x%Tere ones of increased difficulties
of detection. In September, 19^2, 122 attacks on U-boats were reported but many
of than were on sunken objects. This was during the height of the mid-ocean
^Doenitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days
, p. ^25.
2Admiral Sir William Kilburno James, The Bri
War
,
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19'-^)
» p. 29.
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165
jampaign against submarines, so it was easy to see that oven more mistaken attacks
lore made on sunken vessels in the shallow viators of the English Channel and North
Sea. Theodore Roscoc in his work on the United States destroyers also noted
ihat it was not uncommon to mistake a sunken wreck for a U-boat. " Kost of the
>robi ems arose from inaccurately charted areas. A number of rocks throughout
:he war were thought to be submerged submarines and were repeatedly attacked.
Llso, even in areas where the ocean floor was charted accurately the tidal eddies
;aused confusion because they gave reflections on asdic sets similar to U-boats.
The submarine also suffered hazards when operating in shallow water. The
?irst of these was that it did not have room to maneuver as it did in the North
Ltlantic. In the ocean the submarine could go to any depth that its pressure
lull could stand. In shallow waters the depth which the submarine could sub-
lerge was limited by the bottom of the oceans. This made it easier for escorts
:o set their charges because they knew that U-boats could not pass a certain
lepth. Shallow water in the Mediterranean allowed the submarines to be seen
i'rom airplanes. The clear waters of the Mediterranean could be seen to much
greater depths (nearly four times as deep) as the murky waters of the Atlantic.
Throughout this section on offensive action with submarines only Axis,
md particularly German attacks, have been described. The Royal Navy possessed
i fleet of submarines but used them primarily in attacks on warships and were
.ess concerned with commerce destruction.
When the war broke out in 1939 the Royal Navy and the German Navy had an
3
squal number of submarines under their command. Added to this number
Roscoe, U. S. Destroyer Operations, p. 78.
2
Rayner, Escort
, p. 221.
3
RuSe » Per Seekreig , p. 399.
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was the French Force which exceeded even the British. Yet in few places were
the British submarines as effective as German vessels for interdicting and nearly,
stopping commerce. The one area where they wero particularly effective was against
German and Italian supply lines in the Mediterranean.
The British success in the Mediterranean was caused by this being one of
the few areas where success of a German offensive depended on sea transport.
Not only did Germany and Italy need supplies transported to their armies in North
Africa, but for long periods of time the air forces in this area made it impos-
sible for surface ships to operate effectively against enemy shipping. British
submarines were somewhat safer from air attack than were surface ships. Fare
Bragadin noted that of the 786 ships of 3*318,129 tons available to the Italian
Navy in 19^0, British submarines sank 32^-. This amounted to 25^ of the Italian
Navy merchant losses. A larger portion of the Italian merchant marine was sunk
by Allied aircraft. According to an article in the United States Naval Institute
Proceedings in Mediterranean operations Allied submarines sank 1,0^1,570 tons of
merchant shipping. They also sank four cruisers, eight destroyers, twenty-one
submarines and nine other warships. This figure was considerably higher than
25$ of the shipping available to the Italian forces at the beginning of their
war operations. A number of German controlled merchant vessels were sunk in the
Mediterranean. It was difficult to determine the actual effectiveness of Allied
submarines, primarily British, in the Mediterranean because there seemed to be
The exception to this statement was the attack on Norway, but the campaign
was practically over before the sea power of Great Britain had a chance to
intervene.
2
Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II
, p. 36^-66.
3
John Gilbert Nigel, "British Submarine Operations in Wo^ld War II," USMIP
Vol. 89, no. 3, March, 1963, p. 79.
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io accurate figures. Admiral Weichold, who commanded the German forces In the
[editcrrancan, noted that convoys to Africa in October 19^1 were becoming more
lifficult for two reasons, aircraft and submarines. Ho made no distinction bo-
,wcen the effectiveness of the two different methods of attack, so it can be as-
turned that submarines vrere causing heavy losses to the German war effort. Malta
.n the Mediterranean played a vital role. It was a base for British submarines
rhen the only other areas in the closed sea were Alexandria and Gibraltar. It
.11owed the submarines a base for refueling and rearming close to the Axis con-
roy routes to North Africa.
British submarines in the Atlantic were used in a totally different manner
md apparently incorrectly. Kuenne stated that the British Admiralty viewed
,he submarine as only an anti-submarine and blockade weapon. The Mediterranean
ras the one place where they were allowed to prove their ability as commerce
2
lestroyers. Using submarines to keep enemy warships from sailing or destroying
,hem on their return to bases proved remarkably ineffective for both sides. The
rerman light cruiser Karlsruhe which was severely damaged by a British submarine
>ff Kristiansand , Norway, in April, 19^0, was the only German war vessel larger
,han a torpedo boat lost to British submarines. It was so severely damaged that
.he Germans sank it. At the same time German U-boats failed to find the carrier
„rk Royal and the battle-cruiser Renown when they were returning from Freetown
.n October, 19^-0. U-boats were sent out on patrol with the special mission of
linking these two major warships. The failure of the Germans to catch a pair
"weichold, War in the Mediterranean
, p. 33.
2
Kuenne, Attack Submarine
, p. 4-.
^Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. k5? and 46l.
Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. I, p. 131.
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of capital ships should have pointed out to the British that using submarines
for special operations against warships was impractical. During the First World
War a number of capital ships were lost to submarines but these were for the
most part in the very beginning of the war before the British understood how to
avoid this type of activity. Had the Admiralty viewed this situation they might
have decided that there were better methods of employing submarines. Throughout
the war British submarines were stationed in the Atlantic where there was little
German or Italian commerce to stop. Surface warships had for all purposes brought
Axis overseas commerce to a halt. British submarines could have been much more
effectively used in the liediterrancan where there was little room for evasive
routing and plenty of targets for the submarines. Major warships were not par-
ticularly vulnerable to submarine attacks. Having the speed necessary to out-
distance a submerged submarine and the gun power to sink a surfaced one easily,
they were very difficult for submarines, in the Atlantic, to attack.
Most of the discussion of offensive capabilities of submarines has been on
their ability to attack commerce ships. A special section of the problems of
attack on warships needs to be included.
Perhaps the best known attack by a submarine on a capital ship was the sink-
ing of Royal Oak in Scapa Flow by Gunther Prien in October, 1939. Not in any
way detracting from the bravery shown by Prien the attack on the British Fleet's
hone base was due to a special set of circumstances not likely to be repeated.
In one of the many passages to Scapa the defenses that were to protect the base
from submarine attack were not completed. Prien managed to slip his submarine
through a small hole in the defenses. It must be realized in October, 1939, that
the defenses of Scapa were not finished and on war footing. Nevertheless the
successful attack caused the British a severe case of jitters and for a time
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they moved the fleet's anchorage to a safer but a lo r.;s suitable location. Also
Royal Oak was an old battleship completed in 19l6 and while in harbor the ship
was not prepared for attack. Large sections of the crew were on leave and water
tight doors and other safety mechanisms were not functionin
.
The other British battleship lost in the Atlantic Theater was Barham. This
ship was a year older than Royal Oak and was sunk during operations off Solium,
Eygpt, in November, 19^1. There was little known about her loss for a number of
reasons. The first was that when struck by a German torpedo, she blew up and
sank within two minutes. Also, the commander of the U-boat reported sinking a
cruiser instead of a battleship and was sunk before he could file a complete
report.
A number of British carriers were lost during the war to submarines. The
first was Courageous , completed in 1917 as a battle-cruiser and rebuilt in 1928
2
as a carrier. While landing planes west of Ireland, she was sunk by a German
submarine. She took two torpedo hits in the machinery rooms in September, 1939.
Korotkin attributed her loss to weak underwater protection which can probably be
3
explained by having been laid down in 1915 as a cruiser.
The carrier Ark Royal , commissioned in 1939 » "was the first British carrier
built as such. This carrier took one torpedo hit in the boiler rooms and due to
a design error, water was able to run through the flues after the ship started to
list. The pumps were able to handle the flow until after nearly making it to
Gibraltar she was attacked by aircraft and sunk.
1
Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II
, p. 1^4.
2
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
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3
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Eap,lo was completed in 192'J-. Escorting a convoy from Gibraltar to Malta
in August, 19^2, sho took four torpedo hits and after remaining afloat for some
time finally sank.
Two out of the three British escort carriers that were lost were sunk by
submarine torpedoes. Audacity (11,000 tons) was lost in the North Atlantic on
21 December, 19^1. Avenger (13 » 785 tons) was lost west of Gibraltar in November,
19'J-2. The only other escort carrier lost in the Atlantic was Dasher which was
lost because of a gasoline explosion west of Scotland.
In the Atlantic during the Second World War eight British cruisers were
3lost to submarines. This amounted to forty percent of the British cruisers
lost in this area during the war. Practically all of the remaining cruisers
were sunk by aerial attack. Tn order of the date of loss by submarine attack
were: Calypso (12 Juno 19^0), south of Crete; Bonavonture , (31 March, 19^1),
south of Crete; Dunedin (29 November, 19^1), South Atlantic; Galatea (19 December,
19^1), off Alexandria; Naiad (11 March, 19-+2), south of Crete; Edinburgh (2 May,
19^2), Barents Sea; Hermoine (l6 June, 19^2), north of Solium; and Penelope (18
February, 19-VO , Anzio. Very obviously cruisers were most vulnerable to sub-
marine attack in the Mediterranean. This was due in large part to the fact
that they were used to escort convoys both as close and long-range protection.
When proceeding with the convoys they were more likely to be torpedoed because
they were proceeding at slower speeds.
As already noted in table V-6 the losses of destroyers because of submarine
attacks in the Atlantic amounted to 26.6^ of the total British destroyers lost
Korotkin, Battle Damage
, p. 9-10.
2
Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy
, p. 2h.
3Ibid
.
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hiring the war. Tho losses of escort vossels amounted to J&,0fjb of the British
sscort ships lost. Submarines were tho most deadly means of attack on escort
/ess els of all typos.
Axis losses because of submarine attack vrere different than Allied. The
jernan light cruiser Karlsruhe was the largest Nazi ship v;hosc loss was attributed
bo a submarine. No German destroyers were lost because of Allied submarines and
Drily two out of 5^ torpedo-boats vrere lost because of submarines.' The submarine
offensive against German warships was not effective. There were considerably
["ewer German vessels to be lost but the percentage figures of German warships
Lost because of submarine attack were so insignificant as to make small difference,
["he explanation for the difference between British and German losses because of
submarines lay not only in the greater emphasis on them by Gentian forces but also
lpon different strategies of employing surface forces. By refusing to sail the
Jerman Navy limited the effective methods of attack that could be used against
It. Generally the only effective means of attacking Gorman surface ships was
through aerial bombardment x^hile they were in port. While no comparative figures
Jere available for the amount of time spent in port between the British and Ger-
uan Navies, it seemed sure that tho British Navy spent more time at sea. Also,
;he British having superiority in surface ships prefcreed to use them to attack
lerman surface vessels. Because of the small number of targets which appeared
>o infrequently the continued use of British submarines in the Atlantic Theater
*as a waste of effort. The Second World War showed that the value of submarines
igainst warships was not veiy great.
The Italian losses because of submarines compared more effectively with
British losses. During the war Italy lost three cruisers and 12 escorts to
htoskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 4.57-461.
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British submarines. Only one of those cruisors was a heavy one. Tronto was
damaged by aircraft and sunk by a submarine east of Kalta in June, 19^2. The
other two losses were the light cruisers Bandenere which was sunk off Strombili
Island in April, 19^2, and Diaz which was sunk off Tunisa in February, 19^1.
According to an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings only eleven and not
2twelve destroyers were lost because of submarine attacks. Bragadin's work in-
cluded all escorts and it was possible that only one smaller escort was lost by
Italian forces. Using Bragadin's figures 50/» of the Italian cruisers sunk were
lost to submarines and 7C$ of the Italian destroyers lost were sunk by underwater
craft. A larger percentage of Italian warships was lost because of submarine
attack but they still were not as great numerically as those suffered by the
British Navy. The same reason for the small number of Italian losses can be
given as was given for the small number of German losses. The larger percentage
of losses suffered by the Italians over the Germans was probably duo to the in-
creased sailing of the Navy and special characteristics of the Mediterranean.
The factors include little room for evasive routing, normally good weather for
aerial reconnaissance, and increased movement of ships.
4. Submarine effectiveness during the Second World War.
So far throughout this paper the submarine has been primarily studied as
an offensive weapon. Its defensive ability was either non-existent or so severely
limited that they have received comparatively little mention. During the invasion
of France there was a heavy concentration of shipping close to the U-boat bases
but they were unable to stop the invasion and caused few losses. The British
Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II
, p. 3&0.
2
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of Italian Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July, 19'l6, p. 1006-9.
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submarine on occasion was used as convoy escort particularly for the Arctic con-
voys when thero was a threat of action by surfaco ships. No successes were re- •
cordod to this means of escort and some difficulties were probably experienced
by the conventional escorts mistaking them for enemy submarines.
While the submarine used in a defensive manner caused few losses they did,
during the First World War, rearrange the strategy of containing the enemy. The
British could not afford to operate a close blockade against the German High
Sea Fleet during the war because of the danger from both submarines and mines.
Throughout centuries the British had closely blockaded enemy, particularly French,
fleets. This strategy was now abandoned after the invention of submarines and
mines; the Allies had to content themselves with the less effective, but safer,
means of long range blockade from Scapa Flew. The phenomenon of great offensive
and minimal defensive power was witnessed during the period between wars. Capt.
Dewar of the Royal Navy recognized that the submarine's power of attack was great
during the 191^- War but its defensive power, even in coastal waters, was small.
Without any question the submarine in the hands of Germany was one of the
most potent naval weapons during the Second World War in the Atlantic. The losses
in all areas of the Atlantic far exceeded those caused by other means, and in
the Atlantic as a whole far exceeded the combination of all means. During the
entire war over 21,000,000 tons of Allied ships were sunk by all means. Of this
1^,500,000 tons were sunk by submarine attacks on merchant shipping. The loss
of men and material because of submarine attacks was phenomenal. By July, 19^-7,
the insurance companies had paid out $217,000,000 with $50,000,000 in claims
See table III-5 which showed two submarines escorting convoy PQ 18 to
Russia.
2
Capt. C. Dewar, "Disarmament and Naval Policy," Brassey T s, 1935 » P. 69.
V?h
outstanding. The purely Monetary losses in no way showed the added suffering
and losses caused by the armies combating Germany. Among other things the typi- .
cal outgoing ship of 10,500 tons carried: 1,820 tons of munitions (bombs and
shells), 1,555 tons of other stores, 88 trucks, J6> tanks, 48 cars (including
both armored cars and jeeps), and 47 guns. This was not a complete listing be-
cause the ship carried cased gasoline and 5 #000 tons of general stores wherever
2
room could be found. It would have been a major battle for the armies if they
had lost the amount of armaments and munitions in a day that a single ship could
lose by being torpedoed. John Creswell was not altogether uncertain that the
submarine did not cost the Allies more effort than it did the Germans.-* There
seems to bo no doubt that the underwater war was immensely expensive to the
Allied cause. Germany with the investment of around a million tons of submarines
caused the loss of 14 times their tonnage in merchant ships alone. Even granted
that warships were a great deal more expensive to build , and submarines per ton
were probably the most expensive of all, the phenomenal losses could not have
been suffered by the Allies for a long time. Had submarines been easily defeated
during the early months of the war the buildup of armaments and munitions in
England for the cross-channol invasion probably would have taken place sooner
than it did. It has, since Mahan, been the theory that guerre de course or
raider war could not be more than a nuisance to the power commanding the sea.
The submarine during the Second World War seems to have rearranged this. As in
*C. H. Spilman, "The German Submarine War," USNIP , Vol. 73. no. 7, July,
19'(7, p. 683.
o
Ministry of Information, Prepared for the Ministry of War Transport, Mer-
chantmen at War, (London: HMS0, 1944), p. 64-5.
<John Cresewell, Sea Warfare, 1939-45 * (London: Longman, Green and Cornea ny,
1950), p. 246.
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World War War I submarines gave the inferior power in surface ships the ability
to launch a counter-blockade. In discussing the effects of the submarine in the
19'l/l- War, Brodie noted that because the submarine and other underwater weapons
were available to inferior powers, which could launch a counter-blockade, the
decision on the sea no longer went to the country with the superior navy. He
predicted in the 19^3 edition of Seapower that it might go to the country which
had the least vulnerable means of communications.' There was no denying that
Britain and other Allies won the sea war, but the war on both land and sea could
not have been won until the submarine menace had been defeated. Had the leaders
of the Jeune Ecol.e been able to predict the tremendous offense of submarines
during World War II they would have been recognized as fortune-tellers. But
their prediction about the ability of small weapons, submarines included, makes
their views a great deal more credible than they had been viewed at the turn of
the century.
Brodie, Seapower in the Machine Age
, p. 328-9.
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Map VI- 2
Illustration of the Loss of U- - I Mi shant Ships September 1939-May 19-^0.
o Merchant ships sunk
+ U-boats sunk
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Map VI--3
Illustration of the Loss of U-Boats and Merchant Ships Juno 19','0- pch 1 c)h\
.
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Map VI- ':
Illustration of the Loss of U--Boats and Merchant Ships Mid-March 19-J-i -Dec ember
19'H.
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lap VI-5
Illustration of the Loss of U-Boats and Merchant Ships January 19^2-July 1
f
.
o Merchant ships sunk
+ U- Boats sunk
Admiralty, Battle of the Atlantic, p. *K)-4i.
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Map VI-6
Illustration of the Loss of D-Boats and Merchant Ships August 19 y 19-'0.
o Merchant ships sunk
+ U-boats sunk
!0C' 90" etr 7tr
60
50
30
20
10
to
X
*s
50' 40' JO' w icr
m^c i =F=
V
9
\ /e*s
fi.T, AjrftUl
r>.
e
* '. ^ \
/o* 20*
«ffiftr
F, R I C A
Admiralty, Pattlo of the Atlantic, p. '1-8-9.
1K1
Map VI- y
Illustration of the Loss of U-Boats and Merchant Ships June 19 b 19^3.
o Merchant ships sunk
+ U-boats sunk
Admiralty, Battle of the Atlantic , p. 66-7.
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Map VJ-8
HI
I Of the Lose of U-Boats and M ant Ships September V
19^1.
o Iic-7 chant ships sun
+ U-boats sunk
ro
to
w <KT W XT ' 40'_
CM%) fir, 1
{ 'J ^ » \iCOM,ki(iun.
j *«r
•*** OTj
v J
(
lr—
"V
/
^z-1
Admiralty, Battle of the Atlantic, p. ?3-4.
183
Map VJ--9
Illustration of the Loss of U-Boats and Merchant Shi] 19Vi-I-Iay 19': 5.
o Merchant ships punk
+ U-boats sunk
Admiralty, Battle of the Atlantic , p. 88~9.
CHA1TER VII
SHIPS AS WEAPONS--
AN EVALUATION OF NAVAL WEAPONS
1, Introduction.
This final chapter attempts to draw together all the significant informa-
tion presented in the foregoing body of the paper. Certain theories have been
presented earlier and this chapter, while not specifically directed at these
theories, attempts by implication to point out the failure during the Second
World War of theory to conform with practice. The one area during the war where
theory was implemented was in the employment of submarines. Admiral Doenitz's
conception of wolf-packs was the one successful implementation of a pre-World
War II theory. This failure of theories to conform with practice may have been
caused because of a lack of this typo study.
Throughout this paper no mention has been made on the morality, political
implications, or usefulness of war. While questions of this nature are becoming
more and more important to the military establishment, this paper is only an at-
tempt to understand the effectiveness of certain weapons of naval warfare. Ques-
tions on the value and nature of war are exceedingly important but they should
not overshadow the employment of weapons.
2. Battleships.
During the Second World War battleships proved that even though no longer
the decisive weapons at sea they were still worthwhile for control of ocean lanes,
Without question the battleship's guns had the power to destroy any surface ship
which could be brought within range. The question of range became the whole
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problem with the use of battl s during the last Atlantic war. Often All
>attleships could not engage even its o\m kind because the Germans, correctly
•ecognizing their limited abilities with surface ships, wore roluetant to sail
:,heir heavy ships without some measure of certainty that they would return. Jn
,he Mediterranean no decisive actions were undertaken by Italian capital ships.
Seldom even in the Mediterranean did the heavy units moot and in all occasions
ihese actions were indecisive. Some success was achieved by capital ships against
.ighter warships, but usually the destruction of the latter could be effected
lore satisfactorily by other means.
The airplane which was so popular during the period before the war, became
in effective weapon because the Germans were reluctant to sortie their capital
;hips. It was interesting to note that Bismark was the only capital ship lost
.n the Atlantic by either side through aerial attacks at sea. All other German
>attleships were either destroyed in their ports by high level bombing or at sea
>y conventional means. Even though many Italian battleships were not permanently
;unk, the attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto launched from aircraft carriers
•earranged the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. It seems logical there-
fore that the effective use of aircraft when attacking battleships was not to
tttack them while at sea, but when they were in port. Aircraft gave the British
idmiralty one advantage it had never possessed before. Prior to the advent of
Lirpower the navy could only blockade ships in port. After aircraft became use-
ful weapons of war they could not only blockade ships but destroy them while they
•emained in port. This was practically the exact reverse of the situation in
;he Pacific. During the Far Eastern War many Japanese capital ships were sunk
Lt sea and the only major attack on a port was the surprise strike at Pearl Har-
)or. The predictions of the airpower enthusiasts before the war nevertheless
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Table VII-1 BATTLESHJ
I
ALLIED AXIS
Battleships Sunk
By Cause
Axis Ships Sunk
By Allied
Battleships
Axis Battleships
Sunk By Cause
Allied Ships
Sunk By
Axis Battleships
Battle- 1
ships
l 1-2x 2 J-2 1
Cruisers 3 1
Destroyers 43
Submarines 2 1*
Mines ?5 ?5
Merchant-
ships
?5 35
Aircraft ?5 ^2 ?5
^Derived from Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. ITT, pt. 1, p. 379-380 and Vol. Ill
pt. 2, ^57-6l and p. 4?3i and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and British ar
Foreign Merchant Ve ssels and German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boats Destroyed , ar
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July 19^6, p. 1002-3 and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Naval Losses," USNIP , Vol. 72, no. 7, July,
19^6 1 p. 1006-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy , and American Warship Losses, an un-
published document possessed and drawn up by the Office of Naval History, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2Half of the credit for the sinking of the German battleship Bismark has be
given to aircraft.
-^Eight German destroyers were sunk by the Warspite and other British destrc
during the Second Battle of Narvik and half of the credit has been given to the
Warspite
.
Sunk by aircraft from the battleship Warspite during the Second Battle of
Narvik.
'information not available.
did not prove to be true in the Atlantic Theater. The battleships with tli
heavily armored decks and speed while at sea were extremely difficult targ<
for aircraft to hit, much less to sink. Also, battleships were deep water ves-
sels which oporated in the vast reachos of the oceans. By remaining long dis-
tances from the coasts the battleship reduced the threat of aerial attack. This
was not possible in the Mediterranean but still in this area there were no bat-
tle ships lost from air attacks at sea. Tho planes that could attack the capital
ships in mid-ocean either had to fly long distances from their bases on shore
or from aircraft carriers. In either case they carried considerably lighter
loads than land based bombers carried to inshore waters. The Atlantic Theater
was strikingly different from the Pacific in this one respect; the influence of
aircraft on surface ships was in port and not at sea.
While the greatest threat to German battleships was the airplane, the great-
est danger to British capital ships was submarines. Two of the three British
battleships lost were sunk by German submarines. While the loss of these ships
did not upset the balance of power in the Atlantic it caused the British some
serious losses which could, not have been sustained for any length of time. Bat-
tleships, because of their vulnerability to submarines, absorbed large numbers
of escort vessels to protect them from this type attack. These escort vessels
could have been more usefully employed in convoy duties.
The greatest asset of battleships during the Second World War in the Atlan-
tic was not what they did but what they could have done. The battleships which
Germany possessed caused a severe dislocation of Allied forces. By playing the
role of the "fleet-in-being" the Germans not only tied down large numbers of
British battleships, but also the escort vessels needed to protect them. Their
usefulness in this respect was noticed even by that arch-advocate of submarine
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warfare, Admiral Doenitz, who, after he took cotmnand of the German Navy in
January 19^3, convinced Hitler that scrapping the battleships would have be-
unwise.
The battloship's usefulness during the Second World War in the Atlantic was
not commerce raiding but the threat of co;nmerce raiding. This tied down a large
number of enemy forces, but this was a double-edged sword. In the years since
the Second World War the battleship has passed out of sight because the means
to attack them have developed greatly. Also, its effectiveness compared to other
means of attack has decreased greatly. The proof of the danger to battleships
lies not in the Atlantic Theater but in the Pacific. The battleship in the At-
lantic during the Second World War was by no means the most effective weapon,
but neither was it the least effective.
3. Cruisers.
Cruisers which Richmond argued for so strenuously before the x-rar were prob-
ably the least effective warship during the war. Richmond was overly concerned
about the threat of German pocket-battleships and merchant raiders. Ke thought
large numbers of small cruisers would adequately protect the oceangoing corji-erce
of Great Britain. The small cruisers which he advocated would have been able
to combat disguised merchant cruisers which Germany from time to time sent on
attack but a single heavy cruiser of nearly 10,000 tons with eight-inch guns
could not defeat the heavily armed pocket-battleships.
The purposes of the cruiser according to Edward Altham were to scout for
the battle fleet and to protect the sea lanes. Before considering their effec-
tiveness in this role one more type of employment should be discussed. During
Captain Edward Altham, "Cruisers," Encyclopedia Britannica
,
(Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 19'0), Vol. 6, p. ?68.
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peacetime cruisers sailed from port to port "showing tho flag." This action
fas supposed to remind all nations of the strength of the navy using cruisers
•tnd the importance of sea power. In other words this type of action was a pro-
paganda show. The tragedy of cruisers was that they were mostly show and little
force. It seemed irresponsible for governments to place importance on cruisers
for peacetime activity when they in fact had no power in war.
Returning to the cruiser's activity during war, it was a remarkably inef-
fective weapon. Admittedly it could protect the commercial sea lanes from at-
tacks by some German surface raiders, but since one country's defensive weapons
nust be determined in a large part by the other's offensive weapons the construc-
tion of cruisers for this purpose was not worthwhile. The German commerce raid-
i
!
3rs of the type of the Graf Spec were relatively invulnerable to attack by British
:ruisers. The cruiser carried few if any depth charges or underwater weapons
md was not a very efficient means of destroying German submarines. Scouting
for the surface fleet was taken over during the latter part of the war by air-
planes. Consequently the cruiser's effectiveness diminished. Airplanes could
:over thousands of square miles from their higher altitude and faster speeds
fhere cruisers could cover only that area which could be seen from the deck of
i comparatively slow moving ship. The one advantage in scouting cruisers had
Dver the airplanes was that they could remain on the scene for several hours,
3ven days, as proved by the Bismark episode. Also, cruisers could be looking
for targets when aircraft could not because of weather. But during the war, with
the advent of airborn radar and other mechanisms, airplanes in the scouting role
increased in effectiveness while the cruiser's role remained relatively unchanged.
The cruiser was vulnerable to nearly every type of attack that was employed.
V number were sunk by mines and several were lost because of air attack during
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Tabic VII-2. CRUISERS'
ALLIED AXIS
Crui sers Sunk By Axis Ships Sunk By Axis Cruisers Allied Ships Sunk
Cause Allied Cruisers Sunk By Cause By Axis Cruisers
fettle- 1 3
ships
Cruisers 2
Destroyers 83 ^i2*-2 1*
Mines 1 ?5 ?5
Submarines 8 3i6
Merchant- 8
ships
Aircraft & v> ill-6 ?5
Derived from Roskill, War at Sea . Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 379-380 and Vol. Ill
pt 2, 'l57-6l and p. ^73 » and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and British and
Foreign Merchant Vessels and German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boats Destroyed , an
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July 19^6, p. 1002-3 and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Naval Losses," USNIP , Vol. 72, no. 7, July,
19^6, p. 1006-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy , and American Warship Losses, an un-
published document possessed and drawn up by the Office of Naval History, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Shared by cruisers and destroyers northwest of Crete, 19 August, 19^1.
Folop;oro shared by destroyers and cruisers 2 December, 19^2, and Fulmine
shared by destroyers and cruisers, 9 November, 19^1. One-half credit has been
given to each cause.
HI'S Glowworm sunk while ramming the German cruiser Hipper .
Information not available.
Tronto was shared by aircraft and submarines June 15, 19^-2.
7
The British cruiser York was shared by aircraft and an explosive motor boa
22 may, 19^1.
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operations around Crete. Cruisers wore no moro able to attack submarines than
battleships and because they were smaller were moro vulnerable to effects of
torpedoes. During the 191^- War cruisers had been part of the battle line, but
during the most rocent war cruisers could not withstand the impact of the bat-
tleships and were usually withdrawn until the fighting was over. This docs not
mean that cruisers never fought battleships. When they did it was usually only
to protect a convoy and against a determined and skillfully led force of battle-
ships, cruisers stood a veiy good chance of being destroyed.
Cruisers, during various periods in the war, played the role of commerce
destroyers and "fleets-in-boing" because they could sink a large number of mer-
chant ships if they found an unescorted convoy. British cruisers in the Medi-
terranean and Gorman cruisers in the Atlantic were employed in just such roles
but in neither area were they the most deadly forms of attacking merchant fleets.
During the Second World War in the Atlantic cruisers were neither the most
effective means of protecting nor destroying commerce, nor were they an efficient
means of scouting for the fleet. Cruisers could not compete with battleships,
and were easily destroyed by other means of attack. During the last war, cruisers,
even more than battleships, proved their ineffectiveness as a weapon of naval war-
fare.
*h Escorts.
Destroyers and other escort vessels which were overlooked during the period
betx-reen the wars proved to be some of the most valuable weapons in the Allied
naval arsenal. Without destroyers the heavier, and supposedly more powerful ships
of the fleet, were defenseless. It seemed evident, though the fact was often
overlooked, that defense requirements of one country were primarily decided by
the offensive capabilities of the supposed enemy. Since the submarine had been
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Gormany's destructive naval weapon in World War I, the method by which these
craft could be counter-attacked should have been the primary con.cid* of
the British 'aval Staff daring the interwar years. The Admiralty was perhaps
too much imbued vrith Mahan's philosophy which declared that a war against com-
merce could not be successful. As was so often evident in these matters, the
only tiling they concerned themselves vrith was the easy problem of defeating the
enemy's surface forces with their correspondingly heavier surface forces. The
Admiralty and some of the naval writers of the period between the wars (primarily
Richmond) spent a great deal of thought developing the counter-attack method
necessary to destroy the German Navy's surface vessels. Little effort was spent
considering how submarines could best be destroyed. Part of the sense of security
may havo arisen from over-confidence in the abilities of underwater detection
gear and a failure to correctly predict the tactical plans of future operations
with submarines.
During the early period of the war escorts were, without question, the most
effective means of destroying submarines and consequently protecting coiomerce.
During the latter half of the war it was necessary to share the honors with air-
craft, but while the kills of submarines by escorts alone fell, the value of
escorts as commerce protectors remained stable. With the increase of available
escorts, convoys were sufficiently protected and hunter-killer groups were orga-
nized. The close escort of convoys was probably the more valuable method of
employing escort vessels even though the latcer method had much to recommend it.
Escorting convoys was purely a defensive measure which made it difficult for sub-
marines to attack their targets. If submarines had withdrawn from attacking con-
voys, few of them would havo been destroj'ed. This retreat would have accomplisl
the immediate task of protecting the ships from submarines. On the other hand,
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Tahlo VIJ--3. ESCORTS
ALLIED AXIS
Allied Destroyers
S\ink By Causo
Axis Ships
Sunk By
Allied Destroyers
Axis Destroyers
Sunk By Cause
Allied Ships- Sunk
Because of Axis
Destroyers
Battle- 3
ships
$
n . .,4Cruisers 1 4.102 85
Destroyers 10 14 143-5
Submarines 59 30&1
6
711 17
Mines 31 1* 98 ?7
Merchant-
ships
?7 o*
Aircraft 52 ?7 27 ?7
1Derived from Roskill, War at Sea , Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 379-380 and Vol. Ill,
pt. 2, ^57-61 and p. 473, and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy, and British and
Foreign Merchant Vessels and German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boats Destroyed , and
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP
.
Vol. 72, no. 7, July 1946, p. 1002-3 and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Naval Losses," USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July,
1946, p. 1006-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy , and American Warship Losses, an un-
published document possessed and dravm up by the Office of Naval History, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2
The losses for Allied destroyers include not only destroyers but also frigates,
sloops and corvettes.
-'Eight were sunk during the Second Battle of Narvik, April 13, 1940, but be-
cause of the presence of the battleship Warspite only one-half credit has been
given for each of the destroyers lost during this battle.
x-loinrorm sunk while ramming the German cruiser Hipper , 8 April, 1940.
^Folo.^ore (2/12/42) and Fulmine (9/ll/4l) shared by cruisers and destroyers;
half of the credit has been given to each.
Forty-six German submarines were shared with aircraft and only half credit
has been given to the destroyers. Five Italian submarines were shared between
escort vessels and only half the credit has been given to the escorts.
19**
Table VJI-3 continued.
'Information not available.
o
On February 20, 19'J-O, two German destroyers \;ere attacked by accident by
German aircraft and ran into a British minefield while taking avoiding action.
'Since this listing only includes those ships over 1,000 gross tons none
have been recorded as having been lost because of Axis destroyer attacks.
^•^Colleoni shared by cruisers and destroyers northwest of Crete.
HAccording to Roskill, War at Sea , and Bragadin, Italian Navy , the Italian
destroyer Libeccie was sunk by a submarine 11 September, 19^-1. According to the
official recapitulation of losses for the Italian Navy it was sunk in a surface
action the same day.
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submariner, of sufficient range would have been able to renew the attack when
escorts were withdrawn from the convoys. Hunter-killer groups were more effec-
tive at removing the threat to convoys. They had the ability to destroy sub-
marines in any local. Also, they kept the pressure on the submarine crews.
If the first task was to sink submarines, hunter-killer groups should have been
emphasized. If on the other hand the primary duty of escort vessels was com-
merce protection, it was proper to place the primary emphasis on close escort
of convoys. Once enough vessels were present to satisfactorily accomplish both
jobs then groups which hunted submarines were warranted.
As was obvious, from the chart concerning the loss of destroyers, the great-
est threat to British escort craft was Axis submarines. This was logical be-
cause their duty was to hunt down these submarines and they were consequently
in close contact with them. The second most successful weapon against Allied
escorts was aircraft. This was true because destroyers did not have the heavy
armor and anti-aircraft armament which their larger brethern possessed.
Axis destroyer losses were just about equally divided between surface at-
tack and aerial attack which brought up an interesting question. Most of the
destroyers lost by surface action were German destroyers in the Atlantic. Kost
of the destroyers lost by aerial attack were Italian vessels in the Mediterranean.
This seemed to indicate that against small vessels the Mediterranean was the more
opportune area for air power to exert its force. Also, it seems to show that
while the German battleships were content to remain in harbor and be steadily
destroyed by aerial attack, the lighter, and more expendable craft, were out
challenging Allied inshore traffic.
While naval leaders complained of a shortage of destroyers, they were ex-
pendable and used for many non-vital tasks. Capital ships were too valuable to
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bo risked on many of the jobs that destroyers were given. This included com-
mando raids and other hazardous operations. Thus it seemed that destroyers
could perform nearly any task and still be prime surface weapons to destroy the
attackers of British commerce, U-boats. Destroyers could perform any job on a
version scaled down to fit its size that the heavier ships, except aircraft
carriers, could do. Destroyers, one of the small weapons of the Jeune Ecole
,
were without doubt the most useful and important of the surface v/eapons used
in the Atlantic during the last war by the Allied navies.
5. Submarines.
Submarines, which because of the nature of the German naval position were
their primary naval weapon, were in terms of Allied ships sunk the most success-
ful naval weapon of the war. The offensive capabilities of this weapon, which
was not new and had more or less shown its abilities in the 191^ War, had been
ignored by the great sea powers during the period between the wars. This was
due in large part to a misunderstanding about the operational qualities of the
new German U-boats. A sense of security about the threat which these weapons
presented was developed in England during the long armistice. Because of the
development of electronic detecting gear it was thought that submarines were no
longer effectively able to destroy large amounts of Allied merchant shipping.
Submarines, like all other weapons mentioned so far in this summary chapter,
exerted their greatest influence in the deep waters of the mid-Atlantic. Even
though large numbers of merchant ships were sunk in the shallow waters off England
and the United States, by far the largest number were sunk in deep waters. This
phenomenon may bo partially explained by methods of hunting submarines in shallow
water. Offensive patrols hunting submarines in shallow water were in areas whore
traffic was thickest and had the offect of convoying the merchantmen into port.
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If tho ships were attacked on their passage through coastal waters, very often
there was an escort nearby to come to their aid. Even with addition 3 new in-
ventions tho submarine's greatest offensive threat was In the mid-Atlantic.
Submarines while remarkably well adapted to destroying merchant ships were
not particularly well suited for sinking warships. This was because warships
had sufficient means of defending themselves. Even in this field they achieved
some notable successes, sinking two Allied battleships and eight cruisers. Part
of tho explanation for the Axis success against AHicd warships was found in the
increased numbers of Allied ships at sea. The Allied submarine effort against
Axis warships did not prove as successful. In neither case was the submarine a
valuable weapon against warships. Allied warships sunk by submarines can best
be described as targets of opportunity.
The submarine's greatest enemy was either aircraft or escorts depending on
the period of World War II under consideration. Until the middle of 19^3* escorts
were practically the sole method of destroying Axis submarines. After this air-
craft, which had been equipped with radar and longer range, superceded escorts
in effectiveness and destroyed larger numbers than escorts had during the earlier
years of the war. In the 191^ War mines had destroyed nearly as many submarines
as escorts, but during the war their role was drastically reduced because of
changes made in where German submarines could escape to the ocean.
6. Mines.
The major influence of mines during the Second World War in the Atlantic
was not so much what they did, but what they denied the enemy the ability to do.
The mine was the one weapon which unless destroyed closed an area during all
types of weather and throughout the full year. This was because mines were
different in one essential respect from other weapons of naval warfare which
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Tabic VIi . :
ALLIES AXIS
Allied Submarines s Ships Sunk By Axis Submarines Allied Ships Sunk
Lost By Cause Allied Submarines Sunk By Cause By Axis Submarines
Battle- 1* 2
Ships
Cruisers 3 8
Destroyers 17 11 3o&i 59
Submarines 4 40 40 4
Kines 22 ? 3 3&i
6 ?*
ilerchant- 1042 1,209
ships
Aircraft 4 ?3 7329' ?3
1Derived from Roskill, War at Sea . Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 379-330 and Vol. Ill,
pt. 2, 457-61 and p. 473, and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and British arr?
Foreign Ilerchant Vessels and German, Italian, and Japanese U-boats Destroyed , 1
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July 1946, p. 1002-3 and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Naval Losses," U3HIP. Vol. 72, no. 7, July,
1946, p. IOO0-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy, and American Warship Losses, an un-
published document possessed and drawn up by the Office of Naval Histoi'y, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2
This figure is only those Axis ships which were lost in the Home Theater.
3
^Information not available.
4
Sunk by aircraft from HKS Warspite
.
^Forty-six German submarines and five Italian submarines were shared between
escort vessels and aircraft and only half credit has been given to escort vessels.
One submarine was shared between mines and aircraft.
n
Five Italian submarines which were shared (see footnote five) with surface
c^-cift and the one shared with mines accounts for the whole number instead of one-
half.
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have been discussed in this paper. Battle-ships and other surface craft, sub-
marines, and aircraft were all just dolivory systems. Tho destroyer's purposo
was to deliver depth charges accurately; the battleship's high explosive shells;
the aircraft's bombs and torpedoes; and tho submarine's torpedoes. The mine
itself was the weapon. The mine did the destruction whereas other weapons only
delivered shells, torpedoes, or bombs. This, of course, pointed out one of tho
main handicaps of mines. The target, with few exceptions, had to come to the
mine and not the other way around.
It was interesting to note that tho Germans achieved much less success with
their mines than Allied powers. This phenomenon was partially explained by the
success of the British in discovering the principle by which the Axis magnetic
mines were detonated and consequently developing sufficient counter-measures
.
Since this explanation is only partial, other reasons must have played a part
in the success of the British minelaying campaign. Part of the explanation of
the phenomenon lied in the statistics themselves. The losses of Allied ships
because of mines listed only those ships which were over 1,000 tons. In Roskill's
listing all types and sizes of Axis vessels were included.' Even though the
Allies lost fewer ships their tonnage sunk was greater than the German tonnage
lost because of mines. The Axis powers in the Home Theater lost 660,533 tons
of merchant shipping to the Allied total of 857,611 tons. Therefore, it seems
logical that the table was partially in error but the figures that Roskill gave
were the only ones available.
Few warships were sunk by mines as compared with other means but this was
perhaps not mines primary purpose. The mine attack against warships was directed
Roskill, War at Sea
. Vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. ^73.
2
Ibid , and Admiralty, British and Foreign Merchant Vessels
.
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Table VII-5. 3S1
ALLIED AXIS
Allied Mines ~
Destroyed By Cause
Axis Ships Sunk
By Allied Mines
Axis Mines
Destroyed By Cause
Allied ships sunk
By Axis Mines
Battle- ?
ships
?
Cruisers ? ? 1
Destroyers ? 20 ? 31
Submarines ? 3^-3 ? 22
Mines (r 05 o5 0*
Merchant- ?
ships
60'^ ? 199
Aircraft ? o5 ? o5
1Derived from Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 379-380 and Vol. Ill,
pt. 2, p. b57-6l and p. **73, and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy and British and
Foreign Merchant Vessels and German, Italian, and Japanese U-Boats Destroyed , and
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July, 19^6, p. 1002-3, and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Losses," USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July, 19^,
p. 1006-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy , and American Warship Losses, an unpublis 1
document possessed and drawn up by the Office of Naval History, Office of the
Chief of Naval. Operations.
2
These columns are rather meaningless. There is no published record covering
the entire war which gives the number of mines destroyed according to the method
by which they were detonated or otherwise rendered inoperable but certain lower
limitations could bo placed on the number destroyed. For example unless two Allied
merchant ships wore sunk by the same mines it is possible to assune that 60'j- mines
were exploded by merchant ships. The problem arises when it is understood the many
times the striking or detonating of a mine did not sink the ship.
^One was shared between aircraft and mines.
In Home Theater only.
->It is highly doubtful that any aircraft were destroyed by mines as it is
doubtful that any mines were destroyed by mines but not entirely impossible. If
an aircraft was flying at low altitude with a magnetic device to detonate mines
the blast could possibly destroy the aircraft. In any case the figures are not
available.
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in changing their movcmonts and denyin them certain passages to o] . Also
mines forced enemy ships into certain passages where they were more vulnerable
to other means of attack. Mines vroro supposed to play a major role in stop})'
the invasion of Franco during 19^, but wore uncessful. Part of the explana-
tion for thoir failure was due to Hitler's unwillingness to allow the sowing of
new pressure mines and part was due to the extensive Allied sweeping measures.
It also seems that mines were effective against single ships or in denying pas-
sage to a few important vessels. When an enemy was determined to force a passage
through a small area their effectiveness diminished. In part this was because
leading ships set off the mines and consequently were sunk, while the following
ships were then assured a safe passage through the fields. Also, during the last
war mines in large defensive fields were remarkably unsuccessful. The most re-
markable failure was the Iceland-Faroes Passage. The mine which had commonly
been viexxed throughout the Twentieth Century as a defensive weapon had become
a major offensive weapon in a guerre de course.
7. Merchant Ships.
Merchant ships, usually peaceful carriers, could hardly be called weapons
of war except in one sense; they supplied all offensive and defensive weapons
of countries which depended solely on their use. It may .well be that the warships
controlled the oceans, but if a country such as England could not import and ex-
port supplies the warships became useless masses of metal which could not play
a part in the war at sea. Mahan was throughly convinced that while the merchant
marine was one of the assets of sea power, an enemy whose primary purpose was to
attack merchant ships would more than likely lose the war. Warships, powerful
and destructive as they were, would have been totally helpless without the sup-
port and munitions which the merchantmen brought to them and their country. Since
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the inerchant vessels could not adequately protect themselves, it was necessary
for warships to protect them.
Some countries could more easily do without a fleet since they did not
necessarily need the commerce which came in from overseas, but for those whose
ability to make war was determined by the amount of overseas transport the mer-
chant floet and the military fleet were closely connected.
8. Aircraft.
The air power advocates predicted that a country could easily be destroyed
by strategic bombing. The Second World War seems to have disproved this theory.
The effect of strategic bombing did not become apparent in German submarine con-
struction until the end of 19^. There was no telling how many more submarines
would have been built had there never been a strategic bombing campaign against
Germany, but there was no let up in production until nearly the end of the war.
Other factors, such as occupation of the production facilities by the advancing
armies could have just as easily influenced the decrease in U-boat construction.
Air power enthusiasts were also proven wrong when Hitler failed to conquer England
purely through the use of aircraft. If men like Douhet and Trenchard had been
correct in their interpretation of the ability of air power to dominate, there
would have been no need for a navy or a naval war. The essential thesis of many
of the surveys of strategic bombing after the war was how the advocates of stra-
tegic bombing had overstated their claims.
Aircraft in the undetermined field between strategic and tactical bombing
did prove their value when correctly applied. This field in tho naval theater
was the bombing of ports and harbors in attempts to destroy ships that were al-
ready completed there. Admittedly they were unable to sink Sgharnhorst , Gneise-
nau, and later Prina Bugen , but they did manage to keep them immobilized for a
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Table VII-6. AIRCRAFT1
ALLIED AXIS
Allied Aircraft Lost
By Cause
Axis Ships Sunk By
Allied Aircraft
Axis Aircraft
Lost By Cause
Allied Ships Sunk
By Axis Aircraft
Battle-
ships
?
2
«tf ?
2
Cruise: -s ?2 IIP ?2 <*7
Destroyers ? 2 27 ?2 52
Submarines ? 2 3296 ?2 h
Mines ? 2 ? 2
Merchant-
ships
?
2
509 ?
2
267
Aircraft |3 ?3 ?3 ?3
derived from Roskill, War at Spa. Vol. Ill, pt. 1, p. 379-380 and Vol. Ill,
pt. 2, 457-61 and p. ^73» and Admiralty, Ships of the Royal Navy , and British and
Foreign Merchant Vessels and German
f
Italian
f
and Jamnese U-boats Destroyed, and
Navy Department Press Release, "Official Recapitulation of German Naval Losses,"
USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July 19-^6, p. 1002-3 and Navy Department Press Release,
"Official Recapitulation of Italian Naval Losses," USNIP, Vol. 72, no. 7, July,
19^6, p. 1006-9, and Bragadin, Italian Navy, and American Warship Losses, an un-
published document possessed and drawn up by the Office of Naval History, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Information not available.
•^While the losses of aircraft because of other aircraft are available, they
do not tell whether the aircraft lost vrere lost in attacking naval targets or
other operations.
Half of the credit for the sinking of Blsmark has been given to aircraft.
^Trento was shared between aircraft and submarines, 15 June, 19^2.
Five Italian submarines were shared by ships and aircraft and another was
shared with a mine which allowed for the whole number of submarines lost.
'York was shared between aircraft and an explosive motor boat, 22 May, 19^-1.
2C4
long time. Finally they were forced by aircraft to make the reckless dash up
the English Channel. A largo number of submarines were destroyed while still
tied to their docks. In this manner aircraft contributed significantly to the
successful conclusion of the sea war by the Allies.
The final and most successful employment of aircraft was their use in hunt-
ing down submarines at sea. Whether they were employed in convoy escorts or
hunter-killer groups made little difference. Once aircraft were equipped with
10 cm. radar and a satisfactory method of attacking submarines, they achieved
notable successes. In this and virtually all types of employment dealing with
sea power aircraft, the archetype offensive weapon, was acting in a semi-defen-
sive manner.
Aircraft were best used in a tactical manner. While numerous groups argued
throughout the war for the increasing employment of aircraft in attacks on Ger-
man industry instead of combating U-boats, all these strategic attacks were a
detriment to the British naval effort. Perhaps the Axis military effort could
have been ruined had the strategic offensive been given sole attention, but it
was very likely that the war would have been lost long before then. It was ab-
solutely mandatory for England to maintain its lines of communication with the
United States and the Empire in order to insure her continued war effort. While
attention was being given to destroying the Axis war economy, England, given pro-
per circumstances, might have been starved into surrender. The airplane which
could not effectively destroy the ships which theorists had predicted, was more
than adequate in destroying the one weapon which naval writers had ignored, sub-
marines. Once submarines had been defeated and British lines of communication
secured, increasing attention could be paid to the German war economy. But it
was first necessary for aircraft to be employed against that form of attack which
most threatened Allied communications
.
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Carriers during the war in the Atlantic did not become the "Queen of Battl'
"
as they had in the Pacific. They wero used with great effectiveness to track
down battleships. So seldom were thoy employed in this activity that their im-
portance was more of a threat than an actuality. They were also methods of tak-
ing planes to the areas where submarines were concentrating. This was duo to
the fact that in some areas long range aircraft could not patrol. Carriers 1
power was minimal without aircraft and by themselves were vulnerable to other
forms of attack.
Aircraft during the Second World War became another factor in naval power
which needed to be reckoned with. Their influence was greater than some and
not as great as others had predicted.
9. Conclusion.
Throughout this chapter and the tables included in it (VII-1, VII-2, VII-3,
VII-^-, VII~5» VII-6) it will be noticed that there were six types of weapons that
could sink ships; battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mines, and air-
craft and conversely there were five types of ships that could be sunk; battle-
ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines and merchant ships. In each class of
ship that could be sunk the most effective weapon for that class had been given
an arbitrary score of six points, the next more effective five points and so on
until the least effective was given one point. A number of times certain weap-
ons had to share the honors as to the position into which they fell. For example
if battleships, cruisers, and destroyers tied for fourth, fifth and sixth places
the total number of points left was prorated among them. In this example the
three weapons receivod two points each. By employing this method an arbitrary
way of determining the effectiveness of weapons has been reached. The total num-
ber of points available was 105 but no single weapon could receive more than thirty
points.
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Allied weapons in terms of their relative effectiveness against Axis ships
were: aircraft first with 29 points, submarines and destroyers tied for second •
with 17 points each, mines fourth with 16 points, battleships fifth with 1^- points,
and cruisers last with 12 points. This showed that for the defense of the British
Empire and tho other Allied communications aircraft were by far the most effec-
tive weapon used by the Allies in tho Atlantic during the Second World War. The
tie between submarines and destroyers was most unusual becauso it has been assumed
that the submarine was an Axis weapon and the destroyer an Allied one. The situa-
tion of equality arose because destroyers were remarkably effective at sinkj?
submarines but apparently useless for sinking other types of craft. Submarines
on the other hand were valuable for a few cases, but unlike destroyers were use-
ful in attacking other types of ships besides merchant ships. Nines, battleships,
and cruisers were all so close together that not many meaningful judgments can
be made about them without encountering the difficulties of relative effectiveness
in the targets that were being attacked.
Axis weapons in terms of relative effectiveness against Allied ships were:
first submarines with 27§ points, aircraft second with 21 points, mines third
with 20|- points, destroyers fourth with 13i points, battleships fifth with llf
points, and cruisers last with 9 points. Submarines turned out to be the most
effective weapon in tho Axis naval aresnal. Next came aircraft, then mines which
were supposed to be Hitler's secret weapons came in a close third. The next three
weapons in order of the effectiveness were destroyers, battleships, and cruisers.
By adding the two scores for the Axis and Allied weapons a figure which de-
picted the entire war was derived. Aircraft came in first with 50 points, sub-
marines second with *&§ points, mines third with 3&2 points, destroyers fourth
with 3^2 points, battleships fifth with 25|- points and cruisers last with 21
points.
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Those conclusions shovjed that a number of theories about tho conduct of
naval war were correct. In general tho theories supported by tho ovidence were
those of the Jcuno Ecole . Only one of the throe leading weapons—aircraft—hi
been seriously studied during the period between the war. A number of faults
in the ideas of the airpower pundits can be pointed out but for the most part
those were errors of emphasis. Admiral Doenitz of the German submarine arm
seemed to have been one of the few naval intellectuals that had correctly applied
the lessons of the First World War. Mines as weapons of naval warfare had been
ignored by practically all parties in their strategical and tactical studies.
In the introduction it was suggested that the theories of the Juene Ecole
had supplanted those of Kahan. The creation of weapons which either did not
exist at the time of these two schools or were only in their rudimentary forms
changed the nature of sea warfare dramatically. No longer could naval war be
fought in two dimensions—Mahan described the sea as a broad plain—but small
weapons which operated in three dimensions changed significantly tho nature of
naval war during the Second World War. The First World War was the great finale
of two dimensional warfare. Hitler's war may have ushered in a new era of three
dimensional combat. It may be necessary to view war differently and the evi-
dence of the theories between the wars seems to support the observation that
naval theorists did not understand the complex changes caused by the change in the
nature of battle.
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The purpose of this paper has been to analyse particular aspects of naval
operations in the Atlantic Theater during the Second World War. An attempt has
been made not only to describe the method of employing naval weapons but also to
judge their effectiveness in a statistical manner. In certain cases such de-
scriptions have been either difficult or impossible because of insufficient in-
formation.
There are a number of historical studies which describe battles and cam-
paigns, but fev; attempts have been made to analyse the effectiveness of the
weapons employed. Prior to World War II a number of speculations were made
about the effectiveness of weapons in the next war. Some of these proved true
and some false, but in nearly all cases little or no study was attempted to
describe the effectiveness of weapons in the First World War. Because of a lack
of understanding about the effectiveness of weapons in World War I a number of
mistakes were made about the most useful weapon. Richmond's faith in the cruiser
appeared to be one area where such a study would have been useful.
Both sides has certain misconceptions about the course of the next war.
England expected the support of France to continue throughout the war. The sud-
den failure of the French armies cast an entirely different light on the naval
war which England carried on, Germany, on the other hand, felt that the war
would be short and, consequently, they did not need to concern themselves with
a naval force. The events of the Second World War showed both of these views
to be wrong. Further it seemed that Germany could afford to take chances on new
developments in weapons because they were no dependent on the sea for survival.
England, on the other hand, could not survive unless she controlled the sea and
was therefore more conservative in her naval policies.
This paper attempted to resolve a number of problems in each major category
of weapons throughout the war. They have been analysed by chapters according to
type of weapon or delivery system: mines, aircraft, battleships, other surface
ships, and finally submarines. By using a statistical method, aircraft were
found to be the most effective weapon of naval warfare. While this agreed with
a number of predictions made by airpower enthusiasts it had certain flaws in it.
They predicted that their weapons would be useful for destroying capital ships.
While aircraft did destroy a number of battleships in the Atlantic, this destruc-
tion was not accomplished as easily as they had predicted. Aircraft achieved
their greatest success in a field which was ignored during the period between
the wars. Airplanes were found to be an excellent weapon for the destruction of
submarines and achieved some success in attacks on ports and shipping.
The next most effective weapons in order of declining importance were: sub-
marines, mines, destroyers, battleships, and cruisers. Submarines, mines and de-
stroyers were ignored by naval intellectuals during the period between the wars.
Battleships received a great deal of attention because they were no longer con-
sidered useful weapons. This idea was caused partially by the stalemate at Jut-
land, Cruisers, which were Richmond's favorite naval weapon, proved to be the
least effective of all.
The proper value of weapons could not be reached until studies dealing with
the operation of weapons had been completed. This paper which it reached a num-
ber of conclusions about the effectiveness of weapons is basically a experiment
in this type of analysis. If this paper loses its value it does so because of
technological or political change, but this does not remove its value as a method
of historical analysis.

